الصلاح الإلهي – صلاح الله المطلق – سي إس لويس

الصلاح الإلهي – صلاح الله المطلق – سي إس لويس

الصلاح الإلهي – صلاح الله المطلق – سي إس لويس

الصلاح الإلهي – صلاح الله المطلق – سي إس لويس

“المحبة تستطيع أن تحتمل، والمحبة تستطيع أن تغفر… لكن المحبة لا تستطيع أبداً أن تتصالح مع شيء بغيض… لذلك لا يستطيع الله مطلقاً أن يتصالح مع خطيئتك، لأن الخطية نفسها غير قابلة للتغيير، ولكن الله يمكنه أن يتصالح معك كشخص، لأن الشخص يمكن استرداده وتجديده.”

تراهيرن

Traherne. Centuries of Meditation.

إن أي تفكير في صلاح الله ينذرنا على الفور بالمعضلة التالية. فمن ناحية، إذا كان الله أحكم منا فإن حكمه لا بد أن يختلف عن حكمنا في الكثير من الأمور، وليس بأقلها في الخير والشر. فما يبدو بالنسبة لنا خيراً قد لا يكون خيراً في عينيه، وما يبدو بالنسبة لنا شراً قد لا يكون شراً.

من الناحية الأخرى، إذا كان حكم الله الأدبي الأخلاقي يختلف عن حكمنا بحيث أن ما نعتبره “أسود” قد يكون بالنسبة لله “أبيض”، فليس هناك أي معنى أن ندعو الله صالحاً؛ لأننا عندما نقول إن “الله صالح”، بينما نؤكد أن صلاحه يختلف بالكامل عن صلاحنا، فهذا معناه الحقيقي فقط أن نقول، “إننا لا نعرف ماهية الله”. وصفة غير معروفة على الإطلاق في الله لا تستطيع أن تعطينا أسساً أخلاقية لكي نحبه ونطيعه. فإذا لم يكن الله (بحسب مفهومنا) “صالح” فإننا سنطيعه، إن كنا سنطيعه من الأساس، فقط من خلال الخوف – وعندها يجب أن نكون مستعدين بالمثل أن نطيع شيطاناً كلي القدرة. عندما نستنتج من عقيدة “الفساد الكلي” Total Depravity – أنه حيث أننا فاسدون كلية فإن فكرتنا عن الخير ببساطة لا تساوي شيئاً – فإن هذا قد يحول المسيحية بالتالي إلى شكل من أشكال عبادة الشيطان.

لذلك يعتمد الهروب من هذه المعضلة على ملاحظة ما يحدث في العلاقات الإنسانية، عندما يدخل إنسان ذو معايير أدبية أخلاقية دنيا إلى مجتمع يتكون من أولئك الذين هم أفضل وأحكم منه ويتعلم تدريجياً أن يقبل “معاييرهم”، وهي عمليه، إذ تحدث، يمكنني أن أصفها بدقة شديدة، حيث أنني قد اختبرتها بصفة شخصية، فعندما ذهبت أول مرة إلى الجامعة كنت تقريباً بدون ضمير أخلاقي هو نوع من النفور الضئيل من القسوة ومن الدناءة بشأن المال، أما العفة، والصدق، والتضحية بالنفس فقد كنت أفكر فيها مثلما يفكر قرد البابون في الموسيقا الكلاسيكية.

لكن برحمة الله وقعت بين مجموعة من الشباب (وبالمناسبة، ليس من بينهم مسيحيون) كانوا قريبين مني في الفكر والخيال بما يكفي بحيث مثلوا بالنسبة لي مصدر علاقة حميمية مني في الفكر والخيال بما يكفي بحيث مثلوا بالنسبة لي مصدر علاقة حميمية مباشرة، ولكنهم أيضاً عرفوا، وحاولوا أن يطيعوا، القانون الأخلاقي. وبالتالي فإن حكمهم على الخير والشر كان مختلفاً جداً عن حكمي.

ما يحدث في مثل هذه الحالة لا يشبه في أقل تقدير أن يتم سؤالك أن تعامل ما كان يطلق عليه حتى ذلك الحين “أسود”، باعتباره “أبيض”. فالأحكام الأخلاقية الجديدة لا تدخل العقل أبداً كمجرد انعكاسات Reversals للأحكام السابقة (رغم انها تقوم بالفعل بعكسها)، بل “كأسياد متوقعين بكل تأكيد”. فلا يمكن أن يكون لديك أدنى شك في الاتجاه الذي ستتحرك فهي؛ إذ ان هذه الأحكام الجديدة تشبه “الخير” أكثر من ذرات الخير التي كانت لديك بالفعل، ولكنها تكون من ناحية ما مستمرة معها (يعني الكاتب أن كل إنسان في داخله بعض الإدراك لما هو خير وصالح، وبداخله أيضاً بعض القدر من ذرات الصلاح، حتى وإن كانت أفعاله شريرة، وعندما يتعرف هذا الإنسان على الخير والصلاح فإنه يجد أن في داخله تعرف وإدراك مسبق لهذا الصلاح – المحرر).

لكن الاختبار العظيم هنا هو أن إدراك المعايير الجديدة يصحبه شعور بالخزي والذنب؛ إذ يعي الإنسان أنه قد أخطأ بفداحة داخل مجتمع هو غير مؤهل له. وهكذا، في ضوء مثل هذه الخبرات لا بد لنا أن نفكر في صلاح الله.

دون أدنى شك، فكرة الله عن “الصلاح” تختلف عن فكرتنا؛ لكنك لا تحتاج أن تخاف من أنك إذ تقترب من فكرته سيطلب منك ببساطة أن تعكس Reverse أو تناقض معاييرك الأخلاقية؛ فعندما يظهر لك الفارق المقصود بين الأخلاقيات الإلهية وأخلاقياتك الشخصية، لن يكون لديك في الحقيقة أدنى شك في أن التغيير المطلوب منك هو في الاتجاه الذي تستطيع بالفعل أن تدعوه “أفضل”.

يختلف “الصلاح” الإلهي عن صلاحنا، لكنه “لا يختلف جوهرياً” عنه؛ إنه لا يختلف عنه مثل اختلاف الأبيض عن الأسود، بل مثل اختلاف الدائرة الكاملة المتقنة عن أول محاولة يقوم بها طفل للاسم دائرة عجلة. لكن عندما يتعلم الطفل أن يرسم، سيعرف عندئذ أن الدائرة التي رسمها في النهاية هي ما كان يحاول أن يرسمه منذ البداية. (يقصد الكاتب أن صلاح الله لا يختلف عن صلاحنا في جوهره أي لا يناقضه بصورة مطلقة بل إنه يختلف عنه في جودته وكماله وإتقانه – المرجم.)

هذا التعليم مفترض مسبقاً في الكتاب المقدس. فالمسيح يدعو البشر إلى التوبة – وهي دعوة كانت ستصبح بلا معنى لو أن معايير الله تخلف جوهرياً عن المعايير التي عرفها البشر بالفعل وفشلوا في ممارستها. فالله يناشد حكمنا الأخلاقي الموجود بالفعل، إذ يقول، لماذا لا تحكمون في أنفسكم بما هو حق؟ (لوقا 12: 57) كان الله في العهد القديم يوبخ البشر على أساس مفاهيمهم الشخصية عن الامتنان والإخلاص والعدل؛ ويضع نفسه كما لو أنه في محاكمة مع مخلوقاته التي صنعها. “ماذا وجد فيّ آباؤكم من جور حتى ابتعدوا عني؟” (إرميا 2: 5).

بعد هذه المقدمات، أرجو أن يكون من الآمن أن أفترض أن بعض المفاهيم الخاصة بالصلاح الإلهي التي تميل إلى أن تسود تفكيرنا، رغم أنه يندر التعبير عنها بكلمات كثيرة، هي الآن عرضة للنقد.

في أيامنا هذه نحن نقصد بصلاح لله حصرياً تقريباً، محبته؛ وقد نكون على حق في ذلك. في هذا السياق، معظمنا يعني بالحب، اللطف والحنان، أو الرغبة في رؤية الآخرين أكثر سعادة من النفس؛ ليس أن نراهم سعداء بهذه الطريقة أو تلك، بل فقط سعداء. فالذي يمكن أن يرضينا حقاً هو إله يقول على أي شيء نحب أن نفعله. “ماذا يهم، طالما أنهم راضون وقانعون؟” إننا في الحقيقة لا نريد “أباً” في السماء قد ما نريد “جداً” في السماء، شيخاً عجوزاً محسناً، الذي كما يقولون “يحب أن يرى الشباب يستمتعون”، والذي خطته لأجل الكون هي ببساطة أن يقال فعلياً في نهاية كل يوم، “لقد استمتع الجميع بوقت طيب”.

إنني أعترف أنه ليس كل الناس يقومون بصياغة لاهوت بمثل هذه المصطلحات بالتحديد؛ لكن هناك مفهوم لا يختلف كثيراً عن هذا يقبع في الخلفية الذهنية للكثيرين. أنا لا أزعم أنني استثناء، لذلك: كنت أرغب كثيراً في أن أعيش في عالم تحكمه مثل هذه الأفكار الخاطئة. لكن حيث أنه من الواضح بشدة أنني لا أستطيع ذلك، وحيث أن لدي سبب لكي أعتقد، رغم ذلك، أن الله محبة، فإنني أستنتج أن مفهومي عن الحب يحتاج إلى تصحيح.

ربما قد تعلمت بالفعل، حتى من الشعراء، أن الحب هو شيء أكثر صرامة وقوة وروعة من مجرد اللطف؛ وأن حتى الحب بين الجنسين، هو كما في دانتي Dante، “سيد ذو مظهر رهيب” ” A Lord of Terrible Aspect”. نعم هناك لطف في الحب؛ لكن الحب واللطف ليسا متزامنين ومتماثلين Coterminous، وعندما ينفصل اللطف (بحسب المعنى المقدم أعلاه) عن العناصر الأخرى من الحب، فإنه يتضمن نوعاً معيناً من اللامبالاة الجوهرية بالشيء موضوع اهتمامه، بل حتى ما يشبه احتقاره.

إذ يوافق اللطف بسهولة جداً على القضاء على الشيء موضوع اهتمامه، فقد التقينا جميعاً بأناس يقودهم لطفهم تجاه الحيوانات باستمرار إلى قتلها حتى لا تتألم. لذلك فاللطف، كمجرد لطف، لا يهتم ما إذا أصبح موضوع اهتمامه جيداً أو سيئاً، طالما أنه يهرب من الألم. لكن كما يشير الكتاب المقدس، النغول هم الذين يتركون دون تهذيب؛ أما الأبناء الشرعيون، الذين عليهم أن يحملوا ويواصلوا تقليد العائلة، فيتم تأديبهم.

فالناس الذين لا يعنينا شيء من أمرهم هم الذين نطلب لهم السعادة بأية شروط، أما أصدقائنا، وأحبائنا، وأبنائنا، فإننا نكون صارمين، ونفضل حتى أن نراهم يتألمون كثيراً عن أن يكونوا سعداء بطرق حقيرة وجافية. فإذا كان الله محبة، فإنه بحسب تعريف المحبة، يكون أكثر من مجرد لطف. ويبدو من كل السجلات، أنه على الرغم من أن الله يوبخنا كثيراً ويديننا، إلا أنه لا ينظر إلينا أبداً باحتقار وازدراء.

فقد أعطانا الله عطية الحب التي لا يمكن استيعابها أو التعبير عنها، وبرهم لنا هذا الحب بأعمق المعاني وبأكثر الطرق المأساوية التي لا تنسى (هذا التعبير هو تجسد الله في المسيح وموته الكفاري – المحرر).

بالطبع، العلاقة بين الخالق والمخلوق هي علاقة متفردة، ولا يمكن مقارنتها بأية علاقة أخرى بين مخلوق وغيره. فالله أسمى وأبعد عنا وفي نفس الوقت أقرب إلينا، من أي كائن آخر. فهو أبعد عنا لأن الفارق المطلق بين ذاك الذي يحمل في ذاته مبدأ وجوده وذلك المخلوق الذي يتواصل معه، يمكن مقارنته بالفارق بين رئيس الملائكة ودودة حقيرة.

فالله هو الذي يخلق، ونحن المخلوقون؛ هو الأصل، ونحن المشتقون منه. لكن في نفس الوقت، ولنفس السبب، فإن العلاقة الحميمة بين الله وبين حتى أدنى المخلوقات هي أقرب من أية علاقة يمكن الوصول إليها بين مخلوق وآخر.

إن حياتنا، في كل لحظة منها، مستمدة من الله؛ فالقوة المعجزية الضئيلة المتمثلة في إرادتنا الحرة تعمل فقط في أجساد تقوم طاقته المستمرة بحفظها في الوجود، بل أن مجرد قدرتنا نفسها على التفكير هي قدرته المنقولة إلينا، مثل هذه العلاقة الفريدة يمكن إدراكها فقط بواسطة التشبيهات؛ فمن خلال مختلف أنواع الحب المعروفة بين المخلوقات، نصل إلى مفهوم غير كاف، ولكنه مفيد، عن محبة الله للإنسان.

أدنى أنواع الحب، النوع الذي لا يُعتبر “حباً” على الإطلاق إلا فقط كامتداد للكلمة، هو الذي يشعر به الفنان تجاه عمل فني. تتم تصوير علاقة الله بالإنسان بهذه الطريقة في رؤية إرميا للفخاري والوعاء الذي كان يصنعه من الطين، أو عندما يتكلم القديس بطرس عن الكنيسة بأكملها باعتبارها بناء يعمل فيه الله، وعن الأعضاء الأفراد باعتبارهم حجارة. لكن تتمثل محدودية هذه التشبيه بالطبع في أنه في هذا الرمز لا يعتبر المتألم حياً، وأن هناك قضايا معينة تختص العدالة والرحمة تنشأ عندما تكون “الحجارة” بالفعل “حية”.

وبالتالي تظل هذه القضايا غير ممثلة في هذا التشبيه. لكنه تشبيه مهم على قدر ما يذهب إليه. فنحن، ليس مجازياً بل بالحقيقة، تحفة فنية إلهية، شيء يصنعه الله، وبالتالي لن يرضى إلا عندما يكون له شخصية وكفاءة معينة. هنا، مرة أخرى، نلتقي بما أطلق عليه “الثناء الذي لا يُعبر عنه” Intolerable Compliment (بمعنى ان اهتمام الله وتعلقه بالإنسان لا يمكن استيعابه او التعبير عنه. إنه نوع من الحب غير مدرك المعاني أو المفردات بالنسبة للإنسان الذي هو مثل الدودة الصغيرة الحقيرة – المحرر).

قد لا يشعر الفنان بانزعاج كبير بشأن لوحة قد رسمها دون اهتمام لإسعاد طفل؛ قد يرضى بأن يتركها كما هي رغم أنها قد لا تكون بالضبط كما قصدها أن تكون، لكنه بالنسبة للصورة العظيمة لحياته، العمل الذي يحبه، رغم أنه على نحو مختلف، في مثل القوة التي يحب بها رجل امرأة أو أم طفلها – سيتحمل مصاعب لا نهاية لها – وبالتالي سيعطي بلا شك اهتماماً لا حد له للصورة لو كانت حية. يمكن للإنسان أن يتخيل صورة حية، بعد أن يتم حكها وكشطها وإعادة رسمها للمرة العاشرة، تتمنى تلك الصورة لو أنها كانت فقط مجرد رسم مصغر يتم الانتهاء منه في دقيقة. نفس الطريقة، من الطبيعي بالنسبة لنا أن نتمنى لو أن الله كان قد صمم لنا مصيراً أقل مجداً وبالتالي أقل شقاءً؛ لكننا عندها نكون راغبين ليس في حب أكثر بل في حب أقل.

هناك نوع آخر من الحب وهو محبة إنسان لحيوان، وهي علاقة تستخدم باستمرار في الكتاب المقدس لكي ترمز إلى العلاقة بين الله والبشر؛ فنحن قطيعه، “شعبه وغنم مرعاه”. هذا من بعض النواحي تشبيه أفضل من السابق، لأن الطرف الأدنى كائن حي، ولكنه مع ذلك أدنى بلا أي شك من الطرف الآخر. لكن هذا المقياس لا يزال أقل من جيد، حيث أن الإنسان لم يخلق الحيوان ولا يفهمه بالكامل.

ومع ذلك تكمن القيمة العظيمة في التشبيه في حقيقة أن الرابط (يمكن أن نقول مثلاً) بين إنسان وكلب هي في الأساس لأجل خاطر الإنسان: فالإنسان يروض الكلب في الأساس لكي يحب الكلب، وليس لكي يحبه الكلب، ولكي يقوم الكلب بخدمته، وليس لكي يقوم الإنسان بخدمة الكلب. لكن في نفس الوقت، لا يتم التضحية باهتمامات الكلب لأجل اهتمامات الإنسان. فالغاية الواحدة (أن يحب الإنسان الكلب) لا يمكن الوصول إليها بالكامل إلا إذا قام الكلب أيضاً، بطريقته، بمحبة الإنسان، ولا يستطيع الكلب أن يخدم الإنسان إلا إذا قام الإنسان، بطريقة مختلفة، بخدمة الكلب.

