NY Times Interview with Michael Ruse on Does Evolution Explain Religious Beliefs?

Here is a pretty good interview with Michael Ruse on Does Evolution Explain Religious Beliefs

This is the eighth in a series of interviews about religion that I am conducting for The Stone. The interviewee for this installment is Michael Ruse, a professor of philosophy at Florida State University and the author of the forthcoming book “Atheism: What Everyone Needs to Know.”

Gary Gutting: What do you think of the claim that scientific accounts provide all the explanations needed to understand the existence and nature of the world, so that there’s no need to posit God as the ultimate explanation?

I don’t think science can explain everything. As far as I am concerned, if you want God to have a crack at the job, go right ahead!

 

Michael Ruse: Let me start at a more general level by saying that I don’t think science as such can explain everything. Therefore, assuming that the existence and nature of the world can be fully understood (I’m not sure it can!), this is going to require something more than science. As far as I am concerned, if you want God to have a crack at the job, go right ahead!

G.G.: Could you say a bit more about why you think that science can’t fully explain everything?

M.R.: In my view, none of our knowledge, including science, just “tells it like it is.” Knowledge, even the best scientific knowledge, interprets experience through human cultural understanding and experience, and above all (just as it is for poets and preachers) metaphor is the key to the whole enterprise. As I developed my own career path, as a historian and philosopher of evolutionary biology, this insight grew and grew. Everything was metaphorical — struggle for existence, natural selection, division of labor, genetic code, arms races and more.

G.G.: It’s clear that metaphors are useful when scientists try to explain complex ideas in terms that nonscientists can understand, but why do you think metaphors have an essential role in the development of scientific knowledge?

M.R.: Because metaphor helps you move forward. It is heuristic, forcing you to ask new questions. If your love is like a rose, what color is the rose? But note that it does so at a cost. A metaphor puts blinkers on us. Some questions are unanswerable within the context of the metaphor. “My love is a rose” tells me about her beauty. It does not tell me about her mathematical abilities.

Now combine this fact with history. Since the scientific revolution, one metaphor above all — the root metaphor — has dictated the nature and progress of science. This is the metaphor of the world as a machine, the mechanical metaphor. What questions are ruled out by this metaphor? One is about ultimate origins. Of course you can ask about the origins of the metal and plastics in your automobile, but ultimately the questions must end and you must take the materials as given. So with the world. I think the machine metaphor rules out an answer to what Martin Heidegger called the “fundamental question of metaphysics”: Why is there something rather than nothing? Unlike Wittgenstein, I think it is a genuine question, but not one answerable by modern science.

Coming now to my own field of evolutionary biology, I see some questions that it simply doesn’t ask but that can be asked and answered by other areas of science. I think here about the natural origins of the universe and the Big Bang theory. I see some questions that it doesn’t ask and that neither it nor any other science can answer. One such question is why there is something rather than nothing, or if you like why ultimately there are material substances from which organisms are formed.

G.G.: So do you think that we need religion to answer the ultimate question of the world’s origin?

M.R.: If the person of faith wants to say that God created the world, I don’t think you can deny this on scientific grounds. But you can go after the theist on other grounds. I would raise philosophical objections: for example, about the notion of a necessary being. I would also fault Christian theology: I don’t think you can mesh the ancient Greek philosophers’ notion of a god outside time and space with the Jewish notion of a god as a person. But these are not scientific objections.

G.G.: What do you think of Richard Dawkins’s argument that, in any case, God won’t do as an ultimate explanation of the universe? His point is that complexity requires explanation — the whole idea of evolution by natural selection is to explain the origin of complex life-forms from less complex life-forms. But a creator God — with enormous knowledge and power — would have to be at least as complex as the universe he creates. Such a creator would require explanation by something else and so couldn’t explain, for example, why there’s something rather than nothing.

M.R.: Like every first-year undergraduate in philosophy, Dawkins thinks he can put to rest the causal argument for God’s existence. If God caused the world, then what caused God? Of course the great philosophers, Anselm and Aquinas particularly, are way ahead of him here. They know that the only way to stop the regression is by making God something that needs no cause. He must be a necessary being. This means that God is not part of the regular causal chain but in some sense orthogonal to it. He is what keeps the whole business going, past, present and future, and is the explanation of why there is something rather than nothing. Also God is totally simple, and I don’t see why complexity should not arise out of this, just as it does in mathematics and science from very simple premises.

Traditionally, God’s necessity is not logical necessity but some kind of metaphysical necessity, or aseity. Unlike Hume, I don’t think this is a silly or incoherent idea, any more than I think mathematical Platonism is silly or incoherent. As it happens, I am not a mathematical Platonist, and I do have conceptual difficulties with the idea of metaphysical necessity. So in the end, I am not sure that the Christian God idea flies, but I want to extend to Christians the courtesy of arguing against what they actually believe, rather than begin and end with the polemical parody of what Dawkins calls “the God delusion.”

G.G.: Do you think that evolution lends support to the atheistic argument from evil: that it makes no sense to think that an all-good, all-powerful God would have used so wasteful and brutal a process as evolution to create living things?

I don’t want an argument that convinces me that the death of Anne Frank in Bergen-Belsen ultimately contributes to the greater good. If my eternal salvation depends on the death of this young woman, then forget it.

 

M.R.: Although in some philosophy of religion circles it is now thought that we can counter the argument from evil, I don’t think this is so. More than that, I don’t want it to be so. I don’t want an argument that convinces me that the death under the guillotine of Sophie Scholl (one of the leaders of the White Rose group opposed to the Nazis) or of Anne Frank in Bergen-Belsen ultimately contributes to the greater good. If my eternal salvation depends on the deaths of these two young women, then forget it.

This said, I have never really thought that the pains brought on by the evolutionary process, in particular the struggle for survival and reproduction, much affect the Christian conception of God. For all of Voltaire’s devastating wit in “Candide,” I am a bit of a Leibnizian on these matters. If God is to do everything through unbroken law, and I can think of good theological reasons why this should be so, then pain and suffering are part of it all. Paradoxically and humorously I am with Dawkins here. He argues that the only way naturally you can get the design-like features of organisms — the hand and the eye — is through evolution by natural selection, brought on by the struggle. Other mechanisms just don’t work. So God is off the hook.

G.G.: What do you think of the claim that evolutionary accounts show that religion emerged not because of any evidence for its truth but because of its adaptive value?

M.R.: It is interesting that you ask this question because recently I’ve found myself wrestling with this issue more than just about any other. As an ardent Darwinian evolutionist I think that all organisms, and I include us humans, are the end product of a long, slow process of development thanks to the causal mechanism of natural selection. So this means that I think features like the eye and the hand are around because of their adaptive value; they help us to survive and reproduce.

G.G.: Of course, evolutionary explanations are empirically well established on the biological level. But is the same true on the level of social and cultural life, especially among humans?

M.R.: I include society and culture here although I would qualify what I say. I don’t see being a Nazi as very adaptive, but I would say that the things that led to being a Nazi — for instance being open to indoctrination as a child — have adaptive significance. I would say the same of religion. The biologist Edward O. Wilson thinks that religion is adaptive because it promotes bonding and he might be right. But it can go biologically haywire, as in the case of the Shakers, whose religious prohibition on procreation had an adaptive value of precisely zero.

So it is true that in a sense I see all knowledge, including claims about religious knowledge, as being relative to evolutionary ends. The upshot is that I don’t dismiss religious beliefs even though they ultimately can be explained by evolution. I think everything can! I wouldn’t dismiss religious beliefs even if you could show me that they are just a byproduct of adaptation, as I think Darwin himself thought. It is as plausible that my love of Mozart’s operas is a byproduct of adaptation, but it doesn’t make them any the less beautiful and meaningful. I think you have to judge religion on its merits.

G.G.: Is one of religion’s merits that it provides a foundation (intellectual and practical) for morality through the idea of God as divine lawgiver?

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Read previous contributions to this series.

M.R.: I am on record as an “evolutionary skeptic.” I don’t deny substantive morality — you ought to return your library books on time — but I do deny objective foundations. I think morality is a collective illusion, genetic in origin, that makes us good cooperators. And I would add that being good cooperators makes each one of us individually better off in the struggle for existence. If we are nice to other people, they are much more likely to be nice to us in return. However, as the philosopher J.L. Mackie used to argue, I think we “objectify” substantive ethics — we think it objectively the case that we ought return library books on time. But we do this (or rather our genes make us do this) because if we didn’t we would all start to cheat and substantive ethics would collapse to the ground.

So I don’t buy the moral argument for the existence of God. I think you can have all of the morality you need without God. I am a follower of Hume brought up to date by Darwin. Morality is purely emotions, although emotions of a special kind with an important adaptive function. I don’t, however, think that here I am necessarily denying the existence of God. Were I a Christian, I would be somewhat of a natural law theorist, thinking that morality is what is natural. Caring about small children is natural and good; killing small children for laughs is unnatural and bad. If you want to say that God created the world and what is good therefore is what fits with the way God designed it, I am O.K. with this. In fact, I think you should say it to avoid the problem (raised in Plato’s “Euthyphro”) of simply making the good a function of God’s arbitrary will.

G.G.: There seems to be a tension in your thinking about religion. You aren’t yourself a believer, but you spend a great deal of time defending belief against its critics.