فقط لأن الكلب بحسب المقاييس البشرية هو واحد من “أفضل” المخلوقات غير العاقلة، وموضوع مناسب لمحبة الإنسان – بالطبع بدرجة ونوع المحبة التي تناسب مثل هذا الكائن، وليس بدرجة المبالغات السخيفة بتشبيه الكلب بالإنسان – يتدخل الإنسان في حياة الكلب ولجعله محبوباً أكثر مما هو عليه في الطبيعة. ففي حالته كما هو بالطبيعة يكون للكلب رائحة منفرة، وعادات تحبط محبة الإنسان: لذلك يقوم الإنسان بغسل جسم كلبه، وتدريبه في البيت، وتعليمه ألا يسرق؛ وبذلك يستطيع الإنسان أن يحبه بالكامل. بالنسبة إلى الجرو، لو كان عالماً لاهوتياً، لكانت ستبدو له العملية كلها وكأنها تلقي بشكوك خطيرة على “صلاح” الإنسان؛ لكن الكلب كامل النضج وتام التدريب، والأكبر حجماً، والأكثر صحة، والذي يعيش حياة أطول من الكلب البري. والذي يمنح الدخول، كما لو كان بالنعمة، إلى عالم كامل من الميول والولاءات والاهتمامات ووسائل الراحة أبعد بكثير من مصيره الحيواني. لن تكون له مثل هذه الشكوك.

ستلاحظ أن الإنسان (إنني أتكلم خلال كل ذلك عن إنسان صالح) يتحمل كل هذه المشقات والآلام مع الكلب، ويسبب للكلب كل هذه الآلام، فقط لأنه حيوان في مستوى عال – لأنه محبوب بطريقة حميمة حتى أنه يستحق مشقة جعله محبوباً بالكامل. فالإنسان لا يقوم بتدريب حشرة “أبو مقص” في المنزل. أو يقوم بغسل جسم حشرة “أم أربعة وأربعين”. قد نرغب بالفعل لو كنا بمثل هذا الشأن الدنيء لدى الله حتى يتركنا لشأننا لكي نتبع دوافعنا الطبيعية – أن يتخلى عن محاولاته لتدريبنا على شيء يختلف كثيراً عن ذواتنا الطبيعية؛ لكن مرة أخرى، عندها لن نكون ساعين إلى مزيد من الحب، بل إلى القليل منه. (يريد الكاتب أن يقول إن محبه الله لنا تجعله يتحمل ألم تدريبنا وتشكيلنا وتجعلنا نجتاز في آلام مختلفة لأننا نمثل قيمة عظيمة بالنسبة له، لأننا لو كنا ذوي قيمة ضئيلة لما تحمل تلك التكلفة وهذه المشقة الباهظة. والمحبة الحقيقية الحميمة تستلزم التهذيب الذي يكون بلا شك مؤلماً – المترجم.)

هناك تشبه آخر أكثر نبلاً، والذي أقره الاتجاه المستمر لتعليم ربنا، وهو تشبيه محبة الله للإنسان بمحبة الأب لابنه. إلا أنه كلما يتم استخدام هذه التشبيه (أي كلما نصلي الصلاة الربية)، لا بد أن نتذكر أن المخلص استخدمه في وقت ومكان حيث كانت السلطة الأبوية تحتل مكانة أسمى بكثير مما هي عليها الآن في إنجلترا الحديثة. حين يكون الأب الآن نصف آسف لأنه أتى بابنه إلى العالم، خائفاً من كبحه لئلا ينشئ حواجز بينهما بل خائفاً حتى من تعليمه وإرشاده لئلا يتداخل في استقلالية فكره، وبالتالي يمثل ذلك رمزاً شديد التضليل للأبوة الإلهية.

إنني لا أناقش هنا ما إذا كانت سلطة الآباء، في حدودها القديمة، شيئاً جيداً أم سيئاً؛ بل إنني أشرح فقط ماذا كان يعني مفهوم الأبوة بالنسبة إلى أول من استمعوا إلى ربنا، وبالتأكيد لمن خلفوهم على مدى عدة قرون. سيصبح هذا أكثر وضوحاً إذا فكرنا كيف كان ربنا ينظر إلى بنوته الشخصية للآب، ويخضع إرادته بالكامل للإرادة الأبوية ولا يسمح حتى لنفسه بأن يدعى “صالحاً” لأن “الصالح” هو اسم الآب (رغم أن المسيح بحسب عقيدتنا، هو واحد مع أبيه وهو شريك سرمدي معه.

وهذا ما لا يوجد بين أي ابن أرضي لأب أرضي). فالحب بين الآب والابن، في هذا الرمز، يعني في الأساس الحب السلطوي من جانب، والحب الطائع من الجانب الآخر. فالأب يستخدم سلطته لكي يجعل الابن في صورة الكيان البشري الذي، عن حق في حكمته الفائقة، يريده أن يكون. حتى في أيامنا هذه، مهما كان يمكن للإنسان أن يقول، فليس هناك أي معنى أن يقول، “إنني أحب ابني ولكني لا أعباً بمدى بشاعة بذاءته طالما أنه يقضي وقتاً ممتعاً.”

أخيراً نأتي إلى تشبيه مليء بالأخطار، وذي تطبيق أكثر محدودية، والذي يتصادف مع ذلك أن يكون أكثر التشبيهات المفيدة لهدفنا الخاص في تلك اللحظة، وأعني بذلك، القياس بين محبة الله للإنسان ومحبة رجل لامرأة. ويستخدم هذا القياس بحرية في الكتاب المقدس. فإسرائيل زوجة خائنة، ولكن زوجها السماوي لا يستطيع أن ينسى الأيام السعيدة التي قضاها معها: “قد ذكرت لك غير صباك محبة خطبتك ذهابك ورائي في البرية في أرض غير مزروعة” (إرميا 2: 2) إسرائيل هو العروس الفقيرة اللقيطة التي وجدها حبيبها مطروحة على قارعة الطريق، فألبسها وزينها وجعلها جميلة ومع ذلك خانته. يدعونا القديس يعقوب “زناة وزواني”، لأننا ابتعدنا عن الله واتجهنا إلى “محبة العالم”، بينما الله “الروح الذي حل فينا يشتاق إلى الحب”.

هكذا أيضاً الكنيسة هي عروس الرب التي يحبها كثيراً حتى أنه لا يطيق أن يوجد فيها أي عيب أو غضن. لذلك فإن الحق الذي يعمل هذا التشبيه على تأكيده هو أن الحب، بحسب طبيعته الخاصة، يتطلب تكميل المحبوب Love In Its Own Nature , Demands The Perfecting Of The Beloved؛ وأن مجرد “اللطف” الذي يحتمل أي شيء سوى الألم لأجل الشيء أو الشخص موضوع الاهتمام هو، من هذه الناحية، في القطب المضاد للحب. فعندما نقع في حب امرأة، هل نتوقف عن الاهتمام بما إذا كانت نظيفة أم قذرة، جميلة أم كريهة؟ بل ألسنا بالأحرى نبدأ في الاهتمام بها؟ هل تعتبر أية امرأة أنها علامة على الحب في الرجل أنه لا يعرف ولا يهتم كيف يبدو مظهرها؟ يكن للمحب، بالتأكيد، أن يحب محبوبته عندما تفقد جمالها؛ ولكن ليس لأنه فقد.

يمكن للمحب أن يفغر كل العيوب والنقائص ويظل يحب على الرغم من كل هذه؛ لكن المحب لا يمكن أن يتوقف عن الرغبة في إزالة هذه العيوب. الحب أكثر حساسية من الكراهية نفسها لك عيب في المحبوب: “فمشاعره أكثر رقة وحساسية من القرون الرقيقة لقوقع الكوكل البحري.” أنه يغفر أكثر من كل القوى؛ ولكنه أقلها في التغاضي عن الأخطاء؛ إنه يرضى بالقليل، ولكنه يطلب الكل.

لذلك عندما تقول المسيحية أن الله يحب الإنسان، فإنها تعني أن الله “يحب” الإنسان بالحقيقة؛ وليس أن لديه نوع من الاهتمام الفاتر بمصلحتنا، لأنه فعلياً غير مبال أو مهتم، بل أن الحقيقة المهيبة والمدهشة، هي أننا نحن موضوع محبة الله. لقد طلبت إلهاً محباً: وها أنت لديك هذا الإله. إن الروح العظيمة التي استحضرها باستخفاف شديد، “السيد ذو المظهر الرهيب” حاضرة: وهو ليس شيخاً خيّراً يرغب وهو في حالة النعاس في أن تكون سعيداً بطريقتك الخاصة، ولا يقدم إحساناً بارداً كما من حالم ذي ضمير متيقظ، ولا مجرد رعاية كالمضيف الذي يشعر بالمسؤولية عن راحة ضيوفه، ولكن الله يحب لكونه هو نفسه ناراً آكلة، الحب الذي خلق العوالم، حب ثابت مستمر مثل حب الفنان لعمله الفني، وملح مثل محبة الإنسان لكلبه، وحكيم بعيد النظر وجليل مثل حب الأب لابنه، وغيور، يتعذر تغييره وكثير المطالب مثل الحب بين الجنسين.

كيف يمكن أن يكون هذا، لا أعرف؛ إنه حب يتخطى العقل لكي يفسر لماذا يجب لأية مخلوقات، فما بالك مخلوقات مثلنا، أن يكون لها مثل هذه القيمة المدهشة للغاية في عيني خالقها. إنه بالتأكيد ثقل مجد ليس فقط أبعد من استحقاقنا بل أيضاً، فيما عدا لحظات نادرة من النعمة، أبعد من رغبتنا؛ فنحن نميل، مثل العذارى في المسرحية القديمة، إلى أن ننتقص من محبة زيوس Zeus. لكن هذه الحقيقة تبدو غير قابلة للشك.

فالله الذي هو غير خاضع للألم Impassible يتكلم كما لو أنه يعاني من الحب والعشق، وذاك الذي يحوي في ذاته سبب سعادته وسعادة الجميع يتكلم كما لو أنه يمكن أن يكون في احتياج وشوق. “هل أفرايم ابن عزيز لدي أو ولد مُسر؟ لأني كلما تكلمت به أذكره بعد ذكراً. من أجل ذلك حنت أحشائي أليه” (إرميا 31: 20)، “كيف أتركك يا أفرايم؟ كيف أتخلى عنك يا إسرائيل… قد انقلب عليّ قلبي. اضطرمت مراحمي جميعاً” (هوشع 11: 8)، “يا أورشليم يا أورشليم، كم مرة أردت أن أجمعك كما تجمع الدجاجة فراخها تحت جناحيها، ولم تريدوا” (متى 23: 37).

إن مشكلة التوفيق بين الألم البشري ووجود إله يحب، تصبح فقط غير قابلة للحل طالما أننا ننسب معنى تافهاً لكلمة “الحب”، وننظر إلى الأشياء كما لو أن الإنسان هو محورها. ليس الإنسان هو المركز. فالله لا يوجد لأجل الإنسان، كما أن الإنسان لا يوجد لأجل نفسه. “لأنك أنت (يا الله) خلقت كل الأشياء، وهي بإرادتك كائنة وخلقت.” (رؤيا 4: 11) فنحن لم نخلق أساساً لكي نحب الله (رغم أننا خلقنا لأجل ذلك أيضاً) بل لكي يحبنا الله، حتى نصبح موضوع محبته إذ “يُسر” الحب الإلهي بأن يستقر فينا.

لذلك أن نطلب أن محبة الله يحب أن ترضى بنا كما نحن، هذا معناه أننا نريد أن يتوقف الله عن أن يكون هو الله؛ فحيث أن الله هو كينونة وماهيته، فلا بد أن تٌعاق وتٌرفض محبته، بطبيعة الأمور، بواسطة موانع معينة في شخصياتنا الحالية. وحيث أنه بالفعل يحبنا فلا بد أن يجاهد ويتعب لكي يجعلنا محبوبين. إننا لا يمكن حتى أن نتخيل، في أفضل حالاتنا، أنه يمكن لله أن يصالح نفسه مع نجاساتنا الحالية. كما لم تستطع الفتاة المتسولة أن تتخيل أن يرضى الملك كوفيتوا King Cophetua يخرقها البالية وقذارتها، أو أن يتخيل كلب، بعد أن يكون قد تعلم أن يحب إنساناً، أن هذا الإنسان سوف يتحمل في بيته ذلك المخلوق القذر، الذي يعض وينهش، ويلوث المكان، في حالته البرية دون ترويض.

إن ما نطلق عليه هنا والآن “سعادتنا” ليس هو الغاية في الأساس في نظر الله. لكننا عندما نكون مثل ذلك الكيان الذي يستطيع الله أن يحبه بدون عوائق، عندئذ سنكون حقاً سعداء.

يمكنني أن أتوقع بوضوح أن مسار حجتي هذا قد يثير اعتراضاً. فقد وعدت أننا عندما نأتي إلى فهم الصلاح الإلهي يجب ألا يطلب منا قبول مجرد انعكاس Reversal لأخلاقنا الشخصية في الاتجاه المضاد. لكن قد يتم الاعتراض بأن هذا الانعكاس هو بالتحديد ما يطلب منا قبوله. ربما يٌقال إن نوع الحب الذي أنسبه إلى الله هو بالضبط النوع الذي نصنفه في البشر بأنه الحب “الأناني” Selfish أو “الاستحواذي” Possessive، وهو يتناقض بصورة غير مواتية مع نوع آخر يسعى أولاً إلى سعادة المحبوب وليس إلى رضا المحب.

لكني غير واثق من أن هذا هو بالضبط ما أشعر به حتى تجاه الحب البشري. فأنا لا أعتقد أنني يجب أن أعتبر محبة صديق ذات قيمة عظيمة إذا كان كل ما يهتم به فقط هو سعادتي، ولا يعترض إذا أصبحت مثلاً غير أمين. ومع ذلك، فالاعتراض هو موضع ترحيب، والإجابة عليه سوف تلتقي على الموضوع ضوءً جديداً، وتصحح ما كان ذو جانب واحد في نقاشنا.

الحقيقة هي أن هذا التناقض بين الحب الأناني Egoistic والحب الغيري Altruistic لا يمكن تطبيقـه بطريقة لا لبس فيها على محبـة الله لمخلوقاتـه. فتضارب الاهتمامات، وبالتـالي الفرص إما بسـبب الأنانية أو غير الأنانية، يحدث فقط بين الكائنات التي تسـكن عالماً مشتركاً A Common World؛ فلا يمكن لله أن يكون في منافسه مع مخلوق، كما لا يمكن لشكسبير Shakespeare أن يكون في منافسة مع آلة الكمان. وعندما صار الله إنساناً وعاش كمخلوق بين مخلوقاته في فلسطين، عندها بالحقيقة كان حياته حياة التضحية الفائقة بالنفس والتي أدت إلى الجلجثة.

قال أحد الفلاسفة الوجوديين المحدثين، “عندما يقع المطلق The Absolute داخل البحر فإنه يصبح سمكة”؛ بنفس الطريقة، يمكننا نحن المسيحيون أن نشير إلى التجسد Incarnation ونقول إنه عندما يُخلي الله نفسه من مجده ويخضع إلى تلك الظروف التي فيها فقط يكون للأنانية والغيرية معنى واضحاً، فإننا نراه غيرياً بالكامل. لكن الله في سموه – الله باعتباره الأساس غير المشروط لكل الظروف – لا يمكن بسهولة التفكير فيه بنفس الطريقة. إننا ندعو الحب البشري أنانياً عندما يُشبع احتياجاته الشخصية على حساب احتياجات الآخر موضوع المحبة – كما عندما يُبقي الأب أبناءه معه في المنزل، الذين يجب لأجل مصلحتهم الشخصية ان يخرجوا إلى العالم، لأنه لا يحتمل أن يتخلى عن رفقتهم له.

يتضمن هذا الموقف احتياجاً أو عاطفة من جانب المحب، واحتياجاً متضارباً من جانب المحبوب، وتجاهل المحب، أو جهله الملوم لاحتياج المحبوب. لكن لا توجد أي من هذه الحالات في علاقة الله بالإنسان. فالله ليس لديه احتياجات. الحب البشري، كما يعلمنا أفلاطون Plato، هو ابن الفقر، ابن الاحتياج او النقص؛ فسببه هو خير وصلاح حقيقي أو مفترض في محبوبه، والذي يحتاجه المحب ويرغب فيه. لكن محبة الله، إذ تبعد كثيراً عن أن تكون بسبب خير أو صلاح في الإنسان موضوع المحبة، هي التي تسبب كل خير وصلاح لدى ذلك الإنسان، فهي التي أحبته منذ البداية حتى أنها أتت به إلى الوجود ثم بعد ذلك جعلته يصبح جديراً حقاً بالحب، رغم أن تلك الجدارة مشتقة من الله.

فالله هو الخير والصلاح الخالص. يستطيع الله أن يعطي الخير، ولكنه لا يستطيع أن يحتاجه أو يحصل عليه. بهذا المعنى فإن كل حب الله، إذا جاز التعبير، غيري متفان إلى أقصى حد بحكم تعريفه الحقيقي؛ فالله لديه كل شيء لكي يعطيه، ولا شيء ليأخذه. من هنا، إذا كان الله في بعض الأحيان يتكلم كما لو أن الإله الذي هو غير خاضع للألم Impassible يمكن أن يتألم من العاطفة. وكما لو أن الملء الأبدي يمكن أن يكون في احتياج إلى تلك الكائنات التي يغدق عليها كل شيء بدية من مجرد وجودها وحتى كل شيء آخر فصاعداً.

فإن هذا يمكن فقط أن يعني، إن كان يعني أي شيء مفهوم بالنسبة لنا، أن الله بمجرد معجزة قد جعل نفسه قادراً أن يجوع، وخلق في نفسه ذلك الشيء الذي يمكننا نحن أن نشبعه. لذلك فإذا كان الله يحتاجنا، فإن احتياجه ذلك هو باختياره الشخصي. وإذا كان القلب الثابت غير القابل للتغير يمكن أن يحزن بسبب دمى من صنعه الخاص، فإن هذا القلب هو الإله كلي القدرة؛ وليس غيره، والذي أخضع قلبه بهذه الطريقة، وبكامل حريته، وباتضاع يفوق الفهم. إذا كان العالم يوجد ليس أساساً لكي نحب نحن الله بل لكي يحبنا الله، فإن تلك الحقيقة نفسها، على مستوى أعمق، هي كذلك لأجلنا نحن، إذا كان الشخص الذي في ذاته لا يمكن أن يحتاج إلينا أحد.

إن قبل ووراء كل علاقات الله بالإنسان، كما نعرفها نحن الآن من المسيحية، يقبع منجم وخزان لا محدود من فعل إلهي للعطاء الخالص – والذي يتمثل في اختار الإنسان، من اللاوجود Nonentity، لكي يكون محبوب الله، وبالتالي (من ناحية ما) يحتاجه الله ويرغب فيه – الله الذي لا يحتاج أو يرغب في شيء سوى هذا الفعل، حيث أن لديه سرمدياً كل الخير والصلاح، بل أنه هو نفسه، كل الخير والصلاح. هذا الفعل هو لأجلنا نحن، فمن الخير لنا أن نعرف الحب؛ والأفضل لنا أن نعرف محبة من هو أفضل موضوع للحب، الله نفسه.

لكن إذا قلنا إننا نعرف هذا الحب كحب كنا نحن فيه المبادرين المتوددين بالحب في البداية والله هو المحبوب، الحب الذي فيه نحن الذي سعينا إلى الله وهو الذي وجد، والذي فيه يتوافق الله مع احتياجاتنا، ولسنا نحن الذين نتوافق مع احتياجاته، أي أن حبنا نحن هو الذي يأتي أولاً، فهذا معناه أننا نعرف الحب بصورة مزيفة لطبيعة الأشياء نفسها. فحيث أننا مجرد مخلوقات فقط؛ لا بد أني يكون دورنا دائماً هو دور التابع تجاه القوة، دور الأنثى تجاه الذكر، دور المرآة تجاه النور، دور الصدى تجاه الصوت.

أقصى نشاط لنا لا بد أن يكون هو الاستجابة، وليس المبادرة. لذلك عندما نختبر محبة الله بصورة حقيقية وليست خيالية وهمية، فهذا معناه أنا نختبرها كتسليم لمطلبه، واتفاق مع رغبته؛ لكن أن نختبرها بطريقة عكسية، إذا جاز التعبير، فهذا خطأ نحوي ضد قواعد لغة الوجود.

إنني لا أنكر، بالطبع، أنه على مستوى معين قد يحق لنا أن نتحدث عن بحث النفس عن الله، وعن الله كمتلقي لمحبة النفس؛ لكن على المدى الطويل، بحث النفس عن الله يمكن فقط أن يكون صيغة، أو مظهر (Erscheinung) لبحث الله عنها، حيث أن الكل يأتي من الله، وحيث أن إمكانية حبنا نفسها هي عطية منه لنا، وحيث أن حريتنا هي فقط حرية للاستجابة سواء للأفضل أو للأسوأ. ومن هنا اعتقد أنه لا يوجد شيء يميز التوحيد الوثني عن المسيحية بصورة حادة قدر مبدأ أرسطو Aristotle بأن الله يحرك الكون، لكنه هو نفسه غير متحرك، كما يحرك المحبوب المحب. اما بالنسبة للمسيحية، “هذه هي المحبة، ليس أننا نحن أحببنا الله بل أنه هو أحبنا” (1يو 4: 10).

الحالة الأولى إذاً لما يُسمى الحب الأناني بين البشر، منعدمة بالنسبة لله. فالله ليس لديه ضرورات طبيعة، ولا هوى أو شهوة، لكي تتنافس مع رغبته في خير المحبوب؛ أو إذا كان فيه شيء يجب أن نتخيله فيما يشبه الهوى، أو الاحتياج، فإنه فيه بحسب مشيئته الخاصة ولأجل صالحنا نحن. كما أن الحالة الثانية أيضاً منعدمة بالنسبة لله. قد تختلف المصالح الحقيقية لطفل ما عما تتطلبه عواطف الأب بالغريزة، لأن الطفل هو كائن منفصل عن أبيه ذو طبيعة لها احتياجاتها الخاصة والتي لا تتواجد فقط لأجل الأب كما أنها لا تجد اكتمالها التام في أن تشعر بالحب من جانبه. ولا الأب نفسه يفهمها فهماً كاملاً. لكن المخلوقات ليس منفصلة هكذا عن خالقها، ولا يستطيع الخالق أن يخطئ فهمها.

فالمكان الذي صممها لأجله في نظام الأشياء هو المكان المصنوعة لأجله. لذلك عندما تصل إليه تُشبع طبيعتها وتتحقق سعادتها: هناك عظام مكسورة في الكون قد تم جبرها. فانتهى الألم والمعاناة. لذلك عندما نريد أن نكون شيئاً غير الشيء الذي يريدنا الله أن نكون، فلا بد أننا نرغب فيما هو، في الحقيقة، لن يجعلنا سعداء. إن تلك المطالب الإلهية التي تبدو لآذاننا الطبيعية مثل مطالب حاكم مستبد أكثر منها مطالب محب، هي في الحقيقة ترشدنا إلى حيث يجب أن نرغب في الذهاب لو كنا نعرف ما نريد. يطلب الله عبادتنا، وطاعتنا، وسجودنا. فهل نفترض أن هذه الأمور يمكن أن تصنع لله أية فائدة.

أو أن يكون هناك خوف، مثلما تقول الجوقة في ميلتونMilton، من أن عدم المهابة البشرية يمكن أن يأتي “بنقصان لمجده”؟ كلا على الإطلاق؛ لا يمكن لأنسان أن ينقص من مجد الله برفضه لعبادته، كما لا يمكن لمجنون أن يطفئ الشمس بأن يخربش كلمة “ظلمة” على جدران غرفته. الله يريد خيرنا، وخيرنا هو أن نحبه (بتلك المحبة المستجيبة التي تتناسب مع مخلوقات) ولكي نحبه لا بد ان نعرفه؛ وإذا عرفناه، فإننا في الحقيقة سوف نسقط على وجوهنا رهبة.

فإذا لم نفعل، فهذا يُظهر فقط أن ما نحاول أن نحبه ليس هو الله بعد – رغم أنه قد يكون أقرب تقريب لله يمكن لفكرنا وخيالنا أن يصل إليه. إلا أن الدعوة ليست فقط لكي نسجد ونرتعب؛ بل إلى ما نعكس الحياة الإلهية، فتصبح مخلوقات مشاركة في الصفات الإلهية التي هي أبعد بما لا يقاس عن رغباتنا الحاضرة. إننا مدعوون إلى أن “نلبس المسيح”، وأن نصبح مثل الله، وهذا يعني، سواء أحببنا ذلك أم لا، أن الله ينوي أن يعطينا ما نحتاجه، وليس ما نعتقد الآن أننا نريده. ومرة أخرى، نشعر بالخجل بسبب “الثناء الذي لا يعبر عنه” Intolerable Compliment لله بنا. بسبب محبة الله الكثيرة للغاية، وليست الضئيلة للغاية.

ومع ذلك ربما حتى هذه النظرة تقصر عن الحقيقة. ليس الأمر ببساطة أن الله قد خلقنا بتعسف بحيث يكون هو فقط خيرنا الوحيد. بل أن الله هو الخير الوحيد لجميع المخلوقات؛ وبالضرورة، كل منها لا بد أن يجد خيره في ذلك النوع والدرجة من الشبع والاستمتاع بالله الذي يلائم طبيعته. قد يختلف النوع والدرجة بحسب طبيعة المخلوق؛ لكن إمكانية أن يكون هناك على الإطلاق أي خير آخر، هو حلم إلحادي. في مقطع لا أستطيع أن أبحث فيه الآن. يمثل جورج ماكدونالد George Macdonald الله وكأنه يقول للبشر: “لا بد أن تكونوا أقوياء بقوتي ومباركين بنعيمي Blessedness، لأنه ليس لدي شيء آخر أعطيه لكم.”

هذا هو ختام الأمر كله. الله يعطي ما لديه، لا ما ليس لديه؛ إنه يعطي السعادة الموجودة، ليس السعادة غير الموجودة. فإما أن تكون الله – أو أنت تكون مثل الله وتشاركه صلاحه باستجابة المخلوق – أو أن تكون شقياً بائساً. هذه هي البدائل الثلاث الوحيدة المتاحة. فإذا لم نتعلم أن نأكل الطعام الوحيد الذي ينبته الكون (ما لدى الله) – الطعام الوحيد الذي يمكن لأي كون ممكنPossible Universe أن يُنبته على الإطلاق – فإننا لابد أن نتضور جوعاً إلى الأبد.

الصلاح الإلهي – صلاح الله المطلق – سي إس لويس

لماذا يختبئ الله ولا يتكلم معي؟ James Bishop

لماذا يختبئ الله ولا يتكلم معي؟ James Bishop

لماذا يختبئ الله ولا يتكلم معي

يطرح الناس هذا السؤال لان الله لم يظهر لهم بالطريقة التي تناسب فكرهم .او بالمعني الصحيح التي يجب عليه ان يُظهر ذاته لهم بناءاً علي متطلباتهم .فلا يتساءل هؤلاء هذا السؤال لماذا ” ؟لماذا يتوجب علي الله الظهور لاي شخص بالطريقة التي يريدها الشخص نفسه؟ فهل الامر هو حقاً واجب علي الله ظهوره للناس بحسب الطلب والهوي؟ وهل الله لم يضع الكون ليشهد عن وجوده بشكل كافي .فكما يذكر الكتاب المقدس وضع العالم ليشهد عن الله ؟ فالاجابة علي هذا السؤال نقول نعم .فالامر ايضاً يتطلب ايمان ولا ينبغي ان نتجنب الناحية الايمانية ونتجاهلها .يوضح الكاتب والمبشر رافي زكرياس الاتي .

” جعل الرب العالم بشكل كافي لندركه ولنؤمن به وهو الشئ الاكثر منطقية . و تَرَك منه ما يجعل الحياة بالمنطق المُجرّد أو المُلاحظة وحدها مُستحيلاً.” (1)

فيسوع نفسه تكلم عن الشق الايماني في مرقس 10 : 52 , متي 17 : 20 . وكان يحزن حينما يجد القلوب الفاتره لديها نقص ايماني كما جاء في مرقس 6 : 5 . ويتكلم بولس الرسول ايضاً عن الايمان ويؤكد عليه رومية 1 : 17 . وايضاً يتكلم في موضع اخر بما قام به الله لنا من خلال يسوع .في رومية 10 : 10 .ففي الواقع لا يمكن فصل الايمان في الاعتقاد بالله . فبدون ايمان لا يمكن ارضاؤه كما جاء في عبرانين 11 : 6 .هذا هو السبب في لماذا الله لا يظهر ذاته لأولئك الذين يرغبون في ذلك . فالايمان هو السعي الي الله والدخول في علاقة حقيقية معه .

ثانياً الله غير مختفي بالفعل .هو يبدوا انه مخفي في الطريق الذي نتوقع منه وجوده .وعلينا ان نتذكر اننا نطرح هذا السؤال لان الانسان انفصل عن الله كما يخبرنا التكوين 3 : 17 وهذا نتيجة السقوط ومع ذلك كشف الله لنا عن نفسه من خلال يسوع الناصري .فيسوع يقف في قلب التاريخ ليراه الجميع .ففي الواقع خدمة يسوع تخضع للاستكشاف التاريخي والحقيق وهي لب ومنبع حقيقة المسيحية .يفسر لنا المؤرخ Jaroslav Pelikan هذا قائلاً :-

“بغض النظر عن أي شخص قد نعتقد او نفكر فيه .كان يسوع الشخصية الاكثر بروزاً في تاريخ الثقافة الغربية لما يقرب من عشرين قرناً .وايضاً التقويم وبجوار اسمة يلعنه كثيرين وبجواء اسمة يصلي ايضاً كثيرين “

وانا لا اعتقد ان هذا الامر ليس صدفة .فالله بالفعل وضع بصمته في التاريخ لنراه .واعتقد ان المرء قبل ان يذهب الي انكار الله ان يذهب ليري بصمت الله في التاريخ من خلال يسوع المسيح .

فالله منظور لنا في العالم المادي .كما جاء في رومية 1 : 20 لأن أموره غير المنظورة ترى منذ خلق العالم مدركة بالمصنوعات، قدرته السرمدية ولاهوته، حتى إنهم بلا عذر. كتب Fred Hoyle عالم الفلك الانجليزي الشهير ذات مره “

“A common sense interpretation of the facts suggests that a superintellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature. The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this conclusion almost beyond question”

“الحس السليم في شرح الوقائع يشير الي ان superintellect عله تتحكم بقوانين بالفيزياء بالتوازي مع الكمياء بالتوازي مع الاحياء.وانه لا توجد قوي عمياء تستحق ان نتحدث عنها في الطبيعة.الارقام والحسابات من ضمن الحقائق الهائله التي تجعل هذا الاستنتاج غير قابل للشك ” (2)أأيسيسييسي

 

فلم يكن هناك قوه عمياء تتحكم في الطبيعة واسفرت عن وجود هذا التصميم .ولا يوجد بديل لله ليفعل ..!َ

وبولس يخبرنا ان الله كشف لنا عن ذاته من خلال ضمائرنا كما جاء في رومية 2 : 15 الذين يظهرون عمل الناموس مكتوبا في قلوبهم، شاهدا أيضا ضميرهم وأفكارهم فيما بينها مشتكية أو محتجة،ونحن نعلم جميعاً ان الضمير هو الاحساس الاخلاقي تجاه ما هو شر وما هو خير لذلك يعرف ب moral realism الواقعية الاخلاقية .علي الرغم ان بعض الناس تحاول ان تقتل ضمائرهم لانه في وجهة نظرهم يضعفهم في العالم.لكن ايضاً صورة الله انطبعت داخلنا لاننا علي صورته كما جاء في تكوين 1 : 17 ويوضح الفيلسوف ويليام كريج . ” انه في حاله عدم وجود الله لم يكون هناك معايير موضوعية للحق والباطل (3)

وتكلم الرب مع انبياءه بشكل واضح فلم تكن الصوره المادية هي المرجوه فقد تعامل الله مع شعب بني اسرائيل بما هو مادي فما ان تاخر موسي صنعوا العجل ليعبدوه ..! فليس المقياس الصوره المادية .

فيتسائل البعض لماذا لا يتكلم الله بصوت مسموع اليوم ؟

ذلك لان الله تحدث بالفعل عن طريق الوحي الكتابي فلدينا كلمات الله .والوحي قد اكتمل الآن ووصل الي ما وصل اليه .لكن هل لا يزال الله يتكلم ايضاً بعيداً عن الكتاب المقدس ؟ بالطبع يستطيع ان يحدث الينا من خلال روحة القدوس . واشهد انا علي هذه الحقيقة وساكتب عليها فيما بعد .وعلي اي الاحوال متي اراد الله واين اراد الله ان يتكلم هو امر يخص مشيئته.وايضاً الخطية لها دور مهم في هذا الموضوع فالشخص الغير تائب الواقع في الخطية لا يري الله فتكرار الخطايا تصيبة بالصمم وتبعد الانسان عن علاقة حقيقية مع الله .