M.R.: People often accuse me of being contradictory, if not of outright hypocrisy. I won’t say I accept the ontological argument for the existence of God — the argument that derives God’s existence from his essence — but I do like it (it is so clever) and I am prepared to stand up for it when Dawkins dismisses it with scorn rather than good reasons. In part this is a turf war. I am a professional philosopher. I admire immensely thinkers like Anselm and Descartes and am proud to be one of them, however minor and inadequate in comparison. I am standing up for my own. In part, this is political. Religion is a big thing in America, and often not a very good big thing. I don’t think you are going to counter the bad just by going over the top, like in the Battle of the Somme. I think you have to reach out over no-man’s land to the trenches on the other side and see where we can agree and hope to move forward.

I should say that my Quaker childhood — as in everything I do and think — is tremendously important here. I grew up surrounded by gentle, loving (and very intelligent) Christians. I never forget that. Finally, I just don’t like bad arguments. In my case, I think I can offer good arguments against the existence of the Christian God. I don’t need the inadequate and faulty. In “Murder in the Cathedral,” T.S. Eliot has Thomas à Becket say, “The last temptation is the greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong reason.” Amen.

This interview was conducted by email and edited. 

 

 

Did the Earliest Christians Think Jesus Was an Angel? A Response to Bart Ehrman (Part 2)

Did the Earliest Christians Think Jesus Was an Angel? A Response to Bart Ehrman (Part 2)

Note:  This is the second installment of a series of blog posts reviewing Bart Ehrman’s new book, How Jesus Became God–The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (HarperOne, 2014). For the prior post see here.

Ehrman’s core argument is that Jesus was a mere man who gradually, over time, came to be regarded as more and more divine, until he was ultimately (in the fourth century) regarded as the God of the universe.  He states, “It will become clear in the following chapters that Jesus was not originally considered to be God in any sense at all, and that he eventually became divine for his followers in some sense before he came to be thought of as equal with God Almighty in an absolute sense. But the point I stress is that this was, in fact, a development” (44).

In other words, Ehrman argues that the earliest Christians did not understand divinity as something that was “all or nothing”–it could have gradations.

It is no surprise, therefore, that Ehrman begins his volume with a discussion of “gods” and semi-divine beings in the Greco-Roman world because this was a world which clearly did view divinity as something that could have degrees. The problem with such a starting place, however, is that the earliest Christology was not born in a Greco-Roman context, but in a decidedly Jewish one.  Indeed, it was born into a Jewish world which was concretely monotheistic.  And in a monotheistic Jewish world, there are no “half-way” gods.

How, then, does Ehrman avoid this obvious problem for his thesis?  Richard Bauckham in his bookJesus and the God of Israel (Eerdmans, 2008), though not responding directly to Ehrman, describes Ehrman’s kind of approach precisely:

Much of the clear evidence for the ways in which Second Temple Judaism understood the uniqueness of God has been neglected in favour of a small amount of highly debatable evidence. Intermediary figures who may or may not participate in divinity are by no means characteristic of the literature of Second Temple Judaism (5). . . Methodologically, it is imperative to proceed from the clear consensus of Second Temple monotheism to the more ambiguous evidence about so-called intermediary figures. (13).

Ehrman commits the very fallacy that Bauckham describes—he highlights the limited number of ambiguous or debatable passages about supposed semi-divine figures and uses those instances to override the larger and more established monotheistic trends in first-century Judaism. The problem, of course, is that even if his interpretation of these passages is correct (and that is questionable), these passages at best represent only the minority report. And why should we think the earliest Christians held this fringe/minority view of divinity when they formulated their ideas about the identity of Jesus? Or for that matter, why should we think Jesus himself held these minority views when he expressed his own identity?

Each of Ehrman’s examples of supposed semi-divine figures cannot be addressed here, but he bases his argument primarily on angels, particularly the mysterious “angel of the Lord” phenomenon in the OT. However, the idea that early Christians saw Jesus in the category of an angel runs contrary to numerous other lines of evidence. For one, Jesus is clearly distinguished from the angels (Mark 1:13;Matt 4:11), given Lordship over the angels (Matt 4:6, 26:53Luke 4:10Mark 13:27), and exalted in a place above the angels (Heb 1:5, 13).  In addition, Jesus is accorded both worship (Matt 28:17Luke 24:52) and the role of creator (1 Cor 8:6Col 1:16Phil 2:10-11)—two key marks of God’s unique divine identity within Judaism—whereas angels are never portrayed as creating the world, nor as worthy of worship (Col 2:18Rev 19:10, 22:9).

Ehrman attempts to overcome these clear restrictions on angel worship by flipping them around to his advantage: “We know that some Jews thought that it was right to worship angels in no small part because a number of our surviving texts insist that it not be done. You don’t get laws prohibiting activities that are never performed” (54-55, emphasis his).

Yes, you don’t get laws prohibiting activities that are never performed; but at the same time you can’t use laws prohibiting activities as evidence that those activities actually represent a religion’s views! It would be like using the Ten Commandments (which are filled with prohibitions) to argue that ancient Judaism was a religion that embraced idolatry, Sabbath-breaking, adultery, murder, coveting, and so on.

Again, Ehrman is using what is, at best, a condemned and fringe activity (angel worship) as characteristic of first-century Judaism.That simply doesn’t work as a model for how early (Jewish) Christians would have viewed Jesus.

Bart Ehrman’s Worldview Problem–A Response to Bart Ehrman (Part 1)

Bart Ehrman’s Worldview Problem–A Response to Bart Ehrman (Part 1)

I have just finished my formal review of Bart Ehrman’s latest book,How Jesus Became God–The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (HarperOne, 2014), and it should be available on the Reformation 21 website in the next week or so (I will provide a notice when it is posted).

In the meantime, I am beginning a series of blog posts responding to Ehrman’s new book.  Some of these posts will draw on aspects of my forthcoming review, and some of these will be new observations about his book.  This first post falls into the latter category and concerns the internal contradictions within Ehrman’s own worldview.

Even though Ehrman does not offer a comprehensive assessment of his own worldview, it is important to observe that throughout the book he presents himself as simply ahistorian.  For 300-plus pages Ehrman claims he is just doing, well, what historians do.  He is very clear that “religious faith and historical knowledge are two different ways of ‘knowing’” (132) and he puts himself in the latter camp.  He is only interested in studying those events that “do not require faith in order to know about them” (132).

So committed is Ehrman to his role as a “historian” that he chides anyone who wants to insert value judgments into historical discussions. For example, Ehrman insists that we should not use terms like “heresy”or “orthodoxy” because that implies that somebody is really right and somebody is really wrong, and historians cannot make such judgments. These terms should be avoided because they are “value-laden” (319). Indeed, he says, “the historian has no access…to what is right in the eyes of God” (288).

Thus, Ehrman is clear.  Historians should be value-free in their declarations.  They should not declare what is right and wrong. Why? Because historians, as historians, do not have access to such values.

But, then there is the epilogue.  And it is here that Ehrman’s professed worldview begins to unravel.  Having just written a book where he chides others for inserting their own values into historical discussions, Ehrman begins to insert his own. Here he offers a litany of complaints about the immorality of early Christians and how they were guilty of anti-semitism–anti-semitism which is caused, argues Ehrman, by the Christian belief in the divinity of Jesus.  A belief that he claims has “horrific” implications (277).

At this point, however, the reader is mystified.  Wasn’t it Ehrman who insisted that historians were not supposed to weigh in the rightness or wrongness of historical views (such as the Christian view about the divinity of Jesus!)?  Wasn’t it Ehrman who insisted that it is the historian’s task to avoid declarations that are “value-laden”? Yet, here he feels completely free to offer his own moralizing at the end of his book.

But, the problems for Ehrman are even deeper.  The issue is not just that he is violating his own professed code for how historians ought to behave, the bigger issue is the question of where he gets his moral norms from in the first place.  How does Ehrman know that anti-semitism is wrong?  On what grounds does he call it “horrific”? Where does Ehrman get this moral code that he is using?

Elsewhere, Ehrman assures the reader that he does believe in moral norms.  He says, “I do think there is good and evil; I do think we should all be on the side of good; and I do think we should fight mightly against all that is evil” (354).  Aside from the fact that such statements are out of place in a book purportedly committed to only discussing historical issues, Ehrman apparently feels no need to explain to the reader where these moral standards come from.  Who decides what is “good” and “evil”? Bart Ehrman?

Ehrman seems unaware that absolute moral statements like this might just require some sort of philosophical grounding; some sort of worldview that can provide a cogent accounting of moral norms; some sort of basis for why one thing is “right” and another thing is “wrong.” But, Ehrman provides no such explanation.  In fact, the closest he comes is telling the reader what is not his foundation for morality: “I do not believe there is a God in heaven who is soon to send a cosmic judge of the earth to destroy the forces of evil” (355).

It is here that Ehrman does not seem to recognize the profound inconsistency in his own worldview. On what grounds does a professed agnostic make such sweeping moral claims about good and evil, and right and wrong, and what God is like or not like?  How does Ehrman know God is not going to come judge the earth?  When it comes time to make such moral and religious declarations Ehrman seems quite content to abandon his agnostic stance.

Ehrman does hint at some reasons other folks have given for morality (though he doesn’t say these are his own views), such as “we can find the greatest self-fulfillment in life and so we can all thrive together as a society for the long haul” (355).  But, these are not grounds for moral absolutes–they might explain behavior but they do not make behavior right or wrong.  Something is not right or wrong simply because it leads to personal fulfillment. Some people may find personal fulfillment in torturing little children, but that does not make it “right.”

Ironically, it is the very worldview that Ehrman mocks and criticizes–biblical Christianity–that can actually provide foundations for morality. Christians believe that moral norms are grounded in the very character of God himself, the creator of the universe; and Christians claim to know about this God through his word contained in the Bible. Ehrman, of course, rejects this claim, but that misses the point entirely.  If someone is going to make moral claims, it makes much more sense if it comes from someone who thinks they have access to God’s own thoughts on the matter, instead of coming from someone who is offering only agnosticism.

Now one might suppose that Ehrman could avoid this entire quandary by saying he doesn’t really believe in moral absolutes at all, but his merely offering his own personal moral preferences.  Ok, fine. But, then Ehrman has no basis for his prior statement that “I do think there is good and evil.”  Instead he should have said, “There is no such thing as good and evil, just private opinion.”  And, if Ehrman is only offering his private opinion, then he no longer has a meaningful basis to object to anti-semitism.  He cannot say it is really wrong–all he can say is that he personally doesn’t prefer it.

In the end, Ehrman’s worldview is a philosophical mess.  He chides others for inserting value-laden statements and then offers his own.  He claims to believe in the real existence of good and evil, but never explains where such moral norms come from.  He makes sweeping claims about how there is no God who will judge the world while all the while claiming to be agnostic.  He says Christians are wrong for being anti-semitic, but never offers a reason for why anti-semitism is wrong in the first place.

A genuine agnostic would have acknowledged he doesn’t really have anything to offer regarding discussions of God and morality, and good and evil.  Indeed, a genuine agnostic would have acknowledged that Christianity might even be right.  After all, according to an agnostic, who knows?

 

 

Bart Ehrman vs. Michael Licona – Is the Resurrection of Christ Provable? – Debate MP3 Audio

Bart Ehrman and Michael Licona debate: “Is the Resurrection of Christ Provable?” This interesting debate is sure to enlighten.

Bart Ehrman and Michael Licona debate: “Is the Resurrection of Christ Provable?” This interesting debate is sure to enlighten.

https://www.brianauten.com/Apologetics/Ehrman-Licona-Debate.mp3?_=1

Mike Licona’s Review of Bart Ehrmran’s Forged

Review of Bart Ehrman’s book “Forged: Writing in the Name of God”…

 

Bart D. Ehrman, Forged: Writing in the Name of God—Why The Bible’s Authors Are Not Who We Think They Are (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2011), 307 pages: a Review by Michael R. Licona, March 27, 2011

On March 22, the New Testament scholar Bart Ehrman published his latest iconoclastic book challenging the traditional Christian view. In Forged, Ehrman’s bottom line message is that literary forgeries were plentiful in antiquity, many of which were written by Christians and that approximately 70 percent of the New Testament writings were not written by those to whom they are attributed. Ehrman is well read on the subject, citing from a number of doctoral dissertations, scholarly monographs, and journal articles in both English and German.

Why is the subject matter of this book important? For years, a significant number of biblical scholars have contended that the traditional authorship of a large portion of the New Testament literature is mistaken. This raises an important question: If, lets say, Peter was not at all involved in writing 2 Peter and the letter was not written until several decades after Peter’s death, should it be included in the New Testament canon and regarded as authoritative to the Christian? After all, if God does not lie, it would seem that he would not have inspired a letter written by someone who was deceiving others by claiming to be someone he was not. So, if it can be soundly concluded that some of the New Testament literature were not written by the traditional authors, should the guilty literature be removed from the New Testament canon?

This is a fair question and discussions among scholars concerning canonicity have been occurring for the past several years at papers read at annual meetings of the Society of Biblical Literature, the Institute of Biblical Research, and even the Evangelical Theological Society. It is just a matter of time before the issue is placed in the public spotlight. Ehrman’s book may serve as the catalyst for more serious discussion. He’s a good scholar who writes clearly and compellingly. Readers who are unfamiliar with the topics of authorship and canonicity will find Forged a fascinating and/or threatening read, depending on which theological camp they fall into.

The issue of authorship is discussed at length in most introductions to the New Testament, which differ from surveys and are usually written for graduate students. These books explain the pro and con arguments for the traditional authorship of all of the New Testament literature. They also discuss the identity of the original readers to whom the book was addressed, where they were located, why it was written, and when it was written. For those interested in wrestling with the issue of authorship, it’s a good idea to look at a few New Testament Introductions that are written by scholars abiding at differing points on the theological spectrum. Ehrman’s New Testament introduction is a good choice for reading from a rather moderate to skeptical viewpoint.[1] Although he likes to think of himself as a moderate scholar, many of Ehrman’s positions are to the left of the middle. The small percentage of New Testament literature to which he grants traditional authorship is one example. Granted, he’s not out there hanging off the edge of the theological left where some of the members of the Jesus Seminar abide. But he’s certainly not in the middle. Moreover, his view of who Jesus regarded as the apocalyptic Son of Man is closer to the Muslim view than the Christian one. The New Testament Introductions by Luke Timothy Johnson[2] and Raymond Brown[3] are good choices from a moderate-to conservative view and the introductions by Andreas J. Köstenberger, L. Scott Kellum, and Charles L. Quarles[4] and D. A. Carson & Douglas J. Moo[5] are good at presenting the issues from a conservative view. I’m providing these references because it’s not my intention in this review to examine all of the arguments for and against the traditional authorship of the New Testament literature in question. However, I will be interacting with a few of the new arguments offered by Ehrman.

My approach to the traditional authorship question is that there is evidence of varying weight in support of the traditional authorship of each of the 27 books and letters in the New Testament. For example, there is stronger evidence that Paul wrote his letter to the church in Rome than there is that Peter wrote 2 Peter. This was apparent even to the early Church. In the fourth century, the Church historian Eusebius placed early Christian literature in four categories: the certain/accepted literature, the uncertain/disputed literature (though still canonical), the illegitimate /rejected literature (false but not heretical), the heretical literature. In the certain/accepted literature, Eusebius included the four Gospels, Acts, Paul’s letters, 1 John, 1 Peter, Revelation (?). The uncertain/disputed literature included James, Jude, 2 Peter, 2 & 3 John. Illegitimate/rejected literature: Acts of Paul, Shepherd of Hermas, Apocalypse of Peter, Barnabas, Didache, Revelation (?), Gospel according to the Hebrews. Finally, the literature regarded as heretical by the fourth century Church included several Gospels such as the Gospel of Peter, the Gospel of Thomas, the Gospel of Matthias and other Gospels, the Acts of Peter, the Acts of John, and Acts attributed to other apostles. As you may have noticed, some in the early Church placed Revelation among the accepted literature while others included it in the rejected literature.[6] Allowing a book to be included in the New Testament was a big deal to the early Church and was not taken lightly. The general tendency in the early Church was to exclude rather than include.

Given this caution in the early Church, my approach is this: Before jettisoning belief in the traditional authorship of any of the 27, the arguments against it must be reasonably stronger than the arguments for it and be able to withstand the counterarguments. Some like Ehrman appear to take a different approach, assuming that all of the 27 are guilty of false attribution until nearly unimpeachable evidence to the contrary can be presented. Evidence of this approach can be seen when the evidence for traditional authorship is dismissed too quickly or when arguments against the traditional authorship are strikingly weak.

For example, in his discussion pertaining to the authorship of Ephesians, Ehrman contends that Paul speaks of the resurrection of believers as a future event and provides Romans 6:1-4 and 1 Corinthians 15 in support (that Paul wrote these letters is undisputed). He then states that Ephesians teaches that the resurrection of believers has already occurred (2:5-6) and adds “[t]his is precisely the view that Paul argued against in his letters to the Corinthians” (111)!

Ehrman is correct that Paul thought of the resurrection of believers as a very real and physical event that would take place when Jesus returns.[7] Romans 8:11 and 23 teach this even more clearly than the reference cited in Romans by Ehrman. He appears unaware, however, that Paul also spoke of the resurrection of believers in a symbolic sense. Consider Romans 6:13, the same chapter in the same letter Ehrman cites for Paul’s teaching that the resurrection of believers is a future event:

and do not go on presenting the members of your body to sin as instruments of unrighteousness; but present yourselves to God as those alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness to God.[8]

Paul’s teaching concerning the resurrection of believers in Romans is completely compatible with what we find in Ephesians and Colossians. Many of the teachings in the disputed letters of Paul that Ehrman regards as contradictory to the teachings in his undisputed letters are solved just as easily with a careful look at the texts in question. Unfortunately, because many of Ehrman’s readers will go no further than reading Forged, they will fall prey to some very poor arguments.

Let’s now take a quick trip through Forged. In the book’s introduction, Ehrman tells readers of his journey from being an evangelical undergraduate student at Moody Bible Institute to the point when he jettisoned his faith while teaching at Rutgers. In chapter one, Ehrman informs readers of the abundance of forgeries authored by Christians in the first few centuries of the Church. There were even some forgeries like the Apostolic Constitutions that instruct readers not to read forgeries (20)! Ehrman also discusses how some in the early Church questioned the authenticity of some of the New Testament literature. The traditional authorship of Revelation, Jude, 2 Peter, 1 & 2 Timothy, and Hebrews were all questioned for different reasons.