وفي الختام نقول

ان الله تحدث من خلال وسائط متعدده الي البشرية في ملئها .” الكون المادي , الكتاب المقدس , الضمير الاخلاقي ” واكثر هذه الوسائل حسماً هو يسوع التاريخي .فعندما نشعر انه غير موجود وانه لا يهتم حينما نصلي بصدق له هذا استنتاج .لكن هو قريب فكما جاء في ارميا 29 : 13 وتطلبونني فتجدونني إذ تطلبونني بكل قلبكم .فالرب يتمم ما هو صالح حسب مشيئته. فالانسان يري الظلمة ولا يري النور في اوقات الاحتياج

واختم بمقوله فرانسوا فاريون

“اثنان يتميزان بالخساسة عندما يعطي الله فنمدحه وعندما يحجب الله فنسخط عليه “

المراجع

  1. Ravi Zacharias. 2004. The True Face of Atheism. p. 115.

  2. Hoyle, F. 1981. ‘The Universe: Past and Present Reflections’ in Engineering and Science. p. 8–12,
  3. Craig, W. Can We Be Good Without God
  4. Pelikan, J. Jesus through the Centuries.

Biblical Authority in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: A Question of Transition W. Robert Godfrey

Biblical Authority in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: A Question of Transition

W. Robert Godfrey

Sola Scriptura was one of the ringing cries of the Protestant Reformation. This affirmation spoke to the issue of religious authority and summarized the Protestant conviction that religious truth could be known with certainty, not from popes and councils, but from the Bible alone. As the declarations sola fide (by faith alone), sola gratia (by grace alone), and solus Christus (Christ alone) summarized the essence of the gospel, sola Scriptura pointed to the reliable source for all knowledge of that gospel.

Both historians and theologians have sought to understand the meaning of sola Scriptura for Protestants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Recently they have given special attention to change and development in the understanding of the nature and authority of the Bible in this period. Most interpreters have seen a basic agreement and continuity between sixteenth-century Reformers and seventeenth-century orthodox theologians that the Bible was God’s Word and was absolutely reliable in all it said.1

Some theologians and historians in the past fifty years, often influenced by neoorthodoxy,2 have stressed the discontinuity between the Reformation and the following period of Protestant orthodoxy. This scholarship has argued that the contemporary evangelical belief in the absolute reliability or inerrancy of the Bible is a betrayal of the position of the early Reformers and grows instead from an innovation of seventeenth-century orthodoxy.

In the past decade, however, the stress on the discontinuity between the Reformation and the period of orthodoxy has been increasingly challenged. New studies have demonstrated that the lines of continuity between the Reformation and the period of orthodoxy are very strong and that the processes of change were much more gradual than had previously been seen.3 There were indeed changes: new enemies to be answered, old theological debates to be refined in ever more meticulous terms, and the perceived need for the more precise language of dialectics. But the fundamental theological direction remained the same.

This chapter will demonstrate that the continuity between sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theologies presented in recent scholarship applies to the question of biblical authority and that the period of orthodoxy faithfully received and maintained the basic position of the Reformation. While there were shifting emphases in the transition from Reformation to orthodoxy and while both eras may warrant criticism for some particular conclusions, Reformers and orthodox were one in their basic conviction about the Scriptures. For both the Bible is the only ultimate authority for Christians, and it is inerrant.

Examining in a single chapter the attitudes about biblical authority in two centuries requires that sharp limits be established. For this reason it will be useful for me to develop this chapter as a critique of one book that represents the position of those who deny that the Reformers accepted inerrancy and who see a belief in inerrancy as one of the bad products of orthodoxy. This recent book, Jack B. Rogers and Donald K. McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach,4 is an important one that demands careful evaluation. Rogers and McKim present a clear statement of the thesis that the Reformers did not accept the inerrancy of the Bible, a contention that must be tested against the primary and other secondary literature that reveals attitudes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries toward biblical authority.

Rogers and McKim develop their thesis on the foundation of a strict distinction between the function and the form of Scripture. They argue that church history bears eloquent testimony that the Bible is unfailing and absolutely reliable as it fulfills its function of presenting the message of salvation in Christ. They deny, however, that that infallible function is linked to an inerrant form. Indeed they insist that the greatest Christian thinkers, including the early Reformers, fully recognized errors in the form of the Bible while maintaining the faithful fulfillment of its function. They insist that by focusing on the function of the Bible the early Reformers (and the English Puritans until the time of John Owen) made Christ central and kept theology practical. The Reformers maintained Augustine’s view that one must believe in order to understand. They achieved this by recognizing that God had accommodated Himself to man. God’s Word is incarnated in man’s words. Errors are inevitable in such a process, Rogers and McKim maintain, but in no way detract from the saving function of the Bible.

According to Rogers and McKim, concern about an inerrant form is a serious departure from the position of the Reformers. Such concern reflects a loss of concern for the function of Scripture. In particular it means a loss of Christcenteredness, an exaltation of abstract theology, a failure to understand God’s act of accommodation in Scripture, and a return to the Aristotelian scholasticism that insists that one must understand in order to believe.

This chapter will demonstrate the inadequacy of the Rogers-McKim thesis in the light of the evidence in five key areas: (1) Luther’s thought, (2) Calvin’s thought, (3) the Reformed confessions and catechisms, (4) English Puritanism, and (5) continental Reformed orthodoxy.

LUTHER

Martin Luther (1483–1546) is one of the most heroic and fascinating figures of history. His reforming message radiated far beyond the pulpit and classroom of Wittenberg in electoral Saxony and continues to attract and stimulate students of his thought. There can be no doubt that his theology was profoundly centered in Christ and that he stressed that Christ was the message of the Scriptures. As Luther declared, “Christians receive Christ, the Son of God, as the central content of Holy Scripture. Having learned to know him, the remainder becomes meaningful to them and all scripture becomes transparent.”5 Thus Luther undeniably does stress the saving function of Scripture.

Luther does not accept, however, a dichotomy between the function and the form of the Bible as Rogers and McKim and others have suggested. Luther is concerned about questions relating to the form of Scripture, and his position on the form of Scripture is stated clearly: The Bible is inerrant. The following statements from Luther show his concern about inerrancy in matters of form: “But everyone, indeed, knows that at times they [the Fathers] have erred as men will; therefore, I am ready to trust them only when they prove their opinions from Scripture, which has never erred.”6 Also, “The Word of God is perfect: it is precious and pure: it is truth itself. There is no falsehood in it.”7 His concern for form is also expressed in terms of particulars: “Not only the words but also the expressions used by the Holy Spirit and Scripture are divine.”8 Luther argues further that “one letter, even a single tittle of Scripture means more to us than heaven and earth. Therefore we cannot permit even the most minute change.”9

Even in his most famous words Luther bore testimony to his concern for the form of Scripture. When Luther appeared at the Diet of Worms in 1521 before Emperor Charles V and the powers of this world, he pointed to the Bible as the religious authority that formed the foundation of the gospel that he preached. He declared, “Unless I am convinced by testimony from Scripture or evident reason—for I believe neither the Pope nor the Councils alone, since it is established that they have often erred and contradicted themselves—I am conquered by the writings cited by me, and my conscience is captive to the Word of God; I cannot and I will not recant anything, since it is neither safe nor honest to do aught against conscience.”10 Inherent in this statement is Luther’s conviction that the Word of God, which holds him captive, does not contradict itself and does not err.

Luther also used his commitment to the absolutely reliable form of Scripture in his theology. Particularly in defending his eucharistic theology Luther showed his trust in the precise words of Scripture. In answering the Zwinglians he pressed the form as well as the function of the words of Scripture:

Therefore you can joyfully say to Christ, both at your death and in the Last Judgment: My dear Lord Jesus, there has arisen a strife about Thy words at the Last Supper. Some want them to be understood differently from what they say. However, since they cannot teach me anything certain, but only lead me into confusion and uncertainty … I have remained with Thy text as the words stand. If there should be an obscurity in them, Thou wilt bear with me if I do not completely understand them, just as Thou didst forbear with Thine apostles when they did not understand Thee in many things—for instance, when Thou didst speak to them about Thy suffering and resurrection, and yet they retained Thy words and did not alter them. As also Thy dear mother did not understand when Thou didst tell her, Luke 2, “I must be about my Father’s business,” and yet she kept these words in her heart and did not alter them: Thus, I also have remained with these Thy words: This is my body, etc. Lo, no enthusiast will dare to speak thus with Christ.11

Luther was quite willing to rest one of his major theological concerns on the precise form of the little word is because he believed that every word of the Bible is God’s Word.

The analysis of Luther’s theology by Rogers and McKim argues, contrary to Luther’s own testimony, that the great Reformer was not concerned about the form of Scripture. They point to Luther’s stress that God has accommodated Himself in speaking to man in the Scriptures. The Scriptures are accommodated to man in a way analogous to the incarnation of the Eternal Word. For Rogers and McKim this accommodation means that the Bible is written in “weak and imperfect human speech.”12 They cite Luther’s words, “Holy Scripture possesses no external glory, attracts no attention, lacks all beauty and adornment.”13

Rogers and McKim, however, seriously misuse the concept of accommodation in regard to Luther and others in their book. They assume, without real examination, the absolute truth of Seneca’s maxim: “To err is human.” If God accommodated Himself to human language in the Bible, then, they assume, it must contain errors. But is error absolutely inevitable in all things human? This question comes to sharpest focus when the principle of accommodation is related to the Incarnation. Is the incarnate form of Jesus Christ irrelevant to His saving function? Is not Jesus’ person (His form) foundational to His work (His function)? Is not the human speech of Jesus Christ without error? There is nothing in the principle of accommodation as used by Luther that conflicts with biblical inerrancy. In fact just the opposite is true.

Luther’s comments on the lack of beauty in the Scriptures also are in harmony with a doctrine of inerrancy. Luther wrote in the context of the Renaissance’s revived knowledge of ancient literature. Luther like others noted the Scripture’s commonness and lack of beauty when compared to Ciceronian eloquence. But Luther denied that the plainness and simplicity of the Bible detracted from the clarity, efficacy, or authority of its revelation of Jesus Christ. Luther’s recognition that Scripture does not speak with the eloquence of this world was not at all a recognition of error in the Bible. Lack of stylistic grandeur is not an error.

Further, Rogers and McKim refer to specific instances in which Luther supposedly recognized errors in the details of the Bible. Their list of errors is taken from the one-page discussion of this subject in Reinhold Seeberg’s History of Doctrines.14 Curiously they do not take serious account of several important secondary sources that argue a position very different from their own.15 For example, Paul Althaus in his highly respected work The Theology of Martin Luther summarizes Luther’s position: “Scripture never errs. Therefore it alone has unconditional authority.”16 A. Skevington Wood in Captive to the Word, Martin Luther: Doctor of Sacred Scripture concludes that “Luther’s doctrine of inspiration is inseparably linked with that of inerrancy.”17 M. Reu in his very careful study Luther and the Scriptures reaches the same conclusion.18

Those who try to deny inerrancy in Luther use other arguments as well. Often they refer to Luther’s questions on the canonicity of certain books. But such an argument is not relevant. Canonicity and inerrancy are quite separate theological subjects. However, Luther’s concern with questions of canonicity does show his concern for the form of Scripture, indeed it shows that he ties form and function (canon and the gospel message) closely together.

Sometimes Luther’s recognition of problems in harmonizing Gospel accounts is cited as evidence of his rejection of inerrancy. One notable example is Jesus’ cleansing of the Temple, which Matthew places at the end of Jesus’ ministry and John places near the beginning.19 Several scholars refer to Luther’s statement that the failure to harmonize this difference between Matthew and John cannot undermine one’s faith in Christ.20 In the context, however, Luther’s statement does not show either an indifference to form or a recognition of error in the Bible. Luther in this instance first suggested different possibilities of harmonization. He then suggested his own preferred solution to the problem. Yet he did not insist on his solution, acknowledging, “These are problems and will remain problems. I shall not venture to settle them. Nor are they essential.”21 He explained that such problems remain, in part, because the Evangelists do not necessarily intend to give a chronological order and because Christian faith does not require full knowledge of chronological details: “All the evangelists agree on this, that Christ died for our sins. But in their accounts of Christ’s deeds and miracles they do not observe a uniform order and often ignore the proper chronological sequence.”22 But the lack of chronological order is not an error for Luther as he shows in another place where he dealt with a problem of harmonization: “St. Luke testifies at the beginning of his Gospel that he wanted to record all things from the beginning in order.… Therefore there is no question that Matthew did not retain the exact order, but Luke has obligated himself to do so and does so in fact.”23 It is clear that Luther, in facing his problems of harmonizing certain texts and in recognizing different methodologies used by different Gospel writers, was indeed concerned about the form of the Scriptures and was not ascribing error to the Bible.

In concluding this brief look at Luther’s view of biblical authority, one must remember that Luther was influenced by Renaissance humanist study of literature. He recognized differences of style and was sensitive to the context in studying Scripture. He applied the best scholarly tools to the study of the Bible. But his commitment to scholarship was not based on a separation of function and form as Rogers and McKim suggest: “Luther’s faith, therefore, was in the subject matter of Scripture, not its form, which was the object of scholarly investigation.”24 Luther rejected any such dualism. Reason and scholarship are helpful tools in understanding the Scripture, but must be used with true faith and must ultimately submit to the form as well as the function of Scripture: “Believing and reading scripture means that we hear the Word from Christ’s mouth. When that happens to you, you know that this is no mere human word, but truly God’s.”25

CALVIN

John Calvin (1509–1564) was the most brilliant light of the second generation of the Reformers. He came from quite a different background from that of Martin Luther. He was raised in an upper-middle-class family in northern France. He received a fine humanist education in the classics and in the law. He was not steeped in scholastic theology as Luther had been. His life’s work was done largely in a Swiss city-state. While Luther wrote largely on specific theological topics or detailed and extended commentaries, Calvin was more a systematic theologian (as shown by his Institutes of the Christian Religion) and a commentator on many biblical books in his style of “lucid brevity.”

Despite such divergent personal histories, Calvin saw his own theology as very similar to that of Luther. While there were differences, especially on the Lord’s Supper, Calvin saw himself as part of the theological movement that Luther had pioneered. This unity certainly existed in their theology of biblical authority. Calvin, like Luther, stressed the primary importance of the Bible’s saving function: “This is what we should in short seek in the whole Scripture: truly to know Jesus Christ, and the infinite riches that are comprised in him and are offered to us by him from God the Father.”26

Calvin, again like Luther, did not separate function from form in his doctrine of Scripture. The form as well as the function were from God Himself, as Calvin’s famous words in the Institutes show: “Hence the Scriptures obtain full authority among believers only when men regard them as having sprung from heaven, as if there the living words of God were heard.”27 He could speak of the apostles as “sure and genuine scribes of the Holy Spirit, and their writings are therefore to be considered oracles of God.”28 In another clear statement Calvin linked the certainty of faith and the saving message of Scripture to the absolute truthfulness of its form:

Now, therefore, we hold faith to be a knowledge of God’s will toward us, perceived from His Word. But the foundation of this is a preconceived conviction of God’s truth. As for its certainty, so long as your mind is at war with itself, the Word will be of doubtful and weak authority, or rather of none. And it is not even enough to believe that God is trustworthy, who can neither deceive nor lie, unless you hold to be beyond doubt that whatever proceeds from Him is sacred and inviolable truth.29

In his commentaries Calvin also gave testimony to his belief in the truthfulness of Scripture in words that show a confidence in the inerrancy of its form. In speaking of the praise of the law in Psalm 119:105, Calvin noted, “Let us, then, be assured that an unerring light is to be found there, provided we open our eyes to behold it.”30 In commenting on 2 Timothy 3:16 Calvin distinguished yet bound together the form and function of the Bible as he spoke of its authority and its profit:

First he [Paul] commends the Scripture because of its authority, and then because of the profit that comes from it. To assert its authority he teaches that it is inspired of God, for, if that is so, it is beyond all question that men should receive it with reverence.… This is the meaning of the first clause, that we owe to Scripture the same reverence as we owe to God, since it has its only source in Him and has nothing of human origin mixed with it.31

His absolute confidence in the form of Scripture is shown in his reliance on the details of the Bible. After noting the differences of style between 1 Peter and 2 Peter and acknowledging that some in the ancient church denied the canonicity of 2 Peter, Calvin concluded, “If it [2 Peter] be received as canonical, we must allow Peter to be the author, since it has his name inscribed, and he also testifies that he lived with Christ: and it would have been a fiction unworthy of a minister of Christ, to have personated another individual.”32 Indeed Calvin judged that those who find fault with God’s Word have a serious moral problem:

And he affirms that his love to God’s word was not a rash, or a blind and inconsiderate affection, but that he loved it, because like gold or silver which has been refined, it was pure and free from all dregs and dross.… How few are there who are not guilty, either by their distrust, or waywardness, or pride, or voluptuousness, of casting upon God’s word some spot or stain! The flesh then being so rebellious, it is no small commendation of revealed truth, when it is compared to gold well refined, so that it shines pure from all defilement.33

Against such evidence as that cited above, Rogers and McKim, like others, have sought to show that Calvin did not accept the inerrancy of Scripture. Their procedure is to present various kinds of evidence that they believe shows that Calvin did not hold to inerrancy. Some of this material is similar to that cited from Luther. They note that Calvin saw God accommodating Himself to man in Scripture and they assume, without demonstration, that Calvin believed that the Bible was written in “imperfect language.”34 As argued above in reference to Luther, the principle of accommodation does not entail error.