Ehrman then turns to providing a few definitions so that he can be clear in what he’s contending in this volume. Literature that is falsely attributed to a certain author is pseudepigrapha. Literature that was at first anonymous, that is, it was not attributed to any author, and was later attributed to someone who did not write it, carry this label. However, if the literature in question claimed at the outset to have been written by someone who was not involved in its authorship, that literature is not only pseudepigrapha, it is forgery. Ehrman states, “My definition of a forgery, then, is a writing that claims to be written by someone (a known figure [as opposed to someone who writes using a pen name]) who did not in fact write it” (24). What qualifies pseudepigrapha as forgery, then, is authorial intent. With only a few exceptions, the ancients condemned forged literature once they knew it had been forged (36-40). 

In chapters 2 and 3, Ehrman discusses forgeries composed in the names of Peter and Paul respectively. Forged literature attributed to Peter includes the Gospel of PeterThe Epistle of Peter, and The Apocalypse of Peter. Forged literature attributed to Paul includes 3 Corinthians and a series of 14 letters between Paul and Seneca, the latter of which may have been the brightest mind of first-century Rome.

Ehrman goes on to argue that some forged letters attributed to Peter and Paul made it into the New Testament. Both letters attributed by Peter, that is 1 & 2 Peter are forgeries, and six of the 13 letters attributed to Paul “were probably not written by Paul” (Ephesians, Colossians, 2 Thessalonians, 1 & 2 Timothy, Titus; 92-93).

In chapter 4, Ehrman turns to a discussion of the various ways in which biblical scholars have attempted to explain the uncomfortable presence of forgeries in the New Testament. The first attempt claims that when a letter was written in someone else’s name, say Paul’s, deceit was not the intent but rather the author either was trying not to promote himself or thought no one would read an important message from an otherwise unknown person. But Ehrman rightly (in my opinion) replies that, whatever reason the forger had in mind and however noble it may have appeared to him, it is still deceit. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the early Christians always rejected known forgeries. A second attempt to get around the scandal of forgeries in the New Testament has been to state that the Holy Spirit still inspired the book in question even if it is a forgery. I agree with Ehrman that this is a desperate move. For me, at least, if this is the extent one must go in order to preserve the canonicity of forged literature, it is perhaps better to question whether that piece of literature should remain in the canon.

A third attempt is to claim that the forger has taken a genuine apostolic teaching and has rewritten it in order to address a different situation. In other words, because the teaching is still apostolic in a sense, the book should remain canonical. In reply, Ehrman asks “What is the evidence that ‘reactualizing the tradition’ by assuming a false name was a widely followed and acceptable practice” (126)? A fourth attempt contends that students in the ancient philosophical schools often penned literature in the name of their teacher since they had learned the content from them. Ehrman observes that there are only two examples often cited in support. The first does not actually say what is claimed and the second does not prove that this was a practice within the philosophical schools much less outside them. Moreover, there is evidence that students in these schools often wrote in their own names.

The fifth and final attempt cites the involvement of secretaries in the writing of letters. Most, though not all, of the arguments against traditional authorship fall into two categories: style and content. If an author employed the use of a secretary to write what he dictated as well as provide varying degrees of editing, this would explain quite well why some of the questionable letters in the New Testament have vocabulary, grammar, some content and an overall writing style that differs, even significantly, from the undisputed letters. Ehrman recognizes this and writes, “Virtually all of the problems with what I’ve been calling forgeries can be solved if secretaries were heavily involved in the composition of the early Christian writings” (134). But he argues that, although it’s certain that Paul often used a secretary, the secretary only took Paul’s dictation. This is an Achilles heel in Ehrman’s case that we will discuss at length below.

In chapter five, Ehrman turns to some of the motive behind ancient forgeries. In the cases presented in this chapter, the Christians were responding to their conflicts with Jews and pagans. After discussing some of the literature he writes, “The authors intended to deceive their readers, and their readers were all too easily deceived” (159). Although Ehrman is correct, it is likewise noteworthy that none of the literature he cites became canonical. Ehrman fails to mention that.

Before we leave this chapter, I want to note that at one point Ehrman has made what I regard as a huge historical blunder. In his section “Pagan Opposition to Christianity” he asserts,

It is true that Christians were sometimes opposed by pagans for being suspicious and possibly scurrilous, just as most ‘new’ religions found opponents in the empire. But there were no imperial decrees leveled against Christianity in its first two hundred years, no declarations that it was illegal, no attempt throughout the empire to stamp it out. It was not until the year 249 CE that any Roman emperor—in this case it was the emperor Decius—instituted an empire-wide persecution of Christians. (164)

How could Ehrman miss Tacitus’ statement in around AD 115 that Nero had blamed the burning of Rome on the Christians because the Roman people suspected he was to blame (Annals 15.44)? Tacitus reports that, just after the fire in AD 64, multitudes of Christians were exquisitely tortured and brutally executed as a result.

Consequently, to get rid of the report [that he was responsible for the fire], Nero fastened the guilt and inflicted the most exquisite tortures on a class hated for their abominations, called Christians by the populace. Christus, from whom the name had its origin, suffered the extreme penalty during the reign of Tiberius at the hands of one of our procurators, Pontius Pilatus, and a most mischievous superstition, thus checked for the moment, again broke out not only in Judaea, the first source of the evil, but even in Rome, where all things hideous and shameful from every part of the world find their centre and become popular. Accordingly, an arrest was first made of all who pleaded guilty; then, upon their information, an immense multitude was convicted, not so much of the crime of firing the city, as of hatred against mankind. Mockery of every sort was added to their deaths. Covered with the skins of beasts, they were torn by dogs and perished, or were nailed to crosses, or were doomed to the flames and burnt, to serve as a nightly illumination, when daylight had expired. Nero offered his gardens for the spectacle, and was exhibiting a show in the circus, while he mingled with the people in the dress of a charioteer or stood aloft on a car. Hence, even for criminals who deserved extreme and exemplary punishment, there arose a feeling of compassion; for it was not, as it seemed, for the public good, but to glut one man’s cruelty, that they were being destroyed.[9]

And what about the letter of Pliny the Younger (c. AD 112) in which he informs the emperor Trajan that he has been going to the homes of those accused of being Christian and executing those who had refused to deny Christ (Book 10, Letter 96)?[10] While neither of these instances within the very first century of Christianity reveal an official declaration by the empire itself to stamp out Christianity, they serve as conclusive evidence against Ehrman’s statement that there was “no attempt throughout the empire to stamp it out.”

In chapter six, Ehrman provides examples of Christian forgeries created in the midst of conflicts with false teachers. He points out that Paul’s letters constantly address theological opponents and were used by orthodox, Gnostics, and others to support their views. However, Ehrman then enters dangerous territory.

The New Testament emerged out of these conflicts, as one of the Christian groups won the arguments and decided which books would be included in Scripture. Other books representing other points of view and also attributed to the apostles of Jesus were not only left out of Scripture; they were destroyed and forgotten. As a result, today, when we think of early Christianity, we tend to think of it only as it has come down to us in the writings of the victorious party. Only slowly, in modern times, have ancient books come to light that support alternative views, as they have turned up in archaeological digs and by pure serendipity, for example, in the sands of Egypt. (183)

I was shocked when I read Ehrman here. In a book where he is identifying deceit, it’s ironic that Ehrman himself engages in misleading his readers. In a technical sense, he’s correct: the reason we have the present literature in the New Testament is because a theologically orthodox group won the theology war. However, the impression Ehrman leaves his readers is that the only thing distinguishing the literature that made it into the New Testament from the literature that did not is the results of a vote (and perhaps there were some floating chads there too!).

But sometimes the winners deserve to win. Consider the following statements by an expert in the early pseudepigraphal Christian literature.

[I]f historians want to know what Jesus said and did they are more or less constrained to use the New Testament Gospels as their principal sources. Let me emphasize that this is not for religious or theological reasons—for instance, that these and these alone can be trusted. It is for historical reasons, pure and simple.

The scholar who wrote the above has credentials identical to those of Bart Ehrman. He received his doctorate from the same school and also had Bruce Metzger as his mentor. He has published a number of books on the non-orthodox communities of early Christianity and the literature they produced. When comparisons can be made, Ehrman is almost always in agreement with this scholar. This is because the scholar who made this statement is Bart Ehrman![11]

It’s also worth noting that Ehrman’s definition of “Christian” can be challenged. For him, anyone calling himself a Christian qualifies. You can believe that Yahweh of the Old Testament was an evil god whom Jesus stood against and came to save us from (a la Marcion). Or you can believe that a goddess was overthrown by her subjects and imprisoned inside of physical humans on the Earth who could themselves be freed from the physical world by obtaining the secret knowledge available to them through the imprisoned goddess (a la Gnosticism). All of these are ‘Christians’ in Ehrman’s eyes. I don’t mean to appear judgmental but I wonder whether Jesus and his disciples would think of those just mentioned as ‘Christians.’

Let’s turn our attention back to the thrust of this chapter. Ehrman returns to some of the letters he had questioned in chapters 2 and 3: Colossians, Jude, 1 Peter, 1 & 2 Peter, James and adds Acts to his list. He also includes discussions on the noncanonical Epistle of Peter, the Pseudo-Clementine Writings, Gnostic forgeries and Anti-Gnostic forgeries.