Rogers and McKim also note Calvin’s recognition that the Bible was not always written in an exalted style,35 but they wrongly infer that this shows Calvin’s lack of concern for Scripture’s form. Calvin, like Luther, referred to the common style of Scripture, not to accuse it of error, but to defend it from Ciceronian humanist critics.

Rogers and McKim also present new lines of argument and evidence from what was discussed in relation to Luther. They point out that Calvin recognized that some New Testament quotations from the Old Testament were paraphrases rather than exact quotes. They infer that Calvin saw these as “imperfect” and as “inaccuracies.”36 But Calvin did not say that, and it is far from self-evident that a paraphrase is an error. Indeed Calvin recognized the legitimacy of the paraphrases precisely to vindicate the form the apostolic writings took and to preserve them from the charge of error. So too when Calvin noted that some New Testament uses of Old Testament texts were not full expositions but were rather allusions to or applications of those texts, Rogers and McKim believe that Calvin was recognizing an error. But in Calvin’s words, cited by Rogers and McKim, he made such observations to show that “there is nothing improper”37 in that apostolic practice. Calvin did not regard such practices as erroneous.

Another kind of error recognized by Calvin, Rogers and McKim argue, is in the area of science. They refer to Calvin’s argument that Moses wrote in Genesis not as a scientist, but as a theologian.38 Calvin was arguing the propriety of a theologian talking of scientific matters in popular language, oriented to human observation of natural phenomena (e.g., “The sun rises”) rather than in the language of scientific exactness. Calvin was arguing that such a procedure was proper and involved no misrepresentation of the truth. Calvin was not accepting a dualism by which “scientific” truth could be set in opposition to revealed statements of Scripture. While the vocabulary, purpose, perspective, and fullness of the discussion of natural phenomena would differ for the theologian and for the scientist, both were teaching the same truth, according to Calvin. In this area too, there is no evidence that Calvin perceived errors in the Bible.

Still Rogers and McKim offer one more piece of evidence that seems decisive: “In his commentary on Acts 7:16, Calvin declared that Luke had ‘made a manifest error.’ …”39 In this instance, however, the error is that of Rogers and McKim. Calvin actually said, “But when he [Luke] goes on to say that they were buried in the sepulchre which Abraham had bought from the sons of Hamor, it is obvious that an error has been made in the name of Abraham.… This verse must be amended accordingly.”40 Calvin did indeed recognize an error in the text at Acts 7:16 and insisted that the text be changed. But he did not explicitly attribute the error to Luke. Indeed in the context it is likely that Calvin meant something quite different. Two paragraphs earlier Calvin wrote on Acts 7:14:

In saying that Jacob came into Egypt with seventy-five people, Stephen does not agree with Moses, whose reckoning is only seventy.… Therefore I conclude that this discrepancy arose by an error on the part of copyists [of the Septuagint]. But this was not such an important matter that Luke should have confused the Gentiles over it, when they were used to the Greek reading. And it is possible that he himself did write down the true number, but somebody erroneously changed it from the verse of Moses.… If anyone is to persist in disputing this, let us allow him a superiority of wisdom. Let us remember that it is not for nothing that Paul forbids us to be troubled and curious about genealogies (Titus 3:9).41

Several points emerge from these quotations. First, Calvin did not believe that one should be unduly troubled by problems of harmonization. Vain curiosity is a danger to the spiritual life. Second, in recognizing his problem in harmonizing the text, he did not conclude that Luke had made an error in his writing. Calvin was not indifferent to the form of the text but on Acts 7:14 he spent a long paragraph investigating various ways of accounting for and understanding the form of the text. Third, his own solution in Acts 7:14 was that copyists had made an error. It is most probable therefore that he assumed the same origin for the error in Acts 7:16. Indeed his insistence that the text of Acts 7:16 should be amended almost certainly means that he attributed the error to a copyist. Rogers and McKim want to conclude from such evidence that Calvin acknowledged “historical inaccuracies”42 in the text. But that simply is not the case.43

In concluding this brief look at Calvin’s doctrine of biblical authority, it is useful to reflect on John Leith’s stimulating observation: “Scholars disagree whether Calvin believed in verbal inerrancy. The evidence seems to point to a more liberal understanding than verbal inerrancy connotes today, though Calvin did certainly insist that the words of Scripture are the very words of God. The question can probably never be answered, for Calvin never faced the question in the way in which any man who has encounted critical historical studies must ask it.… For this reason it is futile to find answers in Calvin’s writings to new questions raised by modern historical consciousness.”44 Leith is right to insist that Calvin did not face modern criticism of the Bible. He may be right that some modern inerrantists would have problems occasionally with Calvin’s approach to a problem of harmonization.45 And Calvin certainly cannot be expected to have anticipated all specific questions raised by modern critics of the Bible. But when the “modern historical consciousness” rejects the Bible in part or wholly as God’s Word, when it stands in judgment of the Bible’s complete truthfulness and reliability, the position of Calvin is clear and relevant. The “words of Scripture are the very words of God.” Calvin would insist that the modern Christian as well as the sixteenth-century Christian must submit every thought to the Word of God and allow the Bible to stand as judge of man’s truth and even of man’s historical consciousness. Calvin was committed to the best of scholarship, but rejected all dualism between a saving function of the Bible, which is the concern of the pastor, and the form of Scripture, which is the concern of independent scholars.46 Calvin believed that every word of the Bible was God’s Word and that every word was true in all that it says. In Calvin then is clearly found a belief in biblical inerrancy.

REFORMED CONFESSIONS AND CATECHISMS

The Reformed confessions and catechisms stress the saving message of the Scripture, for that was a principal distinctive of Protestants over against the Roman Catholic church. The Reformers maintained that the Bible contained the complete and clear message of salvation and that Christians did not need the additions of tradition or the authoritative interpretations of the church. The Reformers had no dispute with Rome over the truthfulness of the whole Bible. Thus defense of the Scripture’s reliability does not figure prominently in the confessions and catechisms. Still the confessions do assert a commitment to the full truthfulness of the Scripture. A few examples serve to demonstrate this commitment to an inerrant Bible.

Calvin’s Catechism of the Church of Geneva (1545) declared that one profits from Scripture when “we lay hold on it with complete heartfelt conviction as nothing less than certain truth come down from heaven.”47 The French Confession of 1559, which Calvin helped write, declared that the Word of God is “the rule of all truth.”48 The Belgic Confession (1561) is more extensive in its statements. It confessed that the Scriptures, “against which nothing can be alleged,”49 are the “infallible rule”50 of Christians who believe “without doubt, all things contained in them.”51

The Heidelberg Catechism makes the same confession in its definition of faith (A. 21): “I hold for truth all that God has revealed to us in his Word.” Zacharias Ursinus, one of the authors of the Catechism, in commenting on this statement, wrote that an essential element of faith “is to yield assent to every word of God delivered to the church.”52 He insisted that the faithful Christian “believes that every thing which the Scriptures contain is true, and from God.”53

ENGLISH PURITANISM

English Puritanism has attracted many interpreters because of its great formative influence, particularly because of its place in the development of American church history. Puritanism was a theological movement with its own distinctive characteristics because of the unique environment in which it developed. Puritanism grew up within the Church of England, a church that was Reformed in doctrine, but according to the Puritans, not fully Reformed in practice. As a result the Puritans often focused their theological interests on matters of ecclesiastical and personal practice. Puritan theology had a distinctively practical cast to it.

Rogers and McKim emphasize the distinctiveness of Puritan theology as the foundation for their thesis that English Puritanism represents an exception to the early triumph of scholasticism in seventeenth-century Reformed theology. They argue that the practical, nonscholastic character of Puritan theology, flowing out of the unique ecclesiastical politics and philosophical orientation of England,54 preserved Puritanism from excessive concern about the form of Scripture and from the doctrine of inerrancy.

The distinctive interaction of Puritan theology with its environment, however, does not actually provide a foundation for the approach Rogers and McKim take.55 Both Puritans and continental Reformed theologians saw themselves as members of a cooperative international Reformed community. The English, for example, participated fully in the Synod of Dort,56 and Puritans like William Ames hailed Dort’s theological statements. English Puritans and continental Reformed theologians shared most theological viewpoints, including a belief in inerrancy.

Even more important than the unique ecclesiastical politics in England, Rogers and McKim argue, were the unique philosophical conditions. Among English Puritans the philosophy of Peter Ramus was dominant. This philosophical approach retained more of the Augustinian, rhetorical tradition and claimed to reject Aristotle. Rogers and McKim maintain that it was Ramus who kept English Puritanism focused on the message of the Scripture and free of concern about an inerrant form of Scripture.

Ramism, however, was not as theologically determinative as Rogers and McKim claim. The methodology of Ramism often yielded the same theological conclusions as the methodology of Aristotle. For example, the Ramist Arminius sharply attacked the Ramist Perkins for his strong supralapsarian views, while the Aristotelian Gomarus defended Perkins. Neither did Ramism necessarily keep one from rationalism as Rogers and McKim imply. For example, Moise Amyraut was very much influenced by the Ramist tradition,57 but he was at the same time a rationalist: “Amyraut was a rationalist in the sense that he submitted all truths to the test of reason.”58

William Ames is the strongest example of the inadequacy of Rogers and McKim’s efforts to show that the Puritans did not accept inerrancy. Ames was a militant Puritan (a nonconformist) and a Ramist. He wrote one of the most influential Puritan handbooks of theology, The Marrow of Theology (third edition, 1629). Yet in his Marrow, contrary to what one would have expected according to Rogers and McKim, Ames clearly teaches inerrancy. Writing of the manner in which the authors of the Bible were inspired, Ames stated:

Some things were known by a natural knowledge and some by a supernatural. In those things that were hidden and unknown, divine inspiration was a work by itself. In those things which were known, or where the knowledge was obtained by ordinary means, there was added the writers’ devout zeal so that (God assisting them) they might not err in writing.

In all those things made known by supernatural inspiration, whether matters of right or fact, God inspired not only the subjects to be written about but dictated and suggested the very words in which they should be set forth. But this was done with a subtle tempering so that every writer might use the manner of speaking which most suited his person and condition.59

This statement shows that Ames was indeed concerned about the form of Scripture and that he did explicitly proclaim the inerrancy of the Bible.

REFORMED ORTHODOXY

Reformed orthodoxy, as noted in the introduction to this study, has been the object of considerable scholarly investigation and debate. Many more thorough studies will be needed before more exact lines of continuity and discontinuity can be established between the early Reformers and the period of orthodoxy. Such investigation must be attentive to the new historical situation that seventeenth-century orthodox theologians faced. The particulars of orthodox theology cannot be examined in the abstract. Nor can the adequacy of its constructs be fully determined without considering the historical context that produced seventeenth-century orthodoxy.

Rogers and McKim enter this scholarly discussion with their chapter on Protestant orthodoxy.60 The first part of that chapter examines various stages and elements in the development of Protestant orthodoxy and the second part examines Francis Turretin, who epitomizes Reformed scholasticism. Rogers and McKim insist that the development of orthodoxy represents a steady erosion of the Reformation teaching on the centrality of Christ, faith, and the saving message of the Scripture. They argue that orthodoxy represents the progressive triumph of matters of form over the saving function of the Bible. In this era of decline, they argue, the doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture arose in Protestantism.

Within the brief scope of this study it is impossible to examine all of the assertions of Rogers and McKim in this area.61 What should emerge from this study, however, is clear evidence that the orthodox remained concerned for the centrality of the saving message of the Scripture just as the early Reformers had been concerned about the inerrant form of the Scriptures. Also it should be clear that the orthodox discussion of the formal authority of Scripture retained most, if not all, of the emphases of the early Reformers. In this chapter I will discuss orthodoxy with a brief methodological observation first and then with a more extensive analysis of the work of Francis Turretin.

Methodologically Rogers and McKim begin by rightly recognizing the important new threats to Protestantism posed by the rise of Socinianism and of a revived Roman Catholicism in the late sixteenth century.62 But they fail to appreciate the seriousness of these threats. They seem quickly to forget that these heirs of the Reformation had new challenges to answer that necessitated theological development. Those new challenges were often in the area of formal authority of the Scripture: the Socinians insisting on a determinative role for reason and the Roman Catholics pressing the refined arguments of Robert Bellarmine and others for an authoritative church. The orthodox Protestants necessarily responded by refining and elaborating their arguments for the sole authority of a completely reliable Bible. But in their legitimate, scholarly concern for the form of Scripture the orthodox were only continuing the work begun by the early Reformers. The evidence also shows that the orthodox continued to insist on the importance of the saving message of the gospel.63

Francis Turretin (1623–1687) was born in Geneva to a Reformed family of Italian refugee stock. His father was a minister and a professor of theology. He received an education in Geneva from orthodox theologians and himself became a pastor and served as a professor of theology in Geneva from 1653 to 1687. His most noted work was his great systematic theology, Institutio Theologiae Elencticae.

For Rogers and McKim, Turretin epitomizes the deadly interest of Reformed scholasticism in the inerrant form of Scripture. They maintain that “Turretin apparently realized that Calvin’s approach to Scripture was antithetical to his own.”64 They particularly focus on Turretin’s understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit and of reason in attesting to the authority of Scripture. They also critique his scholarly approach to the Scripture and the role of the concept of accommodation in his theology of the Bible. While this study cannot offer a complete study of the historical forces bearing on Turretin or an exhaustive study of Turretin’s views of Scripture, it can demonstrate serious deficiencies in Rogers and McKim’s line of approach.65

Rogers and McKim criticize Turretin for not resting the authority of the Bible’s message—its saving function—on the internal witness of the Spirit. They see Turretin limiting the Spirit to the realm of belief in the inerrant form of Scripture.66 But Turretin could speak strongly of the role of the Spirit:

The Holy Spirit, the supplier, by whom believers should be God-taught, Jer. 31:34, John 1:43, 1 John 2:27, does not render the Scripture less necessary; because he is not given to us in order to introduce new revelations, but to impress the written word on our hearts; So that here the word must never be separated from the Spirit, Isa. 59:21. The former works objectively, the latter efficiently; the former strikes the ears from without, the latter opens the heart within: The Spirit is the Teacher, Scripture is the doctrine which he teaches us.67

The doctrine or message of Scripture to which Turretin referred is not some formal matter but the content of the Bible, which he could summarize elsewhere as

the wonderful sublimity of the mysteries, which could have been discovered by no sharp sightedness of reason; such as the Trinity, Incarnation, the Satisfaction of Christ, the Resurrection of the dead and the like. The holiness and purity of the precepts, regulating even the thoughts, and the internal affects of the heart, and adapted to render man perfect in every kind of virtue and worthy of his maker.…68

Contrary to Rogers and McKim,69 it is also clear that Turretin did not derive the authority of the Bible from its inerrant form. He did indeed argue that a Bible with errors would not be authoritative and labored at length to demonstrate the inerrancy of the Bible. But he was clear that its inerrant form was a result of its divine authority and origin: “Upon the Origin of Scriptures, which we have just discussed, depends their authority, for just because they are from God, they must be authentic and divine.” And further, “When the Divinity of the Scriptures is proved, as in the preceding question, its infallibility necessarily follows.”70

Turretin also discussed in some detail how man could know that the Bible was God’s Word. He said clearly that only the Spirit could convince a person of the Bible’s divine origin. In harmony with Calvin, Turretin argued that the Spirit does this convincing, not by the testimony of the church, but by the Scripture itself: “But concerning the Argument or principle motive which the Spirit uses in persuading us of its truth,” it is not “the inartificial argument of the testimony of the church, as the Papists say,” but it is “the artificial, derived from the marks of the Scripture itself, which we hold.”71 Turretin further claimed that not only the Bible’s claims about itself (its autopistic character) established its authority, but also the marks of the Scripture establish it:

The Bible proves itself divine, not only authoritatively and in the manner of an inartificial argument or of testimony, when it proclaims itself God-inspired: which although it may be well used against those Christians who profess to believe it, yet cannot be employed against those who reject it. But ratiocinatively, by an artificial argument, from the marks which God has impressed upon the Scriptures and which furnish indubitable proofs of divinity. For as the works of God exhibit visibly to our eyes by certain marks the incomparable excellence of the Artificer himself, and as the sun makes himself known by his own light; so he wished in the Bible, which is an emanation from the Father of lights and the Sun of righteousness, to send forth different rays of divinity, by which he might make himself known.72

Turretin in his discussion of the marks of the Bible distinguished between the external and the internal marks, of which the internal are the more persuasive.73 The external marks include the antiquity and survival of the Bible, the weakness of the authors who produced such a work, and the witness of the martyrs and all people.74 The internal marks are the matter of Scripture (Christ and the gospel), the style, the form (the harmony of the doctrine), and the end (the glory of God and the salvation of men).75

Turretin’s discussion of the possibility of proving the Bible by its marks is wholly in harmony with Calvin. Calvin insisted, “True, if we wished to proceed by arguments, we might advance many things that would easily prove—if there is a god in heaven—that the law, the prophets, and the gospel come from him.”76 Calvin even listed some such evidence: “What wonderful confirmation ensues when, with keener study, we ponder the economy of the divine wisdom, so well ordered and disposed; the completely heavenly character of its doctrine, savoring of nothing earthly; the beautiful agreement of all the parts with one another—as well as such other qualities as can gain majesty for the writings.”77 Calvin also discussed other confirmations such as the antiquity of the Scriptures, the miracles that accompanied the revelation, and the testimony of the whole church and the martyrs.78 Calvin’s list of confirmations is very similar to Turretin’s list of marks.

There is one significant difference, however, between Calvin and Turretin on the usefulness of these marks. Calvin insisted that one believes the Bible without marks or proofs. He declared passionately:

For even if it [the Bible] wins reverence for itself by its own majesty, it seriously affects us only when it is sealed upon our hearts through the Spirit. Therefore, illumined by his power, we believe neither by our own nor by anyone else’s judgment that Scripture is from God; but above human judgment we affirm with utter certainty (just as if we were gazing upon the majesty of God himself) that it has flowed to us from the very mouth of God by the ministry of men. We seek no proofs, no marks of genuineness upon which our judgment may lean; but we subject our judgment and wit to it as to a thing far beyond any guesswork! This we do, not as persons accustomed to seize upon some unknown thing, which under close scrutiny displeases them, but fully conscious that we hold the unassailable truth!… we feel that the undoubted power of his divine majesty lives and breathes there. By this power we are drawn and inflamed, knowingly and willingly, to obey him, yet also more vitally and more effectively than by mere willing or knowing.79

While Calvin was not speaking of some irrational mysticism here, he did claim that acceptance of the Bible’s authority is more profound than knowing: it is feeling. He seems to be speaking of a direct intuition of the Bible’s truth: “As to their question—How can we be assured that this has sprung from God unless we have recourse to the decree of the church?—it is as if someone asked: Whence will we learn to distinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter?”80 For Calvin proofs were “very useful aids,”81 but only to those already accepting the Bible.

Turretin went beyond and to some extent against Calvin in arguing that marks or proofs can (but do not have to) be useful in coming to an acceptance of the Bible. He maintained:

Although faith may be founded upon the authority of testimony, and not upon scientific demonstration, it does not thence follow that it cannot be assisted by artificial arguments, especially in erecting the principles of faith: because before faith can believe, it must have the divinity of the witness to whom faith is to be given, clearly established, from certain true marks which are apprehended in it, otherwise it cannot believe. For where suitable reasons of believing anyone are wanting the testimony of such a witness cannot be worthy of credence.82

Turretin said, as Calvin would have, that faith must have something to believe before it can believe, but further Turretin argued, as Calvin would not have, that rational demonstration can be used to support what needs to be believed.

While there is a difference between Calvin and Turretin here, this difference is not directly relevant to the subject of inerrancy. Both Calvin and Turretin agree with the doctrine of inerrancy and disagree only on the usefulness of the proofs of the Bible’s authority in bringing one to trust the Bible. This disagreement may represent a greater role for reason and for Aristotle in Turretin than in Calvin, but does not represent some fundamental betrayal of the Reformation perspective as Rogers and McKim seem to suggest.83

Further Turretin’s orthodoxy did not lead him away from the humanistic principles of interpretation developed in the early Reformation. He did not treat the Scripture simply as a series of propositions or proof texts laid out for the convenience of systematic theologians.84 He insisted on taking the context of any Scriptural text seriously:

To ascertain the true sense of the Scriptures, Interpretation is needed, not only of the words, which are contained in the versions, but also of the things.… But for this, after fervent prayer to God, there is need of an inspection of the sources, the knowledge of languages, the distinction between proper and figurative words, attention to the scope and circumstances, collation of passages, connexion of what precedes and follows, removal of prejudices, and confirmation of the interpretation of the analogy of faith.85

He also fully recognized that the authors of Scripture selected and ordered their material in various ways: “For these histories are not written so in detail as to contain every circumstance; many things were undoubtedly brought into a narrow compass, other things which did not appear to be so important, omitted.”86

Turretin also accepted the legitimacy of other scholarly opinions than his own in dealing with apparent errors in the Bible. He certainly did not hang faith on only one theory in this matter.87 He taught:

Others again think that a few very slight errors have crept into the Scriptures, and even now exist, which cannot be corrected by any collation of Manuscripts, not to be imputed, however, to the sacred writers themselves, but partly to the injuries of time, partly to the fault of copyists and librarians.… Thus Scaliger, Cappellus, Amamus, Vossius and others think. Finally others defend the integrity of the Scriptures and say that these various contradictions are only apparent.88

Turretin held to the latter opinion and argued vigorously for it, but recognized the former as orthodox.

In a related area, many have criticized Turretin for his prominent role in the preparation and propagation of the Formula Consensus Helvetica (1675). They point especially to these words of the Consensus: “But, in particular, the Hebrew Original of the Old Testament, which we have received and to this day do retain as handed down by the Jewish Church, … is, not only in its consonants, but in its vowels—either the vowel points themselves, or at least the power of the points—not only in its matter, but in its words, inspired by God.…”89 They claim that these words demonstrate the intellectual absurdities into which proponents of inerrancy are led. Two observations are important here. First, in Turretin’s day the position of the Consensus was not absurd and was one defensible scholarly theory.90 Turretin and other supporters of the Consensus reasserted their conviction that they possessed the true text of the Scripture both in its consonants and in the force of the vowels. They were continuing a humanistic emphasis on the importance of the original sources. They believed that they had a reliable copy of the original Hebrew text and so rejected emendations of that text by an appeal to translations.91 They believed that the Masoretic vowel pointing faithfully presented the force of the vowels for the original text and so rejected criticism of that vocalization.

The second observation is that modern scholarship has indeed shown that the position of the Consensus on these matters of text is wrong. Turretin’s belief that he possessed a fully reliable copy of the Hebrew original cannot be maintained. But modern rejection of Turretin’s view of the Hebrew text does not demonstrate that his commitment to biblical authority was absurd. Turretin did regard his views on the Hebrew text as an element in his defense of the Bible’s inerrant authority. He argued that Christians possessed inerrant copies of the inerrant original. But the collapse of that one element of his defense, does not make the doctrine of the inerrancy of the original autographs untenable either for Turretin or for those who continued to share his concerns.

For Rogers and McKim Turretin’s formalization of Scripture’s authority climaxes in his abandoning the idea of accommodation. They declare that accommodation “was entirely absent from Turretin.”92 But here again Turretin is misrepresented. He declared clearly, “When God understands, he understands himself, as he is infinite, and so infinitely; but when he speaks, he speaks not to himself, but to us, i.e., in accommodation to our capacity, which is finite, and cannot take in many senses.”93 He also recognized this principle in other ways: “God is called the Ancient of days.… Days, therefore, and years are not ascribed to him properly, but after the manner of men, because we, who live in time, can conceive nothing unless by a relation to time, in which we are,”94 and: “Repentance is attributed to God after the manner of men, but must be understood after the manner of God.”95

Rogers and McKim criticize Protestant scholasticism in general because the practical concerns of theology are swallowed up in an excessive concern for an abstract and speculative theology: “Precision replaced piety as the goal of theology.”96 Here again Turretin does not fit such a description. Turretin defined theology as a mixed discipline partly theoretical and partly practical, concluding that “it is more practical than theoretical.”97 He insisted on theoretical elements (which he defined as the knowledge of matters like the Trinity and the Incarnation) in theology in opposition to the Socinians and Remonstrants. He believed that a purely practical theology was moralism. He warned “that Socinians and Remonstrants … say that Theology is so strictly practical, that nothing in it is positively necessary to salvation, unless what pertains to moral precepts and promises.… Their object is evidently to take away the necessity of the knowledge of the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, etc.”98 But his commitment to theology as mixed did not lead him away from piety. Rather he had a vision of a vital theology in both its theoretical and practical elements, as the following statement demonstrates:

That theology is mixed, that is, partly theoretical and partly practical, the following proofs may be given. 1. The object, God to be known and worshipped, as the first truth and the highest good. 2. The subject, man to be made perfect in the knowledge of the truth, by which his understanding may be enlightened, and in love of good, by which the will may be adorned, in faith, which is extended to credible, and in love, to practical things. 3. The principle, both external, the word of God, which embraces the Law and the Gospel, the former setting forth the things to be done, the latter those to be known and believed, hence called the mystery of godliness and the word of life; and internal, the spirit, who is a spirit of truth and sanctification, of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord.99

The preceding discussion of Turretin is by no means definitive. There are doubtless other elements in his thought that represent differences with the early Reformers than what have been highlighted here. What is clear, however, is the striking agreement of Calvin and Turretin on the basics of the doctrine of Scripture. Both stress the work of the Spirit in establishing the authority of Scripture. Both believe that the majesty and divinity of Scripture can be proved. Both recognize the accommodated, historical nature of Scripture. Both see the message of Scripture as central. For neither Calvin nor Turretin do concerns for the form of Scripture undermine the gospel message. Both teach the inerrancy of Scripture.

CONCLUSION

Exegesis and theology form the center of the battleline for champions of the inerrancy of the Bible. The strength of that center will ultimately determine the outcome of the struggle to understand the nature of the Scriptures. Yet in this conflict the history of the church’s attitudes toward the Bible has become an important flank of the battleline. Various skirmishes have contested whether inerrantists can legitimately claim the history of the church as one of their allies. Hopefully the foray represented by this study of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries will advance the discussion and help reassert the conviction that inerrancy is a vital element of historic Christianity.

 

1 See, for example, Richard Lovelace, “Inerrancy: Some Historical Perspectives,” in Inerrancy and Common Sense, ed. Roger R. Nicole and J. Ramsey Michaels (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980), pp. 21–25; Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Historical Theology: An Introduction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), pp. 327–28; Edward A. Dowey, Jr., The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), pp. 99ff.; see also studies by Robert Preus and John Robinson.

2 See, for example, John Warwick Montgomery, “Lessons from Luther on the Inerrancy of Holy Writ,” in God’s Inerrant Word, ed. John Warwick Montgomery (Minneapolis: Bethany, 1974), p. 69.

3 See, for example, Jill Raitt, The Eucharistic Theology of Theodore Beza (Chambersburg: Pa., American Academy of Religion, 1972); John S. Bray, Theodore Beza’s Doctrine of Predestination (Nieuwkoop: De Graff, 1975); W. Robert Godfrey, “Tensions Within International Calvinism: The Debate on the Atonement at the Synod of Dort, 1618–1619,” Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1974.

4 Jack B. Rogers and Donald K. McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979).

5 D. Martin Luthers Werke, kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. J. F. K. Knaake et al. (Weimar, 1883–) (hereafter cited as WA), vol. 44, p. 510, cited by Willem Jan Kooiman, Luther and the Bible, (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1961), pp. 235–36.

6 Luther’s Works, edited by Jaroslav J. Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann, vol. 32 (Philadelphia: Fortress, and St. Louis: Concordia, 1955–) (hereafter cited as LW), p. 11, cited by Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), p. 6.

7 LW, 23, 236 cited by A. Skevington Wood Captive to the Word (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1969), p. 144.

8 WA, 40, iii, 254, cited by Wood, Captive to the Word, p. 143.

9 Ibid., ii, 52, cited by Wood, Captive to the Word, p. 145.

10 Cited by M. Reu, Luther and the Scriptures (Columbus, Ohio: Wartburg, 1944), p. 28.

11 Cited by Herman Sasse, This Is My Body: Luther’s Contention for the Real Presence in the Sacrament of the Altar (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1959), pp. 109–10.

12 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 79.

13 Ibid., p. 78.

14 Reinhold Seeberg, The History of Doctrines, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), p. 300.

15 Rogers and McKim, in a footnote (p. 133, n. 115), dismiss some of this secondary literature, particularly the work of M. Reu, by citing Otto Heick’s brief discussion of Luther on inerrancy in A History of Christian Thought, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1965), pp. 347–48. Heick’s list of errors parallels that of Seeberg. Heick does not offer any evidence for his rejection of Reu’s work. Reu was a recognized Luther scholar who carefully analyzed the context of Luther’s statements which allegedly ascribe errors to the Bible. Reu very convincingly shows that in context the kinds of references cited by Seeberg, Heick, and Rogers and McKim do not in fact show Luther ascribing any error to the Bible.

16 Althaus, Theology of Martin Luther, p. 6.

17 Wood, Captive to the Word, p. 144.

18 Reu, Luther and the Scriptures, pp. 65–76, 103. See also Montgomery, “Lessons from Luther,” pp. 88–90, for a review of Kooiman’s work; he generally praises it, but warns against some of his conclusions on the question of inerrancy.

19 LW, 22, 218–19.

20 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 87; Kooiman, Luther and the Bible, p. 228; Althaus, Theology of Martin Luther, p. 82.

21 LW, 22, 218.

22 Ibid., 219.

23 Cited by Reu, Luther and the Scriptures, p. 85.

24 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 88.

25 WA, 33, 144, cited by Kooiman, Luther and the Bible, p. 235.

26 John Calvin in Library of Christian Classics, vol. 23, p. 70 as cited by John H. Leith, “John Calvin—Theologian of the Bible,” Interpretation 25 (1971): p. 341.

27 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Library of Christian Classics, vols. 20 and 21 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960) (hereafter cited as Inst.), I, vii, 1.

28 Inst. IV, viii, 9.

29 Ibid., III, ii, 6.

30 John Calvin, Commentary on the Book of Psalms, vol. 4 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), p. 480.

31 John Calvin, New Testament Commentaries, ed. D. W. and T. F. Torrance, vol. 10 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), pp. 329–30. Calvin is not denying here the use of human authors of Scripture nor is he teaching a mechanical dictation theory of inspiration. He is saying that every part of Scripture is ultimately of divine origin and that every part is to be received as one would receive God Himself. He is rejecting any notion of human error in the Bible.

32 Corpus Reformatorum: Joannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. Guilielmus Baum et al., vol. 55 (Brunsvigae: Schwetschke, 1863–1897) (hereafter cited as CR), col. 441, cited by Leith, “John Calvin …,” p. 343.

33 Calvin, Comm. on Psalms, vol. 5, p. 20.

34 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 99.

35 Ibid., p. 108.

36 Ibid., p. 109

37 Ibid., p. 110.

38 Ibid., p. 112.

39 Ibid., p. 110.

40 Calvin, New Testament Commentaries, vol. 6, p. 182. That Luke cannot be the subject of the crucial clause is obvious from the Latin: “in nomine Abrahae erratum esse palam est” (CR, 26, Acts 7:16 ad loc.). The older translation also makes this clear: “It is manifest that there is a fault [mistake] in the word Abraham” (John Calvin, Commentary upon the Acts of the Apostles, vol. 1 [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979], p. 265). The source of Rogers and McKim’s quotation is unclear, since neither the newer nor the older English translations have it as they have cited it. Perhaps Rogers and McKim are depending on John T. McNeill’s statement, “In Acts 7:16 Luke has ‘made a manifest error’ …” (J. T. McNeill, “The Significance of the Word of God for Calvin,” Church History 28 [1959]: 143) although they do not cite that work at this place. If this is their source, Rogers and McKim have just repeated McNeill’s error.

41 Ibid., pp. 181–82.

42 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 116.

43 For other discussions of Calvin’s view of Scripture, see Kenneth Kantzer, “Calvin and the Holy Scriptures,” in Inspiration and Interpretation, ed. John F. Walvoord (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957); John Murray, Calvin on Scripture and Divine Sovereignty (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1960); J. I. Packer, “Calvin’s View of Scripture,” in God’s Inerrant Word, ed. J. W. Montgomery.

44 Leith, “John Calvin—Theologian,” pp. 337–38.

45 It is not clear what Leith has in mind when he refers to modern views of inerrancy. It is amazing how otherwise learned men can misunderstand the doctrine of inerrancy. John T. McNeill, an eminent Calvin scholar, is an example. He assumes that the doctrine of inerrancy is equivalent to an extreme, mechanical dictation theory of inspiration that allows no significant role for the human authors of Scripture. (See McNeill, “Significance,” pp. 139–40, and Inst. IV, viii, 9, n. 9.) But very few if any proponents of inerrancy have ever held such a view.

46 As in the case of Luther, Rogers and McKim wrongly attribute this dualism to Calvin (p. 111). Charles Partee shows how Calvin bound the pastoral and the scholarly, the functional and the formal, together in a quotation from Calvin: “None will ever be a good minister of the word of God except that he be a first-rate scholar” (cited by Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy [Leiden: Brill, 1977], p. 146).

47 John Calvin, Theological Treatises, trans. J. K. S. Reid (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1954), p. 130.

48 The French Confession of 1559, Article 5. This and all the following quotations from confessions or catechisms are from Philip Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977).

49 Belgic Confession, Article 4.

50 Ibid., Article 7.

51 Ibid., Article 5.

52 Zacharias Ursinus, The Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, trans. G. W. Williard (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), p. 108.