One of the reasons Ehrman regards Acts as a forgery is because he sees contradictions between how the relationship between Peter and Paul are presented in it and how Paul speaks of Peter in his undisputed letters. For example, in Acts, Peter and Paul are “completely aligned in every respect” (204). In fact, when it came to accepting the Gentiles as brothers in Christ and eating with them, Peter received a revelation of this even before Paul. (This is not actually true. According to Acts 9-10, Peter’s revelation occurred after Paul’s conversion. And it was made known at the time of Paul’s conversion experience that God was sending him to the Gentiles [Acts 9:15; cf. 22:21].) However, in Galatians 2:11-14 (an undisputed letter), Paul tells us that he opposed Peter to his face when he withdrew from eating with Gentiles (204). Ehrman recognizes there are ways of reconciling these differences. But he extends no charity in such an exercise.

One could argue that Paul was right, that Peter was simply being hypocritical. But there is nothing in Galatians to suggest that Peter actually saw it this way or that he thought Paul was right about the matter (204).

There is also nothing in Galatians to suggest that Peter did not see it this way or that he thought Paul was wrong about the matter. Reconciling Galatians with Acts in this case is quite easy. But Ehrman will have none of it. Could it be because it would throw a wrench in his views?

We again notice this type of stubbornness on the next page. Ehrman writes that according to Galatians, after Paul’s conversion

[h]e went away into Arabia, then back to Damascus, and did not go to Jerusalem for another three years (1:15-19). This makes the story of Paul’s conversion in the book of Acts very interesting. Here we are told that Paul is blinded by his vision of Jesus on the road to Damascus; he then enters the city and regains his sight. And what’s the very first thing he does when he leaves town? He makes a beeline straight to Jerusalem to see the apostles (Acts 9:1-26). Well, which is it? Did he stay away from Jerusalem, as Paul himself says, or did he go there first thing, as Acts says? (205)

In Greco-Roman historical writing, keeping the narrative flowing was an important component.[12] It takes very little effort to see that the author of Acts is doing precisely that. In Galatians 1:15-19, Paul said that after his conversion, he did not go to Jerusalem. Instead, he went away to Arabia for an unspecified period before returning to Damascus. Three years elapsed between his conversion experience and his first post-conversion trip to Jerusalem. In Acts 9:1-27, Paul immediately goes into Damascus—not Jerusalem—after his conversion experience and remains there for several days (9:19). In 9:23 it’s reported that after many days had passed the Jews planned to murder Paul. With the assistance of the Christians, Paul escaped Damascus and went to Jerusalem (9:23-26). If Paul remained in Damascus for several days and then went to Jerusalem after many days, what was he doing during the time in-between? The Acts narrative does not tell us. What is noticeable is the author of Acts appears to fast-forward the narrative between 9:22-23 to keep the narrative moving.

Another alleged contradiction described by Ehrman concerns whom Paul met during his first trip to Jerusalem. In Galatians 1:18-19 Paul reports that he only saw Peter and James during that trip. However, in Acts 9:26-36 it’s reported that the Jerusalem Christians were afraid to meet with Paul because he had been persecuting them. So, Barnabas brought Paul to the “apostles and spends some time among them—not just with Peter and James, but apparently with all of them (9:26-30)” (205).

But Acts does not say that Paul met with all of the apostles. Granted, “apostles” is plural. But Paul does say in Galatians 1:18-19 that he met with Peter and James. And two apostles is most certainly plural. Moreover, if the Jerusalem Christians were fearful that Paul may have playing a trick on them in order to infiltrate their ranks and identify the key leaders of the entire Christian Church, we can understand why only two leaders were willing to meet with him until they could be certain of the genuineness of his conversion to Christianity. A wise move indeed. No contradiction is necessary.

Despite Ehrman’s claim that Acts is a forgery, he likes it when it’s convenient for him. Discussing why the New Testament book of James was not written by James, he writes,

the one thing we know best about James of Jerusalem is that he was concerned that Jewish followers of Jesus continue to keep the requirements of Jewish law. But this concern is completely and noticeably missing in this letter. This author, claiming to be James, is concerned with people doing ‘good deeds’; he is not at all concerned with keeping kosher, observing the Sabbath and Jewish festivals, or circumcision. His concerns are not those of James of Jerusalem (198).

How do we know this about James? It’s reported in the book of Acts. Readers will be surprised, then, to read on the very next page that Ehrman regards Acts as a forgery: “a book that scholars have as a rule been loath to label a forgery, even though that is what it appears to be—the New Testament book of Acts” (199; cf. 208). Apparently, even for Ehrman, being a forgery does not negate the possibility of providing reliable historical evidence. It’s disappointing too that Ehrman speaks of Acts being a forgery as though this is the conclusion of scholarship. Craig Keener is a New Testament scholar known for his obsessive research. His commentary on John’s Gospel is one of the largest ever written, nearly 1,700 pages. Keener has a very broad knowledge of the ancient literature which he cites more than 10,000 times in that commentary. At this very moment, his commentary on Acts is in the editing process with Baker Academic and will be published one volume at a time. Why publish it in stages? Because Keener’s commentary on Acts is more than 7,000 pages! Those familiar with Keener’s work carry a huge respect for his introductory content where authorship is one of the topics covered. Keener has told me that having surveyed the academic literature on Acts and it’s prequel, Luke’s Gospel, he can assert that the majority of modern scholars hold to the traditional authorship of Luke and Acts. (Most specialists on the Gospel of Mark likewise hold to its traditional authorship.) Why doesn’t Ehrman mention this, since he mentions what the majority of scholars believe so frequently throughout the book? Perhaps he doesn’t know it or he doesn’t mention it because the majority don’t support his conclusions here.

Ehrman states that

the problems with identifying Luke as the author of the book [of Acts] are rife. For one thing, the idea that Luke was a Gentile companion of Paul comes from Colossians, a book that appears to have been forged in Paul’s name after his death. To be sure, there is also a Luke named in Paul’s authentic letter of Philemon (v. 24), but nothing is said there about his being a Gentile. He is simply mentioned in a list of five other people. . . (207)

I find it amazing how Ehrman can skim right past the reference to Luke in Philemon as though it’s not a problem for him. It may not say that Luke was a Gentile. But Luke was a Greek name and he is mentioned as one of Paul’s co-workers. The Greek word Paul uses here is sunergoi. And we will be coming back to this important observation later.

Ehrman states that perhaps the biggest challenge to the traditional authorship of Acts is that there are discrepancies between what Paul writes in his undisputed letters and what Acts reports of him. This subject is very involved. So, I will only comment that some scholars who have specialized in Paul see irreconcilable differences between Acts and Paul’s undisputed letters while others contend that most of the differences are easily reconciled.

In chapter 7, Ehrman turns to a discussion of anonymous literature, that is, literature that makes no direct claims pertaining to its authorship. He writes, “It was a lot more common to write a book anonymously in antiquity than it is today. Just within the pages of the New Testament, nine of the books—fully one-third of the writings—were produced by authors who did not reveal their names” (220). Ehrman spends some space discussing the four Gospels which were anonymous in their original manuscripts.

It was about a century after the Gospels had been originally put in circulation that they were definitely named Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. This comes, for the first time, in the writings of the church father and heresiologist Irenaeus, around 180-85 CE. (225)

The actual first mention is quite a bit earlier. Papias was an early leader in the Christian Church who wrote five volumes titled the Expositions of the Saying of the Lord. These volumes have perished. But bits of texts from them have been preserved in the writings of other early Christians. Scholars debate when Papias wrote. Most place his Expositions around AD 120. But some scholars opt for a date a few decades earlier (c. AD 95-110).[13] There is also debate concerning how closely Papias was related to the apostles. Irenaeus (c. AD 180) says he knew the apostle John and Eusebius (c. AD 325) says he knew someone who knew the apostle John.[14] In either case, Papias is very close to the time of the apostles. He is the first to inform us that Matthew was one of the twelve disciples, the tax-collector. Mark wrote his Gospel based on what he had received from the apostle Peter. And John’s Gospel was penned by John the apostle who had leaned on Jesus during the Last Supper.[15]The traditional authorship of Luke is first mentioned by Justin Martyr (Dialogues 103:19; c. AD 150).

Ehrman knows of Papias’ report but rejects it as referring to the Matthew and Mark in our present New Testament (226-27). Although he provides reasons, he fails to mention even in an endnote that many scholars disagree and have provided answers to what Ehrman regards as conclusive.[16] 

Something else must be considered. There were many biographies written in antiquity. Plutarch was one of the most prolific biographers of that time, writing more than 60 biographies of which we still have 50. It is of importance to observe that Plutarch’s name is absent from all of his extant biographies, which are therefore anonymous like the four Gospels in the New Testament. Yet, modern historians are quite certain Plutarch wrote them. Most classical authors did not include their name. But the manuscript traditions pertaining to the authorship of Plutarch’s biographies are clear. Moreover, the Lamprias catalogue from the fourth century attributes them to Plutarch.[17] Does this provide us with unimpeachable evidence that Plutarch wrote the biographies attributed to him? No. Is it reasonable to believe that Plutarch wrote them? You bet. The same may be said concerning the four Gospels in the New Testament. The traditions concerning the traditional authorship of the Gospels begin within 30 years of the final of the four to be written and continues without debate for centuries. Thus, Ehrman’s argument from the anonymity of the autographs of the four Gospels carries little if any weight.

Chapter 8 concludes Forged. Ehrman discusses a few modern forgeries such as the Long-Lost Second Book of Acts and Secret Mark. Why do people forge literature? For lots of reasons. Many Christians forged literature for different reasons, some noble. But at the end of the day they are still forgeries and involve deceit.

And now I wish to return to the crux of the matter of the traditional authorship of the disputed New Testament letters, but especially those attributed to Paul. Most scholars recognize that the use of a secretary in the writing of a letter has the potential to change much. As stated earlier, Ehrman himself recognizes the seriousness of the secretary factor related to arguments against traditional authorship.

Virtually all of the problems with what I’ve been calling forgeries can be solved if secretaries were heavily involved in the composition of the early Christian writings. (134)

Did Paul sometimes use a secretary? We may answer with an unequivocal yes. Of Paul’s seven undisputed letters, it is certain that four involved the use of a secretary. 

I, Tertius, who write this letter greet you in the Lord. (Rom 16:22)

This greeting is in my own hand—Paul. (1 Cor 16:21; cf. Gal 6:11; Phile 19)

Ehrman concurs, “There is no doubt that the apostle Paul used a secretary on occasion” (134). But how heavily involved in the letter were those secretaries? Ehrman interacts with what he refers to as the “fullest and most exhaustive” recent work devoted to the issue of secretaries in Paul’s letters, the doctoral dissertation by E. Randolph Richards.[18] Ehrman is correct that the best work on the topic of Paul’s use of a secretary has been done by Richards. Ehrman cites Richards’ dissertation published in 1991. I’ve likewise read it and it’s impressive.[19]  

Ehrman says Paul certainly used a secretary to whom he dictated at least some of his letters. But that there’s no evidence that he used them for any other services such as editing to correct grammar and improve style, coauthor to contribute to content, or compose the letter with the named author giving his final approval (134-36; cf. 77). Let’s take a look at his 3 reasons for holding this.

First, Ehrman asserts that there is no evidence of this being done by anyone outside of the ultra-wealthy. He writes, “Virtually all of [the evidence for the use of a secretary beyond taking dictation] comes from authors who were very, very wealthy and powerful and inordinately well educated” (135-36).

Writing a letter in antiquity was a costly enterprise. In the updated and expanded version of Randolph Richards’ doctoral dissertation, he discusses the costs involved. Papyri, labor, and courier fees added up quickly. Of course, Cicero, Seneca and the ultra-wealthy could easily afford the costs. But Paul the missionary would not have been so fortunate. Richards estimates that the cost for penning Paul’s letters ranged from $101 in today’s dollars for Philemon to $2,275 for Romans. And that does not include the expenses involved with a courier.[20]

Now perhaps you’re thinking, “But Paul tells us he had churches that supported him (Phil 4:10-18; 2 Cor 11:9). And we know he had co-workers whom he mentioned in his letters. They would naturally have been the couriers and could even have served as his secretaries. So, he wouldn’t have incurred little if any labor costs.” Of course. And what’s to have prevented these co-workers from also providing editorial and compositional services according to their personal abilities? Could the Tertius mentioned in Romans 16:22 have been a professional secretary who had volunteered his services? We will never know. What is clear is the fact that Paul was not a member of the ultra-wealthy does not preclude his use of a secretary for editing and composition.[21]

Second, Ehrman points out that letters in the Greco-Roman world were very short and to the point whereas the NT letters are lengthy treatises that deal with complex issues (136). Ehrman says this is problematic because the disputed letters of the New Testament such as Ephesians and 1 Peter are “lengthy treatises that deal with large and complex issues in the form of a letter” and are “so much more extensive than typical letters . . . in their theological expositions, ethical exhortations, and quotation of and interpretation of Scripture. These New Testament ‘letters’ are really more like essays put in letter form. So evidence that derives from the brief, stereotyped letters typically found in Greek and Roman circles is not necessarily germane to the ‘letters’ of the early Christians” (136, ital. mine). Indeed. And what is true of Ephesians and 1 Peter is even more true of ALL of Paul’s seven undisputed letters with the exception of Philemon. Ehrman has unwittingly eliminated his own argument against the heavy involvement of secretaries! Ephesians and 1 Peter are quite long when compared with the average length of the letters of Cicero and longer than the average length of the letters of Seneca.

  • Cicero: avg 295 words per letter, but ranging from 22 to 2,530 words[22]
  • Seneca: avg 995 words per letter, but ranging from 149 to 4,134
  • Paul: avg 2,493 words per letter (13 letters), ranging from 335 (Philemon) to 7,111 (Romans)[23]Avg of Paul’s undisputed letters: 3,442
    • Rom: 7,111; 1 Cor: 6,830; 2 Cor: 4,477; Gal: 2,230; Eph: 2,422; Phil: 1,629; Col: 1,582; 1 Th: 1,481; 2 Th: 823; 1 Tim: 1,591; 2 Tim: 1,238; Tit: 659; Philem: 335
  • Avg of Paul’s disputed letters: 1,386
  • Other NT letters:
    • Hebrews: 4,953; James: 1,742; 1 Peter: 1684; 2 Peter: 1,099; 1 John: 2,141; 2 John: 245; 3 John: 219; Jude: 461

The above figures provide some interesting observations. With the exception of Philemon, the average length of the New Testament letters is much longer than the average length of letters written by others of the period. However, notice the length of the undisputed letters of Paul. They are longer than the disputed letters. Yet no one, including Ehrman, questions whether Paul wrote Romans and 1 Corinthians in spite of the fact that those letters are each around 7,000 words! This reveals that Ehrman’s argument concerning letter length is only a paper tiger.

Millions of hard working folks have lost their jobs during the downside of our present economy. If your workplace was going to cut 30 percent of the workforce and you had to write and submit a document to the management articulating why your job is necessary and why you’re the person for that job, you wouldn’t take the task lightly. You would write it, read it, and edit it, carefully rewording certain sentences and paragraphs in order to communicate your points clearly and persuasively. You would ask your spouse and/or a trusted friend to read it and offer their honest suggestions before you submitted a final draft. You would do this because you would want to continue making your house payments, car payments, buying groceries and paying all of your bills. In a nutshell, you would carefully craft the document because you would want to keep your job and your present standard of living.

The early Christian Church faced many situations and theological debates. In their minds, these matters were often more important than life itself. For example, in 1 Corinthians Paul is answering a situation where some members of the church in Corinth were denying an afterlife. Paul replies that if we are not raised from the dead to enjoy eternal life, Christ was not raised from the dead either. And if Christ was not raised, our Christian faith is worthless and our loved ones who have already died are forever gone. In fact, Paul adds, if there is no future resurrection of the dead and this life is all there is, let’s party hard now because we will all be dead in a relatively short period of time (1 Cor. 15:12-19, 32)!

The letters in the New Testament weren’t written for the mere enjoyment of the exercise and at leisure as many of the letters of Cicero and Atticus had been. Given the importance the early Christian letters had for their authors and recipients, there was a much greater need for using a secretary in order to craft the letters carefully. We know Paul could write, since he signed many of his greetings at the end of his letters. So, why have a secretary to whom he could dictate a letter without also depending upon him for editing services? After all, as Ehrman rightly notes, Paul did not belong to the intellectually elite (135-36).

There’s another very good reason for holding that Paul would want his secretary to be more involved than simply taking dictation: Paul was apparently not very good at public speaking. This conclusion comes from information provided in his undisputed letters. In 2 Corinthians 11:6, Paul admits that he is “untrained in public speaking” (See also 1 Cor 2:1, 4). In 2 Corinthians 10:9-11 he writes, “it is said, ‘His [i.e., Paul’s] letters are weighty and powerful, but his physical presence is weak, and his public speaking is despicable.’ Such a person should consider this: What we are in the words of our letters when absent, we will be in actions when present.” Notice carefully how the subject changes from Paul the poor public speaker in the singular to the “we” who write the letters. More than one person is involved in writing Paul’s letters. So, the involvement of the secretary appears to go beyond taking simple dictation.

In Ehrman’s third and final argument against the secretary being heavily involved in Paul’s letters he says there’s evidence that brief stereotyped letters like land deeds and sales receipts were created by secretaries. But there is “absolutely no evidence” that such authority was ever provided to a secretary for “composing a long, detailed, finely argued, carefully reasoned, and nuanced letter like 1 Peter or Ephesians” (137). For example, Ehrman contends that 1 Peter was written by a

highly educated Greek-speaking Christian who understood how to use Greek rhetorical devices and could cite the Greek Old Testament with flair and nuance. That does not apply to the uneducated, illiterate, Aramaic-speaking fisherman from rural Galilee, and it does not appear to have been produced by a secretary acting on his behalf. (138-39)

And it does not seem possible that Peter gave the general gist of what he wanted to say and that a secretary then created the letter for him in his name, since, first, then the secretary rather than Peter would be the real author of the letter, and second, and even more important, we don’t seem to have any analogy for a procedure like this from the ancient world. (139)

But recall that Ehrman himself admits that, given the length of the New Testament letters, the Greco-Roman letters are not necessarily germane. Moreover, some analogy exists related to the liberty the historian could take in recreating speeches. The digital recorder was a long time away from being invented when historians attempted to reproduce speeches in antiquity. The historian was to do his best in recalling the content of the speeches from those who had personally witnessed it. However, according to Lucian, a Greek author from the second century who provides the only surviving treatise on the proper conventions of writing history in that era, historians were instructed to use accurate content. However, it was then that the historian could become orator and display his own elegance of words when communicating the content.[24]

Forged is an interesting read. Despite its shortcomings, it does a masterful job of raising the issue of traditional authorship in an accessible and entertaining manner to the general public. Ehrman’s treatment of Paul’s use of secretaries is both weak and problematic. If secretaries were involved with the traditional New Testament authors in the editing and composition of their letters, most of the arguments used against the traditional authorship of this literature lose their force and, as an old friend of mine would say, Ehrman is left with a firm grasp on an empty sack.