53 Ibid., p. 111.

54 Rogers and McKim, The Authority and Interpretation, pp. 200–202.

55 Rogers and McKim betray a fundamental misunderstanding when they simply say that “The Church of England stood between Roman Catholic and Protestant” (p. 200), an assessment that does not reflect the real Protestant theology of the Anglican church expressed in the Thirty-nine Articles, for example. So too they argue curiously that the English civil war retarded the growth of scholasticism (p. 247) when on the other hand they assert that scholasticism was triumphant on the continent long before the civil war.

56 At the Synod of Dort the English delegate Samuel Ward represented a Puritan perspective.

57 David Sabean, “The Theological Rationalism of Moise Amyraut,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 55 (1964): 213.

58 Ibid., p. 204.

59 William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, 3rd ed. and trans. J. D. Eusden (Boston: Pilgrim, 1968), p. 186.

60 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, chap. 3: “Concern for Literary Form in the Post-Reformation Period,” pp. 147–99.

61 This entire chapter of Rogers and McKim’s book needs a thorough review because it is not at all reliable as a guide in the matters it discusses. For example, their three paragraphs on the Synod of Dort (pp. 164–65) contain several errors. They speak of Dort producing a “confession,” but the Synod actually adopted only certain canons as the authoritative interpretation of some of the articles of the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. They claim that Dort “purported to define the essential elements of Calvinism,” but the Canons were never conceived of as more than specific Reformed answers to the five errors of Arminianism. They were never intended to be a summary of Calvinism in its essential elements. Rogers and McKim call the Synod hyper-Calvinist and scholastic, though even they admit that the moderate Calvinism of infralapsarianism was dominant at the Synod. Also the Canons were written clearly in pastoral and not scholastic language. Rogers and McKim assert that Dort fixed continental Reformed theology in a “scholastic mold” and offer as one piece of evidence the claim that Dort taught eternal reprobation while Calvin did not. But Calvin clearly teaches eternal reprobation, see Institutes, III, xxii, 11 and III, xxiii, 1, 3.

62 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 147.

63 Rogers and McKim have a strange insensitivity to the reality of historical threats to the authority of the Bible. This naïveté is also manifested in the remarkable judgments that they make in the introduction to their book. There (p. xxiii) they seem to underestimate the threat posed by modernism to biblical Christianity and see scholasticism as the principal threat to the Reformed tradition in America.

64 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, pp. 174–75. The only evidence offered to support this statement is that Turretin did not quote Calvin in his section on Scripture.

65 Rogers and McKim do not show any first-hand knowledge of Turretin’s Institutio. They appear to depend entirely on Leon McDill Allison, “The Doctrine of Scripture in the Theology of John Calvin and Francis Turretin,” a 1958 Th.M. thesis written at Princeton Theological Seminary. But even a cursory look at Turretin demonstrates serious problems with their characterization of Turretin.

66Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, pp. 176, 179, 182.

67 Francis Turretin, Institutio Theologiae Elenctiae, 1674, trans. George M. Griger, in a manuscript at Princeton Theological Seminary (hereafter cited as Inst. Theo.), II, 2, 9. (Since this chapter was written, an English translation on Scripture has been published: Francis Turretin, The Doctrine of Scripture, ed. and trans. John W. Beardslee III (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981).

68 Ibid., 4, 9.

69 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 176.

70 Inst. Theo., II, 4, 1 and II, 5, 1.

71 Ibid., 6, 5.

72 Ibid., 4, 6.

73 Ibid., 4, 7.

74 Ibid., 4, 8.

75 Ibid., 4, 9.

76 Inst., I, vii, 4.

77 Ibid, viii, 1.

78 Ibid., 3, 5, 12, 13.

79 Ibid., vii, 5.

80 Ibid., 2.

81 Ibid., viii, 1.

82 Inst. Theo., II, 4, 13. Rogers and McKim (p. 177) quote only part of this statement and give a distorted picture of Turretin’s position here.

83 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, pp. 176–77.

84 Ibid., pp. 174, 177.

85 Inst. Theo., II, 19, 18.

86 Ibid., 5, 11.

87 Rogers and McKim allege this in Authority and Interpretation, pp. 180–81.

88 Inst. Theo., II, 5, 3.

89 From Canon II of the Formula Consensus Helvetica as printed in A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology, enlarged ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1972), p. 656.

90 John Bowman, “A Forgotten Controversy,” The Evangelical Quarterly 20 (1948): 55.

91 Canon III, Formula Consensus Helvetica, in A. A. Hodge, p. 657.

92 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 177.

93 Inst. Theo., II, 19, 8.

94 Ibid., III, 10, 14.

95 Ibid., III, 11, 11.

96 Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 187.

97 Inst. Theo., I, 7, 2.

98 Ibid.                 

99 Ibid., 6.

If Jesus is the Jewish Messiah, why don’t more Jews believe in him? | Brown, M. L

If Jesus is the Jewish Messiah, why don’t more Jews believe in him?

Actually, there are tens of thousands of Jews who have believed and do believe in him. The problem is that most Jews have not bothered to check into the facts about Jesus, and the only Jesus most of them know is either the baby Jesus of Christmas, an emaciated figure hanging on a cross in churches, or the Jesus of the Crusades and Inquisitions. The question is, Why don’t you believe Jesus is the Messiah? Do you really know who he is?

I encourage you to consider the following points.

1. Most Jews have never seriously studied the issue. Many of those who have decided to find out who Jesus is have been quite surprised by what they have learned. The greatest scholars and scientists in the world once believed the earth was flat—until firsthand investigation and discovery altered their outlook. It’s the exact same thing with Jews who honestly investigate the Messianic claims of Jesus. Everything changes—to put it mildly.

2. If most religious Jews learn anything about Jesus in their traditional studies, it is quite biased and negative. 22 Thus, they do not entertain even the possibility of the messiahship of Jesus.

3. Many so-called Christians have committed atrocities against Jews in the name of Jesus, helping to drive Jews away from their true Messiah. (See below, 2.7, for more on this, along with my book Our Hands Are Stained with Blood.)

4. These same Christians have often put forth a distorted picture of Jesus that bears little resemblance to the real Messiah who walked the earth two thousand years ago. Can Jews be blamed for thinking that Christians worshiped idols when the churches were filled with worshipers bowing before large, beautiful statues depicting Jesus as a babe in his mother’s lap?

5. There is often great pressure on those Jews—especially religious Jews—who put their faith in Jesus the Messiah. Some succumb to the fear, the pressure, the intimidation, the separation, and the loneliness, and they deny with their lips what they know to be true in their hearts.

6. Traditional Jewish teaching gives a slanted portrayal of who the Messiah is and what he will do. Since the description is faulty, people are looking in the wrong direction for the wrong person. No wonder relatively few have found him.

7. Once a learned Jew does believe in Yeshua, he is discredited, and so his name is virtually removed from the rolls of history. It’s almost as if such people ceased to exist. (Do you remember reading the novel Animal Farm in school? Revisionist history goes on to this day—even in traditional Jewish circles.) The story of Max Wertheimer provides one case in point. In the last century, Wertheimer came to the States as an Orthodox Jew, but over the course of time, he became a Reform Jew and was ordained a rabbi upon graduating from Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati in 1889. (He also received a Ph.D. from the University of Cincinnati the same year.) He then served as the greatly loved rabbi of B’Nai Yeshurun synagogue in Dayton, Ohio, for the next ten years. When he became a fervent believer in Jesus, however, pastoring a church as well, his name was literally removed from the rolls of the school—a school of alleged tolerance at that. Why was his name dropped? According to Alfred A. Isaacs, cited in the November 25, 1955, edition of the National Jewish Post, Wertheimer was disowned by Hebrew Union College solely because of his Christian faith. 23 And to think, this happened in a “liberal” Reform Jewish institution!

8. Although this may be hard for you to accept, because our leadership rejected Jesus the Messiah when he came, God judged us as a people (just as he judged us as a people for rejecting his law and his prophets in previous generations), and as a result, our hearts have become especially hardened toward the concept of Jesus as Messiah. 24 Paul explained this in his important letter to the believers in Rome: “What Israel sought so earnestly it did not obtain, but the elect did. The others were hardened, as it is written: ‘God gave them a spirit of stupor, eyes so that they could not see and ears so that they could not hear, to this very day’ ” (Rom. 11:7–8; the quote here is taken from Deut. 29:4 in our Torah and Isa. 29:10 in our Prophets).

If you stop to think about it, isn’t it strange that as a people we have almost totally lost sight of the fact that Jesus-Yeshua is one of us, actually, the most influential Jew ever to walk the earth? 25 Yet most of us think of him as if he were some fair-skinned, blue-eyed European. The good news is that Israel’s hardening was only partial: There have always been Jews who followed Jesus the Messiah, and in the end, our people will turn back to him on a national scale. Paul explains this a few verses later:

I do not want you [Gentiles] to be ignorant of this mystery, brothers, so that you may not be conceited: Israel has experienced a hardening in part until the full number of the Gentiles has come in. And so all Israel will be saved, as it is written: “The deliverer will come from Zion; he will turn godlessness away from Jacob. And this is my covenant with them when I take away their sins.”

Romans 11:25–27; the quote is taken from Isaiah 59:20–21; 27:9; and Jeremiah 31:33–34, all in our Prophets

Hopefully, you will be one of those Jews who is determined to find out the truth about the Messiah right now, determining to follow him at any cost. In the end, you must decide for yourself, and the bottom line question is one that only you can answer: Why don’t you believe Jesus is our promised Messiah?

What if more Jews—including your rabbi—did believe in him? Would you? Of course, that wouldn’t change the facts. Either Jesus is or is not the Messiah of Israel. Public opinion can’t affect the truth. But many times, when people find out that it’s okay to hold to a certain opinion, they come out of the closet.

Maybe it would help you to know that many of us in Jewish work have spoken with Orthodox and even ultra-Orthodox Jews who have told us in private that they believe Jesus is the Messiah, but they are afraid to go public for fear of what could happen to them. Maybe if a number of these religious Jews—some of whom are rabbis—showed up one day on your doorstep and told you their views, it would get you to think seriously about the matter.

As we grow and mature—from infants to children to teens to adults—we find out that not everything we have been told is true. Sometimes we just have to learn for ourselves. And even as adults, we often have skewed perspectives on many things. Just look at what Democrats believe about Republicans (and vice versa) or what Palestinians believe about Israelis (and vice versa) or what Black Muslims believe about Jews (and vice versa). Our perspectives, opinions, and convictions are not always right—no matter how strenuously we argue for our position. Common sense tells us that all of us can’t be right about everything all the time.

Even on an interpersonal level, how often have you met someone only to find out that all the bad things you heard about that person were greatly exaggerated or false? It happens all the time. As for the matter at hand, I assure you in the strongest possible terms: As a Jew, most everything you have heard about Jesus has been untrue. You owe it to yourself to find out just who this Jesus really is—and I say this to you whether you are an ultra-Orthodox rabbi reading this book in secret or you are a thoroughly secular, wealthy Jewish businessman who was given this book by a friend.

This much is certain: We have carefully investigated the claims of Jesus and can testify firsthand that Yeshua is who he said he was. What do you say?

[1]

 

22 The infamous Rabbinic collection of anti-Jesus fables, called Toledot Yeshu, is still studied in some ultra-Orthodox circles, although virtually all other Jewish scholars have long since repudiated the Toledot. These scurrilous writings, based in part on some Talmudic references, accusing Mary of fathering Jesus through a Roman soldier (or by rape), and portraying Jesus as an idolater, magician, and Israel’s arch-deceiver, were the primary source of information about Jesus for many traditional Jews, especially in the Middle Ages. Of course, as noted by the Oxford Dictionary of Jewish Religion, ed. Geoffrey Wigoder (New York: Oxford, 1997), 695, “the work is an expression of vulgar polemics written in reaction to the no less vulgar attacks on Judaism in popular Christian teaching and writing.” But as I have stated before, just as many Gentiles around the world have had a biased and inaccurate view of the Jewish people, so also have many Jews had a biased and inaccurate view of Jesus, the Jewish Messiah. For a representative sampling from the Toledot, see the excellent study of Walter Riggans, Yeshua ben David: Why Do the Jewish People Reject Jesus as Their Messiah? (Crowborough, England: Marc, 1995), 127–32. Interested readers of this present volume would do well to read Riggans as well.

23 For more on this, see Nahum Brodt, “The Truth about the Rabbi,” in Would I? Would You?, ed. Henry and Marie Einspruch (Baltimore: Lederer, 1970), 8–10. For a fuller account of Wertheimer’s faith, see Jacob Gartenhaus, Famous Hebrew Christians (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 191–97.

24 This is not the first time in our history that God has hardened our hearts because we sinned against him. This is what God said to the prophet Isaiah more than twenty-five hundred years ago: “Go and tell this people: ‘Be ever hearing, but never understanding; be ever seeing, but never perceiving.’ Make the heart of this people calloused; make their ears dull and close their eyes. Otherwise they might see with their eyes, hear with their ears, understand with their hearts, and turn and be healed” (Isa. 6:9–10). The prophet was actually called to a ministry of hardening his people’s hearts! It was as if God were saying, “Fine. If you want to be hard-hearted, refusing to believe me or obey me, I will give you over to your hardness and make you even harder.” This is exactly what has happened to us regarding the Messiah: When so many of our people refused to follow him, God gave us over to our unbelief and obduracy to the point that through the centuries, we have become especially resistant to Jesus.

25 This well-known, anonymous tribute to Jesus, known as “One Solitary Life,” puts things in perspective: “He was born in an obscure village. He worked in a carpenter shop until He was thirty. He then became an itinerant preacher. He never held an office. He never had a family or owned a house. He didn’t go to college. He had no credentials but himself. He was only thirty-three when the public turned against him. His friends ran away. He was turned over to his enemies and went through the mockery of a trail. He was nailed to a cross between two thieves. While he was dying, his executioners gambled for his clothing, the only property he had on earth. He was laid in a borrowed grave. Nineteen centuries have come and gone, and today he is the central figure of the human race. All the armies that ever marched, all the navies that ever sailed, all the parliaments that ever sat, and all the kings that ever reigned have not affected the life of man on this earth as much as that one solitary life.”

[1]Brown, M. L. (2000). Answering Jewish objections to Jesus, Volume 1: General and historical objections. (21). Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books.

How Can One God Be Three?

How Can One God Be Three?

Speaking through the prophet Isaiah, God said, “My thoughts are not your thoughts, / Nor are your ways My ways … / For as the heavens are higher than the earth, / So are My ways higher than your ways, / And My thoughts than your thoughts” (Isa. 55:8–9). God is infinite, man is finite, so there are mysteries about God that man cannot fully understand. One of these mysteries is the Trinity, the tri-personality of God. According to Christian orthodoxy, God is one God in essence, power, and authority, and also eternally exists as three distinct co-equal persons. These three persons are the Father, the Son (Jesus), and the Holy Spirit. This does not mean that Christians believe in three gods (polytheism). Rather, the doctrine of the Trinity is that there is only one God who exists in three distinct persons, and all three share the exact same divine nature or essence.

Understanding this fully is beyond human comprehension and has no human parallels, although various analogies have been offered. One of these analogies is the three physical states of water. Water is not only a liquid but also a solid (ice) and a gas (vapor), yet its chemical composition (substance) never changes in all three forms (two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen—H2O). Although such analogies help us visualize the concept of the Trinity, they all fall short in some way. In the case of the water analogy, although the molecule H2O can be liquid, solid, or gas, it is never all three at one time. The Trinity, on the other hand, is all three persons as one God.

The word Trinity is not used in Scripture, but it has been adopted by theologians to summarize the biblical concept of God. Difficult as it is to understand, the Bible explicitly teaches the doctrine of the Trinity, and it deserves to be explained as clearly as possible, especially to non-Christians who find the concept a stumbling-block to belief. So let’s dig into this topic by addressing four key questions.

IS THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IRRATIONAL?

The doctrine of the Trinity is certainly a mystery but that doesn’t mean it’s irrational. The concept cannot be known by human reason apart from divine revelation, and, as we’ll soon see, the Bible definitely supports the idea of the Trinity. But for now, I want to demonstrate that the doctrine of the Trinity, although beyond human comprehension, is nevertheless rational. Our acceptance of it is congruous with how we respond to other data about the known world.

There are many things about the universe we don’t understand today and yet accept at face value simply because of the preponderance of evidence supporting their existence. The scientific method demands that empirical evidence be accepted whether or not science understands why it exists or how it operates. The scientific method does not require that all data be explained before it is accepted.

Contemporary physics, for instance, has discovered an apparent paradox in the nature of light. Depending on what kind of test one applies (both of them “equally sound”), light appears as either undulatory (wave-like) or corpuscular (particle-like). This is a problem. Light particles have mass, while light waves do not. How can light have mass and not have it, apparently at the same time? Scientists can’t yet explain this phenomenon, but neither do they reject one form of light in favor of the other, nor do they reject that light exists at all. Instead, they accept what they’ve found based on the evidence and press on.