Michael Licona, Ph.D. is associate professor in theology at Houston Baptist University and president of Risen Jesus, Inc. He has debated Bart Ehrman twice. The second debate may be viewed HERE. The first debate may be viewed HERE. Short videos providing answsers to Ehrman may be found HEREA raido dialogue between Ehrman and Licona is HERE.


 


[1] Bart D. Ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings, fourth ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[2] Luke Timothy Johnson, The Writings of the New Testament, third ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2010).

[3] Raymond E. Brown, An Introduction to the New Testament (New York: Doubleday, 1997).

[4] Andreas J. Köstenberger, L. Scott Kellum, and Charles L. Quarles, The Cradle, The Cross, and The Crown: An Introduction to the New Testament (Nashville: B&H, 2009).

[5] D. A. Carson and Douglas J. Moo, An Introduction to the New Testament, second edition (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2005).

[6] For a full accounting of the ancient lists of canonical literature, see Lee Martin McDonald, The Biblical Canon: Its Origin, Transmission, and Authority (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2007), 445-51.

[7] For a comprehensive case that Paul regarded Jesus’ resurrection as an event that involved his physically transformed body, see Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach(Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2010), 400-37.

[8] NASB. See also Rom. 6:11; 7:6. John reports Jesus speaking of the resurrection of believers in both a present and future sense in John 5:25 and 28.

[9] English translation by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb (1876).

[10] See also The Martyrdom of Polycarp (c. AD 155-160); Tertullian, The Apology 50 (c. AD 200).

[11] Ehrman, The New Testament (2008), 229; cf. 221.

[12] See Ronald Mellor, The Roman Historians (New York: Routledge, 1999).

[13] Robert W. Yarbrough, “The Date of Papias: A Reassessment” in Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society26/2 (June 1983), 181-91.

[14] See the Fragments of Papias in The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English Translations, third ed., Michael W. Holmes, ed. and transl. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007), 733-37.

[15] Ibid, 739-41.

[16] For a few examples, see R. T. France, Matthew: Evangelist and Teacher (Downers Grove: IVP, 1989), 53-60; Robert H. Gundry in Mark: A Commentary on His Apology for the Cross, Volume 2 (9-16) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 1027-45; Craig S. Keener, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 38-41;

[17] I am grateful to Christopher Pelling for his assistance related to Plutarch.

[18] E. Randolph Richards, The Secretary in the Letters of Paul (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1991).

[19] Richards as an updated and expanded version with which Ehrman does not interact or mention: E. Randolph Richards, Paul and First-Century Letter Writing: Secretaries, Composition and Collection (Downers Grove: IVP, 2004).

[20] Richards (2004), 169.

[21] Josephus uses the Greek term sunergoi (co-workers) for those who had helped him write the Jewish War. Richards (1991, 153n108) cites a number of references in Paul’s letters where those he mentions with him may be regarded as sunergoi (1 Cor. 1:1; 2 Cor. 1:1; Phil. 1:1; Col. 1:1; 1 Th. 1:1; 2 Th. 1:1; Philem. 1. cf. Gal. 1:1). I will add that Paul calls his traveling companions sunergoi in contexts where they may possibly be understood in a manner compatible with Josephus’ use (Rom. 16:21; 2 Cor. 8:23; Phil. 2:25; Philem. 1:24; Col. 4:11). We should keep in mind that Josephus was wealthy. However, this does not disqualify Paul’s sunergoifrom serving in similar duties in the letter-writing process, although they may not have been skilled professionals.

[22] The figures for Cicero and Seneca are from Richards (2004), 163.

[23] Numbers of Greek words in each of the New Testament literature is from BibleWorks 8.

[24] Lucian, “How to Write History,” 58.

Handling an Objection: “I love the moral teachings of Jesus but I don’t think He is divine.”

Handling an Objection: “I love the moral teachings of Jesus but I don’t think He is divine.”

 
This past week I was doing some outreach on a major college campus. When it came time to talk about the identity of Jesus, I heard two similar responses. Granted, I have heard this objection many, many, times. It goes like this:

“I really like the moral teachings of Jesus, but I don’t think he is divine.”

I could respond to this by using the C.S. Lewis argument that Jesus is either Lord, Lunatic, or Liar. I tend to not use that one a lot. While it still has some value it generally begs the question of the reliability of the New Testament. After all, some skeptics assume the deity of Jesus is a later invention of the Church. As I have noted elsewhere, this is incorrect. The Christology is Jesus was at the very start of the formation of the early Jesus movement.

Jesus is the Message

Anyway, how do I respond to this? First, since the person already admires the teachings of Jesus, I point to the blind spot in their thinking. First, it is not the moral teachings of Jesus that is the message. Rather, Jesus is the message!

Probably the most pertinent examples of how Jesus in the message is in the Gospel of John where we see the “I AM” (Gk. ego eimi,) statements. I am well aware that all these passages need to be studied in context. But we see clearly that Jesus is emphasizing He is the message. For example:

Then Jesus declared, “I am the bread of life. He who comes to me will never go hungry, and he who believes in me will never be thirsty. (John 6:35)

When Jesus spoke again to the people, he said, “I am the light of the world. Whoever follows me will never walk in darkness, but will have the light of life.” (John 8:12)

I am the gate; whoever enters through me will be saved. He will come in and go out, and find pasture. (John 10:9)

“I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep.” (John 10:11)

Jesus said to her, “I am the resurrection and the life. He who believes in me will live, even though he dies; and whoever lives and believes in me will never die.” (John 11:25-26)

Jesus answered, “I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.” (John 14:6)

“I am the vine; you are the branches. If a man remains in me and I in him, he will bear much fruit; apart from me you can do nothing.” (John 15:5)

From a tactical perspective, when people say they only like the teachings of Jesus, it can allow you the opportunity to share these passages from John and ask them if they might rethink their position.

Why Was Jesus Crucified?

Second, I ask the person is why was Jesus crucified? One issue that can tend to be overlooked is that we can minimize the issue of blasphemy in a Jewish setting. by the way, none of the above figures were accused of blasphemy. According to Jewish law, the claim to be the Messiah was not a criminal, nor capital offense. Therefore, the claim to be the Messiah was not even a blasphemous claim. (1)

If this is true, why was Jesus accused of blasphemy? According to Mark 14:62, Jesus affirmed the chief priests question that He is the Messiah, the Son of God, and the Coming Son of Man who would judge the world. This was considered a claim for deity since the eschatological authority of judgment was for God alone. Jesus provoked the indignation of his opponents because of His application of Daniel 7:13 and Psalm 110:1 to himself.

Also, many parables, which are universally acknowledged by critical scholars to be authentic to the historical Jesus, show that Jesus believed himself to be able to forgive sins against God (Matt. 9:2; Mark 2: 1-12). Forgiving sins was something that was designated for God alone (Exod. 34: 6-7; Neh.9:17; Dan. 9:9) and it was something that was done only in the Temple along with the proper sacrifice. So it can be seen that Jesus acts as if He is the Temple in person. In Mark 14:58, it says, “We heard him say, ‘I will destroy this man-made temple and in three days will build another, not made by man.’ The Jewish leadership knew that God was the one who was responsible for building the temple (Ex. 15:17; 1 En. 90:28-29).(2)

Also, God is the only one that is permitted to announce and threaten the destruction of the temple (Jer. 7:12-13; 26:4-6, 9;1 En.90:28-29). (3) It is also evident that one reasons Jesus was accused of blasphemy was because He usurped God’s authority by making himself to actually be God (Jn. 10:33, 36). Not only was this considered by the Jews to be blasphemous, it was worthy of the death penalty (Matt. 26:63-66; Mk. 14:61-65; Lk. 22:66-71; Jn. 10:31-39; 19:7)

As the late Martin Hengal said:

“Jesus’ claim to authority goes far beyond anything that can be adduced as prophetic prototypes or parallels from the field of the Old Testament and from the New Testament period. [Jesus] remains in the last resort incommensurable, and so basically confounds every attempt to fit him into categories suggested by the phenomenology of sociology of religion.” (4)

Remember that there was a Jewish leader named Bar Kohba who made an open proclamation to be the real Messiah who would take over Rome and enable the Jewish people to regain their self-rule (A.D. 132-135). Even a prominent rabbi called Rabbi Akiba affirmed him as the Messiah. Unfortunately, the revolt led by Bar Kohba failed and as a result and both he and Rabbi Akiba were slain. And remember, Bar Kohba was not accused of blasphemy. He never claimed to have the authority to forgive sins or claim to be the Son of Man (as referring to Daniel 7).