Like physicists, we are no more able to explain the mechanics of the Trinity than they can explain the apparent paradox in the nature of light. In both cases, the evidence is clear that each exists and harbors mystery. So we must simply accept the facts and move on. Just because we cannot explain the Trinity, how it can exist, or how it operates does not mean that the doctrine must be rejected, so long as sufficient evidence exists for its reality. So let’s now explore this evidence.

HOW DOES THE BIBLE PRESENT THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY?

THE OLD TESTAMENT

Although the doctrine of the Trinity is fully revealed in the New Testament, its roots can be found in the Old Testament.

In several places, God refers to Himself in plural terms. For example, “Then God said, ‘Let Us make man in Our image’” (Gen. 1:26; see 3:22; 11:7; Isa. 6:8).

The Messiah was prophesied in the Old Testament as being divine. Isaiah 9:6 states that the Messiah will be called “Mighty God,” a term applied in the Old Testament specifically to Yahweh (see Mic. 5:2).

Isaiah 48:16 refers to all three members of the Godhead: “Come near to Me, listen to this: From the first I have not spoken in secret, from the time it took place, I was there. And now the Lord God [Father] has sent Me [Jesus], and His Spirit [the Holy Spirit]” (nasv).

The Old Testament also makes numerous references to the Holy Spirit in contexts conveying His deity (Gen. 1:2; Neh. 9:20; Ps. 139:7; Isa. 63:10–14).

THE NEW TESTAMENT

The New Testament provides the most extensive and clear material on the Trinity. Here are just a few of the texts that mention all three members of the Godhead and imply their co-equal status.

•     Matthew 28:19, the baptismal formula: “Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name [not ‘names’] of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.”

•     Matthew 3:16, at the baptism of Christ in the Jordan: “And after being baptized, Jesus went up immediately from the water; and behold, the heavens were opened, and He saw the Spirit [Holy Spirit] of God [Father] descending as a dove, and coming upon Him [Jesus]” (nasv).

•     Luke 1:35, the prophetic announcement to Mary of Jesus’ birth: “And the angel answered and said to her, ‘The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Highest [Father] will overshadow you; therefore, also, that Holy One who is to be born will be called the Son of God [Jesus].’”

•     The trinitarian formula is also found in 1 Peter 1:2, 2 Corinthians 13:14, and 1 Corinthians 12:4–6.

DIGGING DEEPER

To explain the doctrine of the Trinity, I will take an inductive (scientific) approach. By this I mean I will accumulate general facts in Scripture that lead to a specific conclusion—that the nature of God is triune. The argument will go like this:

1. The Bible teaches that God is one (monotheism) and that He possesses certain attributes that only God can have.

2. Yet when we study the attributes of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we discover that all three possess the identical attributes of deity.

3. Thus we can conclude that there is one God eternally existing as three distinct persons.

God Is One (Monotheism)

The Hebrew Shema of the Old Testament is “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one!” (Deut. 6:4; see Isa. 43:10; 44:6; 46:9). Some people have argued that this passage actually refutes the concept of the triune nature of God because it states that God is one. But the Hebrew word for “one” in this text is echod, which carries the meaning of unity in plurality. It is the same word used to describe Adam and Eve becoming “one flesh” (Gen. 2:24). Scripture is not affirming that Adam and Eve literally become one person upon marriage. Rather, they are distinct persons who unite in a permanent relationship.

The New Testament confirms the teaching of the Old: “You believe that God is one. You do well; the demons also believe, and shudder” (James 2:19, nasv; see 1 Tim. 2:5; 1 Cor. 8:4; Eph. 4:4–6).

God Has a Certain Nature

Both the Old and New Testaments list the attributes of God. We won’t consider all of them here, but what follows are some of the clearest expressions of what constitutes deity.

•     God is omnipresent (present everywhere at once): Psalm 139:7–10; Jeremiah 23:23–24.

•     God is omniscient (possesses infinite knowledge): Psalms 139:1–4; 147:4–5; Hebrews 4:13; 1 John 3:20.

•     God is omnipotent (all-powerful): Psalm 139:13–18; Jeremiah 32:17; Matthew 19:26.

The Father Is God

To the Jews, who do not accept the Trinity, God is Yahweh. In the Old Testament, Yahweh is to the Hebrews what Father is in the New Testament and to Christians. The attributes of God (Yahweh) listed above are the same for Yahweh and Father because both names apply to the one God. Although the concept of God as Father is not as explicit in the Old Testament as it is in the New, nevertheless, it has its roots in the Old (see Pss. 89:26; 68:5; 103:13; Prov. 3:12).

In the New Testament, the concept of the Father as a distinct person in the Godhead becomes clear (Mark 14:36; 1 Cor. 8:6; Gal. 1:1; Phil. 2:11; 1 Pet. 1:2; 2 Pet. 1:17). God is viewed as Father over creation (Acts 17:24–29), the nation of Israel (Rom. 9:4; see Exod. 4:22), the Lord Jesus Christ (Matt. 3:17), and all who believe in Jesus as Lord and Savior (Gal. 3:26).

The Son Is God

Like the Father, Jesus possesses the attributes of God. He is omnipresent (Matt. 18:20; 28:20). He is also omniscient: He knows people’s thoughts (Matt. 12:25), their secrets (John 4:29), the future (Matt. 24:24–25), indeed all things (John 16:30; 21:17). His omnipotence is also taught. He has all power over creation (John 1:3; Col. 1:16), death (John 5:25–29; 6:39), nature (Mark 4:41; Matt. 21:19), demons (Mark 5:11–15), and diseases (Luke 4:38–41).

In addition to these characteristics, Jesus exhibits other attributes that the Bible acknowledges as belonging only to God. For example, He preexisted with the Father from all eternity (John 1:1–2), accepted worship (Matt. 14:33), forgave sins (Matt. 9:2), and was sinless (John 8:46).

The Holy Spirit Is God

The Holy Spirit is also omnipresent (Ps. 139:7–10), omniscient (1 Cor. 2:10), and omnipotent (Luke 1:35; Job 33:4).

Like Jesus, the Holy Spirit exhibits other divine attributes that the Bible ascribes to God. For instance, He was involved in creation (Gen. 1:2; Ps. 104:30), inspired the authorship of the Bible (2 Pet. 1:21), raised people from the dead (Rom. 8:11), and is called God (Acts 5:3–4).

The upshot of all this is that God is triune. In a formal argument, we can put it this way:

Major Premise:

Only God is omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent.

Minor Premise:

The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent.

Conclusion:

Therefore, God is triune as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

THE TRINITY

HOW DOES JESUS TEACH THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY?

In the Bible, Jesus claims to be God and then demonstrates this claim by displaying the attributes of God and by raising Himself from the dead. So what Jesus has to say about God must be true. And Jesus clearly teaches that God is triune.

Jesus Is Equal with the Father and Holy Spirit

In Matthew 28:19, Jesus tells His followers to “make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” He uses the singular word name but associates it with three persons. The implication is that the one God is eternally three co-equal persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Jesus Is One with the Father

In John 14:7 and 9, Jesus identifies Himself with the Father by saying to His disciples, “If you had known Me, you would have known My Father also; and from now on you know Him and have seen Him … He who has seen Me has seen the Father” (see John 5:18). Jesus is not claiming to be the Father; rather, He is saying that He is one with the Father in essence.

Jesus Is One with the Holy Spirit

Continuing in John 14, Jesus tells His disciples that, after He is gone, He will send them “another Helper” who will be with them forever and will indwell them (vv. 16–17). The “Helper” is the Holy Spirit. The trinitarian implication lies with the word another. The apostle John, as he wrote this passage, could have chosen one of two Greek words for another. Heteros denotes “another of a different kind,” while allos denotes “another of the same kind as myself.” The word chosen by John was allos, clearly linking Jesus in substance with the Holy Spirit, just as He is linked in substance with the Father in verses 7 and 9. In other words, the coming Holy Spirit will be a different person than Jesus, but He will be the same with Him in divine essence just as Jesus and the Father are different persons but one in their essential nature. Thus, in this passage, Jesus teaches the doctrine of the Trinity.

So far we have seen that the authors of Scripture and Jesus Christ teach the triune nature of God. Therefore, the only way the doctrine of the Trinity can be rejected is if one refuses to accept the biblical evidence. Some groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, do this by reinterpreting and altering Scripture. Others, such as the Unitarians (who claim that Jesus is just a man), arbitrarily and without any evidence deny anything supernatural or miraculous in the Bible. Both the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unitarians are guilty of the very same thing of which they accuse Christians—irrationality. They refuse to accept the evidence for the Trinity regardless of how legitimate it is. This is unscientific and irrational. If one approaches Scripture without bias, he will clearly discover what the church has maintained for centuries: God is triune—one God in essence but eternally existing in three persons as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

A COMMON OBJECTION

Perhaps you’ve wondered or heard someone say, “If Jesus is one in essence with the Father, an equal member of the triune Godhead, why does He say, ‘the Father is greater than I’” (John 14:28)? This question actually moves away from the doctrine of the Trinity and launches us into the doctrine of the incarnation, the process whereby Jesus, as the eternal Son of God, came to earth as man. Nevertheless, because this question is frequently raised as an objection, it needs to be answered.

Numerous passages in Scripture teach that Jesus, although fully God, is also fully man (John 1:14; Rom. 8:3; Col. 2:9; 1 Tim. 3:16). However, Philippians 2:5–8 states that, in the process of taking on humanity, Jesus did not give up any of His divine attributes. Rather, He gave up His divine glory (see John 17:5) and voluntarily chose to withhold or restrain the full use of His divine attributes. There are numerous instances in Scripture where Jesus, although in human form, exhibits the attributes of deity. If Jesus had surrendered any of His divine attributes when He came to earth, He would not have been fully God and thus could not have revealed the Father as He claimed to do (John 14:7, 9).

The key to understanding passages such as John 14:28 is that Jesus, like the Father and the Holy Spirit, has a particular position in the triune Godhead. Jesus is called the Son of God, not as an expression of physical birth, but as an expression of His position in relationship to the Father and Holy Spirit. This in no way distracts from His equality with the Father and the Holy Spirit or with His membership in the Godhead. As man, Jesus submits to the Father and acts in accordance to the Father’s will (see John 5:19, 30; 6:38; 8:28). So when we read passages such as Mark 14:36 where Jesus submits to the Father’s will, His submission has nothing to do with His divine essence, power, or authority, only with His position as the Incarnate Son.

Perhaps an illustration will help to explain this. Three people decide to pool their money equally and start a corporation. Each are equal owners of the corporation, but one owner becomes president, another vice-president, and the third secretary/treasurer. Each are completely equal so far as ownership, yet each has his own particular function to perform within the corporation. The president is the corporate head, and the vice-president and secretary/treasurer are submissive to his authority and carry out his bidding.

So when Jesus the God-man submits to the Father’s will or states that the Father is greater than He or that certain facts are known only by the Father (e.g., Matt. 24:36), it does not mean that He is less than the other members of the Godhead but that in His incarnate state He did and knew only that which was according to the Father’s will. The Father did not will that Jesus have certain knowledge while in human form. Because Jesus voluntarily restrained the full use of His divine attributes, He was submissive to the Father’s will.

Why did Jesus choose to hold back from fully using His divine powers? For our sake. God willed that Jesus feel the full weight of man’s sin and its consequences. Because Jesus was fully man, He could fulfill the requirements of an acceptable sacrifice for our sins. Only a man could die for the sins of mankind. Only a sinless man could be an acceptable sacrifice to God. And it is only because Jesus is an equal member of the triune Godhead, and thus fully God, that He was able to raise Himself from the dead after dying on the cross and thereby guarantee our eternal life.

When all the evidence is accounted for and the verdict read, the Bible clearly teaches that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three distinct, co-equal, co-eternal members of the Godhead, yet one in essence, power, and authority. All three are one God. Were this not the case, if the Trinity were not a reality, there would be no Christianity.

[1]

 

 

[1]Story, D. (1997). Defending your faith. Originally published: Nashville : T. Nelson, c1992. (99). Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications.

The Treasures of Coptic Art in the Coptic Museum and Churches of Old Cairo Hardcover – Dr. Gawdat Gabra

The Treasures of Coptic Art in the Coptic Museum and Churches of Old Cairo Hardcover – Dr. Gawdat Gabra

 

 

Egypt’s Coptic Church is one of the oldest in the world, with a cultural tradition dating back two millennia, during which time churches have been built and a variety of distinctive art forms have flourished. The world’s largest and most exquisite collection of Coptic artifacts is now housed in the Coptic Museum, founded in Old Cairo in 1908. Here for the first time, in this lavishly illustrated book, more than one hundred of the greatest treasures of the Coptic Museum have been beautifully photographed to present an overview of this rich artistic heritage. Objects from churches and monasteries across Egypt include some of the finest examples of Coptic icons, stelae, sculptures, wall paintings, wooden altar screens, metal crosses, censers, liturgical implements and vestments, chandeliers, and bible caskets. Besides being objects of great craftsmanship and beauty, these artifacts, which range in date from the third to the nineteenth centuries, represent indispensable material for the study of the origins and development of Coptic art, as well as its relations with the ancient Egyptian, Byzantine, and Islamic traditions. Textiles, ceramics, terracotta, ivory and bone carvings, and documents (including the famous Nag Hammadi Gnostic library from the fourth century, one of the most valuable collections of papyri in the world) provide invaluable insights into the economic and social life of Egypt over the past two thousand years. In addition to objects from the Coptic Museum, this book also includes photographs of surrounding churches, some of Egypt’s oldest, that illustrate the architectural legacy of the Copts. The accompanying text and captions provide a description of Coptic civilization in general and Coptic art in particular.

 

 

Dr. Gawdat Gabra

Dr. Gawdat Gabra is an independent scholar specializing in Coptic studies, and former director of the Coptic Museum in Cairo (1985). He is also a member of the board of the Society of Coptic Archaeology and chief editor for the St. Mark Foundation for Coptic History Studies 

He is the author and editor of numerous books related to the literary and material culture of Egyptian Christianity, including Coptic Monasteries: Egypt’s Monastic Art and Architecture and Christian Egypt: Coptic Art and Monuments through Two Millennia (both AUC Press 2002). He is also the co-editor of the three volumes of The Popes of Egypt (vol. I: AUC Press, 2004
 
Dr Gabra was born in Luxor, Egypt, but spend a great deal of his childhood in Aswan. He subsequently gained his LIC in Egyptian Antiquities at Cairo University in 1967, obtaining his PhD in Coptic Antiquities at Munster University, Germany.

Gawdat is currently resident in Southern California and a visiting lecturer at Claremont Graduate University.

 

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The Rabbinic Messiah By: Rev. Tom Huckel

 
 The Rabbinic Messiah
 
The Rabbinic Messiah

 

 
Braude, William G. The Midrash on Psalms. Two Volumes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
Braude, William G. and Israel J. Kapstein. Pəsiqtâ də-Raḇ Kahănâ. 2nd ed., Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1978.
Danby, Herbert, D.D. The Mishnah. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933; reprint, Thetford, Norfolk: Lowe and Brydone Printers Limited, 1980.
Epstein, Rabbi Dr. I., ed. The Babylonian Talmud. 4th ed., London: The Soncino Press, 1978.
Freedman, Rabbi Dr. H., B.A., Ph.D. Midrash Rabbah. trans. by Rabbi Dr. H. Freedman B.A., Ph.D. and Maurice Simon, M.A., 3rd ed., New York: The Soncino Press, 1983.
Hammer, Reuven. Sifre A Tannaitic Commentary on the Book of Deuteronomy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
Klausner, Joseph, Ph.D. The Messianic Idea in Israel. trans. by W. F. Stinespring, Ph.D., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955.
Landman, Leo. Messianism in the Talmudic Era. New York: KTAV Publishing House, Inc., 1979.
Levertoff, Rev. Paul P. Midrash Sifre on Numbers. London: The Macmillan Co., 1926.
Levey, Samson H. The Messiah: An Aramaic Interpretation The Messianic Exegesis of the Targum. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1974.
Neusner, Jacob Messiah in Context. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984.
Visotzky, Burton L. The Midrash on Proverbs. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
 
Introduction
 
Rabbinic Messiah is a collection of traditional Jewish Messianic belief quotes, as proclamated by the Rabbis down through the centuries. The quotes are taken from the most commonly used Jewish literature resources. These Messianic belief statements are arranged in canonical order, i.e. according to the traditional Canon of the Christian Bible. Since this is simply a collection of the quotes themselves with very little commentary by the author (only where he felt it was needed), this work then can be a helpful reference tool that can be useful to both Jewish and Christian scholars alike.
The author intends to add additional references in the future. He also hopes to compile a summarized portrait of the Jewish Messiah and the Messianic Era by gathering these texts into a unified picture.
I trust that you will find this tool a help in your Bible and Messianic studies.
 
Rev. Tom Huckel,
Director of Hananeel House
PO Box 11527
Philadelphia, Pa. 19116-0527

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