Conclusion

In the end, I think the reason some people like the moral teachings of Jesus and avoid the divinity issue is an issue of autonomy. A non- divine Jesus is really not very threatening and doesn’t ask much of us.

Sources:

1. See Darrell L. Bock. Blasphemy and Exaltation in Judaism: The Charge Against Jesus in Mark 14:53-65. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1998.
2. William Lane Craig. Reasonable Faith: Third Edition. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 2008, 307.
3. Martin Hengel, The Charismatic Leader and His Followers. New York: Crossroad, 1981. 68-69; Cited in Edwards, 96.
4. Jacob Immanuel Schochet. Mashiach: The Principle of Mashiach and the Messianic Era in Jewish Law and Tradition. New York: S.I.E. 1992, 93-101.
5. Ibid.

Using Inference to the Best Explantion: What Caused the Birth of Christology?

Using Inference to the Best Explantion: What Caused the Birth of Christology?

Using Inference to the Best Explantion: What Caused the Birth of Christology?
 
Anyone who studies historical method is familiar with what is called historical causation. Historians seek out the causes of a certain events. As historian Paul Barnett says, “The birth of Christianity and the birth of Christology are inseparable both as to time and essence.” (1) One thing for sure: the birth of Christology was very early and not something that was invented much later in Church history.

We must not forget that within Judaism there is a term called “avodah zara” which is defined as the formal recognition or worship as God of an entity that is in fact not God i.e., idolatry. In other words, the acceptance of a non-divine entity as your deity is a form of avodah zara. (2) As of today, traditional or Orthodox Judaism still upholds the position that Jewish people are forbidden to pray and worship anyone other than the God of Israel (Ex. 20:1–5; Deut. 5:6–9).

Paul’s Letters are the earliest records we have for the life of Jesus. We know that from about AD 48 until his death (60 to 65 AD) Paul wrote at least 13 of the New Testament’s books. They are also the earliest letters we have for the Christology of Jesus. To read any objections to Paul’s Letters, see here.

As pointed out by Richard Bauckham in his work on this topic, Paul believed that Jesus was God by attributing attributes to him that were distinctly reserved for God. And he did so in a distinctly Jewish manner while also preserving monotheism. There were three attributes that first century Jews uniquely assigned to God:

1. God is the Sole Ruler of all things

2. God is the Sole Creator of all things

3. God is the only being deserving of worship

So let’s look at how Paul matches up the data here:

1. Jesus participates in God’s sole rule over all things

Phil: 3:20-21: “For our citizenship is in heaven, from which also we eagerly wait for a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ; who will transform the body of our humble state into conformity with the body of His glory, by the exertion of the power that He has even to subject all things to Himself.”

Eph. 1:21-22: Paul speaks of Jesus being ”far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this age but also in the one to come. And He put all things in subjection under His feet…”

Here, Jesus is clearly given the authority to rule above every one of God’s created beings.

2. Jesus as the Creator of all things

Jesus is clearly thought by Paul to have been the creator of the universe. This attribute is reserved only to God in Second Temple Judaism. Paul makes it clear that Jesus created all things.

Col. 1:15-16: “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For by him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things were created by him and for him.”

3. Jesus as worthy of worship

As discussed above, only God was worthy of worship in Second Temple Judaism. Nevertheless, Paul discusses the worship of Jesus. Since God is the sole Creator and Ruler of all things He alone should be worshiped. Even within the Roman Empire, Jews worshiped God alone. No other entity was worthy of worship. Here is one of the earliest Christological texts:

Philippians 2:6-11: “Who, being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient to death even death on a cross! Therefore God exalted him to the highest place and gave him the name that is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.”

In their book The Jesus Legend, The: A Case for the Historical Reliability of the Synoptic Jesus Tradition, Gregory Boyd and Paul Eddy say,

“During the reign of Pilate and Herod, when Caiaphas was high priest, we find a Jewish movement arising that worships a recent contemporary alongside and in a similar manner as Yahweh-God. To call this development “novel” is a significant understatement. In truth, it constitutes nothing less than a massive paradigm shift in the first century Palestinian Jewish religious worldview.” (3)

Explanations try to show how something happened. That is, what is the cause for something that has happened. So let’s weight the options on the table and see if we can come up with an explanation that explains the data at hand:

#1: Religious Syncretism

While there were various Jewish sects during the time of Jesus, religious syncretism is a form of idolatry. First, the Jewish Scriptures forbids worshiping anyone other than the God of Israel (Ex. 20:1–5; Deut. 5:6–9). Following the exile and subsequent intertestamental struggles, it can asked whether Jews still fell prey to physical idolatry. Some skeptics assert that since Israel always had problems with idolatry in their early formation, it would not be a challenge to assert they could fall into idolatry again by worshiping one of their own countrymen as God. But this is problematic; To assert that Israel’s previous problems with idolatry which would lead to further into idolatry in the Second Temple period leads me to cry “anachronism.” Remember, idolatry is rarely mentioned in the Gospels. But there are warnings about idolatry in other portions of the New Testament( 1 Cor. 6:9-10 ; Gal 5:20 ; Eph. 5:5 ; Col 3:5 ; 1 Peter 4:3 ; Rev 21:8). Paul instructs believers not to associate with idolaters ( 1 Cor .5:11 ; 10:14 ) and even commends the Thessalonian for their turning from the service of idols “to serve the living and true God” ( 1 Thess1:9) (see Walter A. Elwell’s Baker’s Evangelical Dictionary of Biblical Theology, pgs 364-365). So I guess my question is the following: Why would Paul or the early disciples commit an idolatrous act (by saying Jesus is divine) and but then later speak against idolatry? It seems rather inconsistent.

#2 Hellenism or Polytheism?

The syncretism objection is related to the Hellenism/Polytheism possibility. The first followers of Jesus were exclusively Jews. The book of Acts gives a reference to the early followers of Jesus as “the sect of Nazarenes” (Acts 24:5). However, it is asserted that as the Christian faith spread, it became a predominately Gentile based religion. By the time of Jesus, Jews had encountered the impact of Hellenistic culture for three hundred years. The word “Hellenistic” was given to describe the period of history that started with the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C. and ended when Rome conquered Alexander’s empire in 30 B.C .It is also safe to say that several forms of Jewish culture during the Roman period were somewhat Hellenized. This is why it is often argued that the incarnation grew out of Hellenistic presuppositions. But as Paul Eddy points out in his articleWas Christianity Corrupted by Hellenism? from the middle of the third century BC, while Jewish Palestine had already experienced the effects of Hellenism we need to remember that Hellenism did not tend to infiltrate and ‘corrupt’ the local religious traditions of the ancient world. Rather, people maintained their religious traditions in spite of Hellenistic influence in other areas of their lives. Also, there are also references to the negative views of gentile polytheism (Acts 17: 22-23; 1 Cor 8:5). Gentiles were regarded as both sinful (Gal 2:5) and idolatrous (Rom 1:23).

#3: The Deity of Jesus is Legend?

As I already said, the earliest documents for the Christology of Jesus are Paul’s Letters. In them, we have one of the earliest confessions of the deity of Jesus in 1 Corinthians 8: 5-6:

“For though there are things that are called gods, whether in the heavens or on earth; as there are many gods and many lords; yet to us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we for him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we live through him.”

Here is a distinct echo of the Shema, a creed that every Jew would have memorized from a very early age. When we read Deuteronomy 6:4-9, which says, “Hear O Israel! The Lord our God is our God, the Lord is one,” Paul ends up doing something extremely significant in the history of Judaism.

A glance at the entire context of the passage in 1 Corinthians 8:5-6 shows that according to Paul’s inspired understanding, Jesus receives the “name above all names,” the name God revealed as his own, the name of the Lord. In giving a reformulation of the Shema, Paul still affirms the existence of the one God, but what is unique is that somehow this one God now includes the one Lord, Jesus the Messiah. Therefore, Paul’s understanding of this passage begets no indication of abandoning Jewish monotheism in place of paganism.

For a Jewish person, when the title “Lord” (Heb. Adonai) was used in place of the divine name YHWH, this was the highest designation a Jewish person could use for deity. Furthermore, it would have been no problem to confess Jesus as prophet, priest, or king since these offices already existed in the Hebrew Bible. After all, these titles were used for a human being. There was nothing divine about them.

#4: The Christology of Jesus can be explained by the disciples experience with Jesus before the resurrection and the post-resurrection appearances

I have already pointed out that the resurrection of Jesus is the best explanation for many historical issues within the New Testament.. So at this point, I would have to assume that skeptics can only say that the birth of Christology is simply false because of their metaphysical starting points (e.g., Jesus can’t be divine because the natural world is all there is, etc).

For those that are still hung up on the reliability of the New Testament, see our resource page.

Sources:
1. 1. Paul Barnett, The Birth of Christianity: The First Twenty Years (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2005), 8.

2. David Berger, The Rebbe, The Messiah And The Scandal Of Orthodox Difference, 160-174.

3. Gregory A. Boyd and Paul R. Eddy, The Jesus Legend: A Case For The Historical Reliability of the Synoptic Tradition (Grand Rapids: MI: Baker Books, 2007), 132.

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